Diligence, though not of equal degree, is also necessary in order to warrant the filing of a supplemental bill (a). And so with regard to bills of review; -concerning which it has been determined that even for error apparent, they will not lie after twenty years from the date of the decree (b), except in the case of persons not in esse at the time of the decree, and of persons having contingent interests, of infants and of others under any legal disability (c). The judgment of Lord Chancellor Camden in the case of Smith v. Clay (d), which established the rule last mentioned with respect to hills of review will form an appropriate conclusion to the present treatise. [*]From the accuracy with which this judgment ascertains the principles that influence courts of equity in their treatment of stale demands, and explains the reasons upon which those principles are found ed, it has been regarded as an authority applicable to all cases in which the circumstance of lapse of time forms a prominent and characteristic feature. The case arose upon a petition for a bill of review for error manifest upon the face of the record. It was between thirty and forty years after the time when the decree was pronounced. Lord Camden said,—The question upon this petition is, whether a bill of re (a) See Barrington v. O'Brien, 1 rington v. Smith, 2 Bro. P. C. by Ball and Beat. 173. (b) Smith v. Clay, Amb. 645; 3 Bro. C. C. 639, n. S. C.; Norris v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 26, 38; Edwards v. Carrol, 2 Bro. P. C. by Toml. 98; Lytton v. Lytton, 4 Bro. C. C. 441. See also Sher Toml. 62; Earl of Castlehaven v. Underhill, 2 Cha. Rep. 46; Fitton v. Earl of Macclesfield, 1 Vern. 287. (c) Lytton v. Lytton,' supra. (d) Supra. view here is not barred by the length of time. I am of opinion it is. There are two questions. First, what period of time is a bar to a bill of review? Second, from what time this period shall be computed? To the first question the answer here is easy. Twenty years is the period. Edwards v. Carrol(a) is decisive, and now not open to argument. A court of equity which is never active in relief against conscience, or public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence: where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction, [*]there was always a limitation to suits in this court. In Fitton v. Lord Macclesfield, Lord North said rightly, that though there was no limitation to a bill of review, yet, after twenty-two years, he would not reverse a decree but upon very apparent error. Expedit reipublicæ ut sit finis litium, is a maxim that has prevailed in this court at all times, without the help of an act of parliament. But, as the court has no legislative authority, it could not properly define the time of bar, by a positive rule, to an hour, a minute, or a year; it was governed by circumstances. But, as often as parliament has limited the time of actions and remedies to a certain period in legal proceedings, the Court of Chancery adopted that rule, and applied it to similar cases in equity(1). For (a) 2 Bro. P. C. by Toml. 98. when the legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for equity (which, by its own proper authority, always maintained a limitation) to countenance laches beyond the period that law had been confined to by parliament. Hence, in all cases where the legal right has been barred by parliament, the equitable right to the same thing has been concluded by the same bar. Thus the account of rents and profits, in a common case, shall not be carried beyond six years. Nor shall redemption be allowed after twenty years' possession in a mortgagee, except in cases of disability. By the like analogy, the House, in Edwards v. Carrol, determined that twenty years should bar a bill of review, because the statute of Will. III. had barred all writs of error after that period. As to the second question, his Lordship held, that the time, whence the period of [*]twenty years was to be computed, was the date of the decree. And he remarked in conclusion, that the rule which prevented the bringing of bills of review after twenty years, was also applicable to the case of bills for a re-hearing(a)(1). (a) Amb. 649. On the latter point, see also Yate v. Mosely, 5 Ves. 480. (1) Vide Thomas v. Harvie, 10 Wheat. 146. Lansing v. Albany Ins. Co., 1 Hopk. 102. Webb et al. v. Pell et al., 1 Paige, 564. [*450] ABSENCE. Absence abroad, an answer to presumptions from lapse of Page 14, 366 Absence for seven years without interim account, presumptive ABSTRACT. Old abstract presumptive evidence of the deeds, &c., ab- ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance of property conveyed or devised to a man pre- 279 197 32 ACCOUNTS. except in the case of infants, when the account is car- Right to open an account generally, settled between trustee - 436 437 437 438 If trustee has been guilty of fraud, the account may be ACTS OF PARLIAMENT. Acts of parliament presumed in support of long possession. ACCUMULATIVE LEGACIES. 6, n., 194 See DOUBLE LEGACIES. Legacy by a parent, or person in loco parentis, adeemed, or by a subsequent advancement to the child of like amount by a portion of like amount secured to be paid to the 130 130 129 Differences in the period whence interest.is to be paid, or in ADEMPTION-(continued.) terests, differences in the modes of limitation immaterial The presumption of intent to adeem rebutted, Page 134 128, n where the legacy is of a qualified interest, and the 133-134 where the legacy and subsequent provision depend 132 - 133 132 where the bequest is of a residue The presumption repelled, by evidence of the parent's intention, as shown in a by extrinsic evidence of intention, whether written or What parol declarations are effectual to this - 135 136 136 137-140 140 Extrinsic evidence admissible to fortify the presumption ADMINISTRATION. Letters of administration presumable in support of an old as- Admission of a demand or equity within twenty years an ADMITTANCE. admittance to a copyhold, what secondary evidence of after long possession and payment of the rents and from the lord's accepting a surrender from the party ib. ib. Purchase in the name of a wife or child before unprovided 57 |