as a difpenfation in the mother country might be-But that is not now the question. The test act is part of their law, because it is applicable to their fituation; and if it was not, the conftitution, nay the dominion of the island may be foon changed, and that is of fome confequence to the nation, as it is of the very greatest to the inhabitants of Grenada. Having mentioned the tye of natural affection to a man's native country, the fenfe of the legiflature of Great Britain on this fubject may be here very aptly mentioned; fo ftrongly were our ancestors impreffed with it, that in the 12th and 13th years of King William the IIId. they paffed "An act to prevent dangers that might arife to the Kingdom from foreign attachments, connections, and dependencies", which enacted, That no Alien born out of the dominions of the crown. of Great Britain, even though he be naturalized, fhould be capable of being a member of parliament. And by a fubfequent tatute, No bill can be received in either house of parliament without a claufe to disable the person who is to receive the benefit of it from being a member of the privy council, member of parliament, or to take any office, or place of truft, civil or military, or to hold lands, tenements, or hereditaments under the crown, by himself, or by any in truft for him; 1ft. Geo. I. chap. 4th. Before I conclude thefe obfervations upon their lordships reafons against this act, allow me to add, that it must appear very extraordinary to every natural-born subject in the British dominions, to hear that this matter of the teft fhould be made an objection to the act. How his Majefty's new fubjects, formerly fubjects of the French King, became entitled to all the privileges of British natural-born fubjects, fhall not be the fubject of enquiry here, (tho it may probably fome day or other receive a legal difcuffion and determination elfewhere) but furely it is but very lately that they have afpired to the privileges which have been actually conferred on them. They made no fuch ftipulations at the conqueft of the island for themselves on the event of the ceffion of the island to the crown of Great Britain. The moft Chriftian King made no fuch ftipulations for them when the treaty of Paris was negociated. All that he asked in favour of them, all that the King of Great Britain granted, is contained in the following words:

9th Article of the late Definitive treaty.

The moft Chriftian King cedes and guaranties to his Britannic Majefty in full right, the islands of Grenada and the Grenadines, with the fame ftipulations in favour of the inhabitants of this Colony inferted in the 4th article for those of Canada."

Stipulation in the 4th Article for the Canadians.

"His Britannic Majefty on his fide agrees to grant the liberty of the Catholic religion to the inhabitants of Canada, he will confequently give the most effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic fubjects may profefs the worship of their religion according to the rites of the Romish Church, as far as the laws of Great Britain will permit".

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From hence it evidently appears, that the contracting power their agents and ambassadors, meant no more than that these people should enjoy the free exercife of their religion as far as the Jaws of Great Britain would permit. And this faving claufe fufficiently fhews the sense of the King and every perfon concerned in advifing the ratification or approbation of that treaty, as to what laws we fhould be governed by, and that thofe againft Roman Catholicks in Great Britain, as far as they could be applied here, were to be admitted.

Another matter of furprize is, that the ordinance for calling the firft affembly was paffed in Grenada the ioth of February, 1766, and immediately after transmitted home by the Governor. This ordinance received the approbation of Government, and yet there is in it, befides requiring the members to fubícribe this odious teft the following provifion-Surely much more unfavourable to the favourites than any thing in the act now reported againft.

Provided always that the faid candidate be a white perfon, and a proteftant natural-born or naturalized fubject, &c. &c."

But what furprizes moft is, that their lordships, who are in fome measure to fit in judgment upon the laws of all the colonies, by which many millions of their fellow fubjects are to be governed, fhould in their advice and report to the Sovereign, deliver doctrines and opinions of fo flavish a tendency that in the latitude they have laid them down- -The inhabitants of Grenada are placed fo much in the power of the Crown, that in fome more arbitrary reign, and when a minifter may take it in his head to think that Colonies of black People will be a vaft acquifition to the Mother Country, they may be commanded to educate their flaves, and then chufe them for their Representatives Nor is this idea fo chimerical or abfurd- They may be even commanded by the fame prerogative to chufe them uneducated and uninformed. Their lordships love of liberty will be estimated by the share they have dealt out to the Colonies.

