Uncommon characters and extraordinary events, therefore, which have a natural foundation, will always intereft more than those which are wholly artificial. Now, the writings ftyled novels, are intended to imprefs us like the narrations of real occurrences. They even pretend (however falfely, for the moft part) to instruct us in the knowledge of human life. Their effect depends upon a kind of illufion, which makes their perfonages appear to us like familiar acquaintance, whose fentiments and actions are what we fhould expect from the circumftances under which they are placed. Romance, on the other hand, transports us into a new creation—a world of wonders, peopled with inhabitants exprefsly formed for the fcene. They have fundamentally, indeed, the paffions of men; but fo modified by habits of thinking and acting peculiar to themselves, that they do not produce the ufual results of those paffions in real life. An Amadis will fall in love as well as a Grandifon, but will not love like him, or like any other mortal. Yet Yet even Grandifon is not a common cha racter, nor is his hiftory a common one and hence the novelty of the fable. It is true, the ordinary run of novels exhibit pictures which are little more than old faces new dreffed and grouped; and yet they are perused with avidity by a certain class of readers. But the taste for fuch reading is a kind of falfe appetite refembling that for fnuff and tobacco, which rather feeks the fupply of a want, than the enjoyment of a pleasure. It is now time to fum up my critical doctrine, which I fhall do in few words. This is that even the pleasure derived from natural objects is confiderably dependent on their novelty-that art more peculiarly applies to this fource of gratifi- ' cation-that even the arts termed imitative, have a purpose distinct from copying nature, which is, the allying it with something new, as the clothing and vehicleand that with refpect to the degree in which these additions may be made with a happy G 2 a happy effect, it depends in great meafure upon local habits and affociations. I may, perhaps, hereafter apply these ideas to another topic. At prefent, Farewell! .'1 LETTER LETTER X. ON PREJUDICE, BIGOTRY, CANDOUR, AND LIBERALITY. DEAR SON, As the profeffional concern you will have in the opinions of mankind, may fometime or other involve you in controverfy, I fhall offer to your confideration fome reflections on the true import of cer tain words, than which none more frequently occur in controverfial writings, though their application is for the most part extremely loose and undeterminate. The accurate ufe of terms is in all cafes important; but that of the terms in queftion is peculiarly fo, in these times of violent and bitter party contention. The first that I shall mention is PREJUDICE. This word, according to its derivation, implies a judgment prior to examinaG 3 tion s tion ;-it feems, therefore, on its very face, to bear the mark of rafh and unreasonable decifion. But in common language, its meaning is frequently foftened down into an impreffion which a man does not fcruple to avow, and for that reafon probably does not recognize to be wrong. We readily own a prejudice against a man or a caufe, if we have grounds from experience for thinking ill of them. And as it is frequently necessary, in the occurrences, of life, to come to a practical determination in a cafe where we have nothing but fuch a prefumption to guide us, we cannot be blamed for following the best lights we are able to procure. Prejudice in this inftance is only a reasonable analogy, by which we draw inferences of what will be from what has been. I know that a perfon has acquired an office or truft by fraudulent means. I am inclined to credit an accufation of his having exercised it fraudulently. A magiftrate has betrayed an outrageous spirit of party virulence.-I fuf¬ pect |