grammatical. "The different fignifications of a word (he observes) are indeed collected; but they are feldom digested into general "claffes, or ranged under the meaning which the word principally expreffes: And fufficient care is not taken to diftinguish the "words apparently fynonymous." To illuftrate this criticism, he copies from Dr. JOHNSON the articles BUT and HUMOUR, and opposes to them the fame articles digested agreeably to his own idea. The various fignifications of the word BUT are very nicely and happily discriminated. The other article does not seem to have been executed with equal care.

The obfervations on the ftate of learning in Europe are written with ingenuity and elegance; but are chiefly interesting, as they shew the attention which the Author had given to the philosophy and literature of the Continent, at a period when they were not much studied in this ifland.

In the fame volume with the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mr. SMITH published a Differtation " on the Origin of Languages, and on the different Genius of those which are original and compounded." The remarks I have to offer on thefe two difcourfes, I fhall, for the fake of diftinctnefs, make the fubject of a separate fection.

SECTION II.

Of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the Differtation on the Origin of Languages.

HE fcience of Ethics has been divided by modern writers into

THE

two parts; the one comprehending the theory of Morals, and the other its practical doctrines. The questions about which the former is employed, are chiefly the two following. First, By what principle of our conftitution are we led to form the notion of moral distinctions ;-whether by that faculty which perceives the diftinction between truth and falfehood; or by a peculiar power of perception, which is pleafed with one fet of qualities, and difpleafed with another? Secondly, What is the proper object of moral approbation; or, in other words, What is the common quality or quali ties belonging to all the different modes of virtue? Is it benevolence; or a rational felf-love; or a difpofition to act fuitably to the different relations in which we are placed? Thefe two queftions feem to exhaust the whole theory of Morals. The fcope of the one is to afcertain the origin of our moral ideas; that of the other, to refer the phenomena of moral perception to their moft fimple and general laws.

The practical doctrines of morality comprehend all those rules of conduct which profefs to point out the proper ends of humanpursuit, and the most effectual means of attaining them; to which we may add all thofe literary compofitions, whatever be their particular form, which have for their aim to fortify and animate our good difpofitions, by delineations of the beauty, of the dignity, or of the utility of Virtue.

I fhall not enquire at prefent into the juftness of this divifion. I fhall only observe, that the words Theory and Practice are not,

in this inftance, employed in their usual acceptations. The theory of Morals does not bear, for example, the fame relation to the practice of Morals, that the theory of geometry bears to practical geometry. In this laft fcience, all the practical rules are founded on theoretical principles previously established: But in the former fcience, the practical rules are obvious to the capacities of all mankind; the theoretical principles form one of the most difficult fubjects of dif cuffion that have ever exercised the ingenuity of metaphyficians.

In illustrating the doctrines of practical morality, (if we make allowance for fome unfortunate prejudices produced or encouraged by violent and oppreffive fyftems of policy,) the antients feem to have availed themielves of every light furnished by nature to human reafon; and indeed those writers who, in later times, have treated the fubject with the greatest fuccefs, are they who have followed most closely the footsteps of the Greek and the Roman philofophers. The theoretical question, too, concerning the effence of virtue, or the proper object of moral approbation, was a favourite topic of difcuffion in the ancient schools. The queftion concerning the principle of moral approbation, though not entirely of modern origin, has been chiefly agitated fince the writings of Dr. CUDWORTH, in oppofition to thofe of Mr. HOBBES; and it is this queftion accordingly, (recommended, at once, by its novelty and difficulty to the curiofity of fpeculative men,) that has produced most of the theories which characterise and diftinguish from each other the later systems of moral philosophy....

It was the opinion of Dr. CuDWORTH, and also of Dr. CLARKE, that moral diftinctions are perceived by that power of the mind which distinguishes truth from falfehood. This fyftem it was one great object of Dr. HUTCHESON's philofophy to refute, and'in oppofition to it, to fhew that the words Right and Wrong exprefs

certain

certain agreeable and difagreeable qualities in actions, which it is not the province of reafon but of feeling to perceive; and to that power of perception which renders us fufceptible of pleasure or of pain from the view of virtue or of vice, he gave the name of the Moral Senfe. His reafonings upon this fubject are in the main acquiefced in, both by Mr. HUME and Mr. SMITH; but they differ from him in one important particular,-Dr. HUTCHESON plainly fuppofing, that the moral fenfe is a fimple principle of our conftitution, of which no account can be given; whereas the other two philofophers have both attempted to analyse it into other principles more general. Their fyftems, however, with respect to it are very different from each other. According to Mr. HUME, all the qualities which are denominated virtuous, are useful either to ourfelves or to others, and the pleasure which we derive from the view of thèm is the pleasure of utility. Mr. SMITH, without rejecting entirely Mr. HUME's doctrine, propofes another of his own, far more comprehenfive; a doctrine with which he thinks all the most celebrated theories of morality invented by his predeceffors coincide in part, and from fome partial view of which he apprehends that they have all proceeded.

Of this very ingenious and original theory, I fhall endeavour to give a fhort abftract. To thofe who are familiarly acquainted with it as it is stated by its author, I am aware that the attempt may appear fuperfluous; but I flatter myself that it will not be wholly use- lefs to fuch as have not been much converfant in thefe abftra&t difquifitions, by presenting to them the leading principles of the fyftem in one connected view, without thofe interruptions of the attention which neceffarily arise from the author's various and happy illustrations, and from the many eloquent digreffions which animate and adorn his compofition.

THE

THE fundamental principle of Mr. SMITH's theory is, that the primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of other men; and that our moral judgments with refpect to our own. conduct are only applications to ourselves of decifions which we have already paffed on the conduct of our neighbour. His work accordingly confifts of two parts. In the former, he explains in what manner we learn to judge of the conduct of our neighbour; in the latter, in what manner, by applying these judgments to ourselves, we acquire a fenfe of duty.

Our moral judgments, both with respect to our own conduct and that of others, include two diftinct perceptions: first, A perception of conduct as right or wrong: and, fecondly, A perception of the merit or demerit of the agent. To that quality of conduct which moralifts, in general, express by the word Rectitude, Mr. SMITH gives the name of Propriety; and he begins his theory with enquiring in what it confifts, and how we are led to form the idea of it. The leading principles of his doctrine on this fubject are comprehended in the following propofitions :

1. It is from our own experience alone, that we can form any idea of what paffes in the mind of another person on any particular occafion; and the only way in which we can form this idea, is by fuppofing ourselves in the same circumstances with him, and conceiving how we fhould be affected if we were fo fituated. It is impoffible for us, however, to conceive ourselves placed in any fituation, whether agreeable or otherwise, without feeling an effect of the fame kind with what would be produced by the fituation itself; and of consequence the attention we give at any time to the circumstances of our neighbour, must affect us somewhat in the fame manner, although by no means in the fame degree, as if thefe circumftances were our own.