To the Editor of the Political Regifter.

On the Effect of Bribery and Corruption upon the CONSTITUTION.

A

man of retirement, whilft his converfation is with the dead, and his ftudy for improvement-the records of ages paft, would be apt to conclude, that minifters of state, if they are above taking advice, would for their own fakes, at least take warning. But, when he comes out into the world to converfe with the living, experience will foon convince him of his mistake. He will find, the fame follies, the fame vices, are as regular in their revolutions among men in power, as the planets in their orbits. And that all their study of law and hiftory, has availed only to teach them tricks inftead of wifdom. Ambition, like a public robber, is too bold an adventurer to be checked by the precepts of virtue, or examples of punishment.

It is not neceffary to fay, the prefent fet are worfe than their predeceffors. It is reflection enough, to fuppofe they are no better. In one thing they perfectly agree; which is, that, when they have done their worst, they have their tools in pay ready enough to commend, what themselves cannot justify.

The writers for the prefent miniftry are fo well matched, that, though their talents are various, their felf-confiftency and modefty are exactly the fame. Silurus, with a lie in his mouth, warneth his reader of the meannefs, folly, and depravity of lying. Philo Britanniæ, in the midft of his own mifreprefentation. fcandal and' abuse, prayeth for fair argument, truth, justice and public good. And at last, Creon, in his great anxiety for the welfare of the conftitution, recommendeth bribery and corruption as the only means to fupport it. Unhappily for Creon (whole penfion is well known) he has in this very inftance, warned the public, by his own example, to what a degree of depravity bribery will reduce a man of fome underftanding. But, as Creon has fhewn his defire to speak for himself, let him be heard.

"The influence which the crown is known to poffefs with the two inferior branches of the legislature, is neceffary, and will be permanent."

If Creon intends to be understood, it will be expedient for him to inform us, what legislature he is here fpeaking of. The British conftitution knows no inferior branches of the legislature. The three eftates, King, Lords, and Commons, are upon an equality as legiflators, and each eftate is, by the conftitution, invefted with its diftinct and feparate rights, privileges and powers, for the very purpose of fupporting that equality and independence, which is neceffary to preferve the check and counterpoife to each other, upon which our fecurity depends; and, when loft, our constitution will go with it. If, by the two inferior branches of the legiflature, Creon means the house of lords, and the house of commons, of Great Britain, he has offered the most daring infult to both houses, that can well be conceived; and how he can exculpate himself, when called to account for it, is worth his while to confider.

After taking fome pains to fupport his favourite paradox, that the legislative power ought, and must be dependent upon the executive, Creon tells us,

"Should they, by any means be rendered independent, our conftitution would, from that moment, cease to exist."

I with Creon would tell us what conftitution he has in view, the fupport of which depends upon reverfing the nature of things. In all conftitutions of government that now exift, or ever did exift, the legislative authority is, and muft be, fupreme, and the executive power fubject to it, and limited by it. We all know that, in Great Britain, the fupreme executor at his coronation binds himself in a folemn coutract, confirmed by an oath, to this fubjection. To talk of the legislative power, in a limitted government, being dependent upon the executive, is highly ab

furd:

fard: becaufe, in that cafe, it would no longer remain a limited government, but become, to all intents and purposes, an abfolute monarchy. If that is the fpecies of government Creon is fond of, he has nothing to do, but to cross the channel from Dover to Calais, and fecure his property, as well as he can, under a government to his own tafte, leave us in peace, and carry his nonfenfe with him.

The independence of the parliament upon the crown, is effential to our coftitution. It is the main pillar that fupports our rights and liberties. If a minifter of ftate will be hardy enough to try his ftrength to pull it down, he may fucced in the attempt; the building may fall; but, like Sampfon, he himself will certainly be buried in the ruins. Every attempt to remove this independence, is an overt act of treason against the state.

