fures and pursuits, are not neceffary for the fuccefsful fearch after truth! It can be little less than the whole bufinefs of a man's life-"Vitam impendere vero." Ought we then to blame the ancient philofophers when they limited the power of acquiring intellectual truth to a few, and proposed it as the noble prize to be contended for by a number selected from the vulgar? Truth of no kind is of eafy acquifition -that truth, I mean, which is the refult of examination: for true opinions ftumbled upon by chance, and only by following the authority of great names, is no certain poffeffion, and will readily give place to error more highly patronized. Truth in fcience is only arrived at by laborious experiment and patient deduction. Hiftorical truth requires for its inveftigation perfect impartiality, and an acquaintance with every poffible inlet to fraud and miftake. Moral truth demands a heart capable of feeling it. Religious truth is not attained without an union of the requifites for all the other species of truth.

Have we, then, any well-grounded reafon to hope that the majority of mankind will ever come to a general perception of what is fo obfcured by difficulties in the detail?

If you should think the doctrine of this letter fomewhat inconfiftent with my former one On the pursuit of Improvement, recollect, that the tenor of that was to fhew the natural progrefs towards perfection in every practical art on which the human faculties are in earnest employedand the advantage to be derived from that reference to general principles which is properly termed philofophy. To free men from those weakneffes of their nature which oppose the admiffion of abstract truth, is a very different attempt; which, however, is not to be given up in despair because it cannot be fo fuccessful as we fhould with.

Truth will prevail-how far? As far as it is pursued with a proper temper, and by perfons properly qualified. Place before fuch men an object of controverfy Q4 capable

capable of being decided, and be affured that it will finally be decided according to truth. But that falfe opinions on fubjects which warmly intereft the paffions of mankind will ever cease to fway the multitude, is what I dare not promise myself. A fingular example of the different fitness of different men to receive truth is afforded by the modern impofture of Animal Magnetifm. When its pretenfions were submitted to a board of philofophers in France, its futility was clearly and unanimously established. Still, however, that class who are the proper fubjects of deception were deluded by its bold promises, and mysterious reafonings; and among them the delufion in fome measure still fubfifts. It cannot, however, ftand long; but its votaries will remain just as prone as before to fall into another plausible delufion.

Meantime, fuch is the intrinfic value of truth, that no other encouragement is wanted to animate to the vigorous pursuit of it, than the diftant hope of attaining it

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for ourselves, and propagating it among a felect few; for in fact, of all the differences between mortals, the different degree in which they are poffeffors of truth is incomparably the greatest. Nor can it be doubted that a large share of it is within the reach of man, though not of all men. Like the inoculation of the fmall pox, it confers indifputable benefits on those who receive it; yet too few will probably ever receive it to produce striking effects npon the whole fpecies. Let truth be fairly offered to the world without the veil of mystery, in her own naked radiance. If the world fail to recognize her, and leave her to a few enamoured votaries, let them confole themselves with the affurance that Truth, like Virtue, is her own reward.

Farewell!

LETTER

LETTER XXII.

ON SECOND THOUGHTS AND MIDDLE

COURSES.

DEAR SON,

"SECOND Thoughts are beft," fays a frequently-quoted proverb.

Confidered

as a prudential maxim, its truth, I believe, cannot be controverted; for there are few points of evil to be avoided or advantage to be gained, in which mature deliberation is not better than hafty decifion. But that they are best, in the sense of being more conformable to moral or natural truth, in my opinion, is fo far from reality, that I should more readily acquiefce in a propofition nearly the reverse-that first impreffions are most to be relied on. This, however, I do not mean to affert without limitation.

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