other of relatively recent date; and these will be familiar to most economists. I refer to the "socialcontract" and the "social-organism" theories.

(1) The social-contract theory may be briefly disposed of; for probably no one now holds it in its pure form. Nevertheless it exerted no small influence

upon early economists. According to this theory, originally no society existed and a more or less unmodified individualism reigned. Such was the state of nature described by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Society, the thought of which was not separated from that of the state, was formed by a voluntary, deliberate agreement among its individual members. Thus society was an abstract something entirely separate from its members. The individual came first; and, conscious self-interest having been the cause of society, it remained the moving force. Only such phases of individual life were embraced in the social existence as might be necessary for protecting the lives and property of the individuals concerned, and the governmental aspect of social action was decidedly the dominant one. The theory, as it found expression in the thought of the Classicists, meant an extreme, rationalistic individualism; which, in turn, meant a tendency toward certain theories of wealth, value, productivity, as indicated above. Of course there are different brands of individualism, just as there are of socialism. The distinguishing marks of the older social-contract individualism were its rationalism and its mechanical character. Men were supposed to be guided by selfinterest and, as the self was looked upon as a material atom exclusive of other selves, each self's interests were apt to clash with those of other selves—and of society. Naturally the limitations of natural resources

1 Fite, Individualism.

and costs were emphasized, and the possibilities of organization were given little attention.

(2) At the other extreme comes the concept of society as a social organism. Sometimes this concept is based on mysticism, sometimes on biologial analogy, sometimes on historical continuity; but always, as in the social-contract concept, those who hold it are apt to fall back upon the "natural" in explanation. Society is thought of as an entity which is either separate from its members (Clark) or fused with them (Schaeffle). The reason for its structure and purpose are to be found within itself. Society comes first and all economic activities are thought of as social processes. All phases of social life are fused. As found in the thought of typical socialistic, nationalistic, and sociological economists, the social-organism theory leads to an extreme "societism" and to a submerging of the individual. Differences among individuals are overlooked as insignificant, including both differences in capacity and in possession. Indeed, it is a general criticism of the thought of these theorists that they reason either as tho there were a communistic state or a

uniformity of individuals. Thus they seek to grasp and to balance "social utility" and "social cost" directly and immediately, as tho society existed as some conscious entity apart from or above individual units. Instead of composing demand and supply from individual marginal utilities and disutilities they would draw curves for society as a whole directly. Those who are socialists assume a “just” (equal?) distribution and so are able to disregard important existing inequalities; but those who accept the existing system must resort to some idea of organic harmony or to an average. The individual, then, instead of being guided by self-interest, acts as a cell which is nourished

and controlled by social processes, and harmony comes not through clash of interests but through identity.

The preceding theories are now of relatively slight importance: one is dead, the other is rapidly dying. Both are alike in that they set the individual over against society. They both rest upon metaphysical bases, the one assuming a natural state of individual freedom, the other a natural social organism. In the one the individual is a mechanical atom; in the other he is a subordinate cell. Yes, in one, value is measured by contract labor cost, and in the other by social labor cost (Clark). Truly, extremes meet!

2

1

Of late, however, there has come into prominence a more refined (and less extreme) modification of the social-organism theory, which is based upon psychological analysis and centers in discussions of the "social mind." As worked out by Professor Cooley 1 and followed by Dr. Anderson, this refined psychological theory is less liable to lead to unsound results, and with most of what its proponents say no fault is to be found. Indeed, with these writers the discussion may become a mere quibble over the meaning of the word" organism." The danger lies in an over-emphasis of society. Thus, tho Professor Cooley surely speaks well when he says that the individual is a differentiated center of psychical life, having a world of his own into which no other individual can fully enter (p. 9), and that the "social mind" is the expression of a vital co-operation of individuals (page 4), he also says that the individual's acts are the outcome of the whole (page 4). Dr. Anderson's statement of the case appears to include more of the cruder biological idea. "Society is an

1 Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, 1909 (1912 edition cited).

↑ Anderson, B. M., Social Value, 1911.

organism," he says (page 83); and goes on to argue that this is true because (a) an organism has different parts with different functions, which parts (b) are interdependent, and (c) it has a central theme, not externally imposed, to the working-out of which the different parts contribute. But in what sense has society these things ? 1 Hardly in the sense that the individual organism has them, or in any ordinary sense of the word organism. Can an organism be made up of parts which are themselves organisms? Do the parts of an organism, interdependent and co-operating as they are, each duplicate the complete round of functions of the organism as a whole ? Whence does society get its" central theme," and what is that theme? Does it not come from the conscious co-operation of potentially independent individuals, and is it not the well-being of those individuals? It is logical, perhaps, to talk of a central theme of society, if we regard it as the harmony of co-operating individuals; but we cannot stop there, for the question remains, whence comes this co-operative harmony? — and the answer takes us to the individual. Of course this gets us into a circle, but circles have centers and starting points, and for purposes of analysing social valuations we must work out from and back to individual estimations. Dr. Anderson goes on to state that there is a social mind; and that individual differences among the minds of men rather prove the organic character of the social mind, by introducing the fact of differentiation. (As tho differences in parts could make an organism!) And then, integration being obviously necessary, he adds: "The integrating element is found in the points which the individual minds have in common" (page

1 See Coker, F. W., Organismic Theories of the State, Columbia Studies, vol. xxxviii, no. 2.

85).

But this gives us but a mechanical integration: a mere identity of minds constitutes no living thing or organism, but a blind commonness of states of consciousness. Dr. Anderson himself says that his social" organism -or the parts is not necessarily conscious" of the social theme. Few if any thinkers would now deny the existence of differentiation; the rub comes in the manner of the integration.

Writers of this new psychological school have done excellent service in emphasizing social institutions and the interrelation of ethical, political, and economic values; but they seem to forget that this emphasis can be accomplished without regarding society as an organism. While criticising economists for taking individual activities as ultimate data,1 they are themselves too prone to take social institutions, fashions, social values, society itself, for granted, and so to dismiss the question of priority of individual and society as unimportant, forgetting that what is unimportant in time may in logic involve the true social point of view.

There remain at least two other theories of society which are worthy of more serious attention. The first of these may be called:

(3) The common-content-of-consciousness theory, or for short the common-consciousness theory. Passing over the sub-varieties of this theory for the present, we note first that it comes nearer to being a rational theory than either of those mentioned above; for it does not rest upon an assumed natural condition, individual or organic. According to it, society, which is thought of as having always existed where men have had relations with one another, is the

1 Cooley, "The Institutional Character of Pecuniary Valuation," American Journal of Sociology, January, 1913.