The power which, by our conftitution, the King is invefted with, as a third part of the legislature, and fupreme executive, is as great as a wife and good King can wish for or defire, and will anfwer all the purpose of fupporting the welfare and profperity of his people. A King of Great Britain, who will be content with that, and employ it for the prefervation of the conftitution against the encroachment of his minifters, would be the greatest monarch upon earth. The hearts and purfes of his fubjects will be open to him, whenever his own defence, or their good, call for it.

But, what is enough for a King, will feldom fatisfy an hungry minifter of State, who has generally views of his own, inconfiftent with his Sovereign's honour and dignity, and the profperity of his people; and if his Sovereign intrufts his own power with his minifter, he may be very fure of having it abufed.

Many attempts have been made to deftroy this civil balance of our conftitution, by grafping at a monopoly of the fupreme power. This was the aim of wicked or weak Kings before the revolution, and has been the favourite bufinefs of minifters of ftate ever fince.

This was at first attempted by open violence, but with fo little fuccefs, that it coft one King his head, and another his crown; which produced the well known aphorifm, that England cannot be ruined, but by a parliament.

Charles the fecond, who was more artful, but not more honest, than the rest of his family, availed himself of this maxim, and endeavoured to accomplish the fame end by bribery and corruption, which his father had failed to obtain by open force. When his grandfather was told that he made the judges and the bishops, he replied, Then godfwaans, I's mak what pleases me to be law and gofpel." But Charles had a mind to try whether he could not go a ftep further, and mak parliaments alfo; for "Then he could mak what pleased him to be the conftitution." All places in his difpofal were beftowed upon fuch members of parliament, as engaged to enact his will into a law; and, when places failed, penfions were to fupply the defect. But, at last, Charles found, that he had undertaken to make bricks without ftraw. He had not places enough to create a fufficient number of friends in parliament;

liament; and his extravagance upon his whores and pleafures fo reduced his finances, that, notwithstanding the affiftance of France, penfions failed alfo. With all his bribes, promifes and threatenings among the electors, he could not prevent the choice of that worthy reprefentative of the commons, which would grant no money without a previous redrefs of grievances.

It is generally allowed, that, in bribery, Charles was an œconomift, and made his money go as far as he could. It was to the want of places and money to beftow, that we owe our escape from the trap that was then laid for us, and faved our conftitution, by the remaining integrity of our reprefentatives.

Our prefent ministers cannot lament the want of places, to gratify their friends in parliament. If they have any thing to complain of, it must be the rife in the value of the purchase; and yet, perhaps, this is not fo much owing to the unwillingness of the feller to deal, as to the receflity of the purchafer to buy. In Charles the fecond's reign, one houfand pounds principal money, would have purchased as good a fpeech and vote, as three thoufand pounds per annum will now, fince the number of places have been fo greatly multiplied, and their value increased, partly by the public neceffity of borrowing, and partly by the ministerial neceffity of bribing, the luxury of corruption is grown enormous; but, fo little does this affect our prefent managers, that fmall penfions, and occafional pay, are fuffered to be licked up as the crumbs that fall from their mafter's table.

But, to be ferious, On the very day that a monopoly of the legislative power fhall fall into the hands of the executive (whether brought about by force, or bribery) the British conftitutitution will be no more. This catastrophe is fo fenfibly reprefented by Mr. Locke, in his treatise upon government, that I must beg leave to quote him here.

After having obferved, that governments are diffolved, when the legislature, or the prince, either of them act contrary to their truft, he adds,

"The fupreme executor acts contrary to his truft, when he employs the force, treafure, and offices of the fociety, to corrupt the reprefentatives, and gain them to his purpofes: when he openly pre-engages the electors, and prefcribes to their choice, fuch whom he has by folicitations, threats, or otherwife won to his defigns; and employs them to bring in fuch, who have promised beforehand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poifon the very fountain of public fecurity? For the people having referved to themselves the choice of their reprefentatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chofen, and fo chofen, freely act and advife, as the neceffity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination and mature debate, be judged to require. This, thofe who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the

reafons