after coming of age, to require an account of the profits received by an agent during his minority, Lord Macclesfield held him to be as much barred by the statute, or by analogy to it, from bringing a bill for an account of the profits, as he was from bringing an action of account at common law(1). In like manner, if a person on coming of age, settles accounts with his trustees, and after an interval of six or seven years brings a bill generally to impeach such accounts, the court will not allow them to be unravelled, but will only permit the plaintiff to surcharge and falsify; the reason for which is the dif ficulty that would otherwise be imposed on trustees in obliging them to prove the particular items of their [*]accounts after so long a time (a). A less period however than six years will not perhaps in general serve to protect accounts from being opened. Hardwicke, in Roberts v. Kuffin(b), said, that bringing a bill three or four years after an account is settled for errors in that account, was not too long a time. Where an accountant has been guilty of fraud, the whole account is of course liable to be opened, though at an indefinite period (e)(2). Lord McDowl v. (2) Botifeur v. Weyman, et al., 1 M Cord, Ch. 156. Charles, 6 Johns. Ch. 132. Watson v. Toone, 6 Madd. Ch. 153. Jones v. Conoway et al., 4 Yeates, 109. discontinuance fall, as it is now settled, within the general provisions of the statute of limitations (a). Doubts were once entertained on this point,-merchant's accounts being in direct terms excepted from the operation of the act(b). But it deserves remark, that even while such difference of opinion prevailed, courts of equity uniformly refused their assistance in the investigation of accounts between merchants, where the dealings between them had been long discontinued (c)(1). XIII. That transactions liable in the first instance to be relieved against will be rendered ultimately unimpeachable by the long forbearance of the persons interested, is also a point which has before come under [*]consideration. In the following cases, additional examples are furnished of the application of this principle. Thus, it has been determined, that after an acquiescence of thirty years, the owner of an estate cannot dispute an agreement entered into by his bailiff for the inclosure of an appurtenant common (d); and in like manner, that after an occupation for twelve or thirteen years of an enclosed parcel of a manor waste with the knowledge of the steward, the occu (a) Martin v. Heathcote, 2 Eden, 169; Barber v. Barber, 18 Ves. 286. (b) See 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3. Vern. 276; Bridges v. Mitchell, (d) Tufton v. Wentworth, 5 Vin. Abr. 8, pl. 32. (1) Gregory's exr. v. Forrester, 1 M'Cord, 332. Irvine v. Robert son, 3 Rand. 549. pation shall be presumed to have originated under a licence from the lord(a) (1). So, although a husband cannot alone make a binding declaration of the uses of a fine levied by himself and his wife of the wife's land, yet if, after the termination of the coverture, the feme delay for a considerable time to signify her disagreement, the declaration of uses made by the husband alone will be sustained on the supposition of her acquiescence Fifteen years, in a case before Lord Hardwicke, were accounted sufficient for this purpose (b). In Burke v. Crosbie (c), a misapplication of the separate estate of a feme covert was held to be irremediable solely in consequence of the laches of the parties. On the marriage of Edward Crosbie, an estate [*]subject to a mortgage was settled on the husband for life, remainder to the issue of the marriage in the usual manner, and in default of issue, as to one moiety, to such uses as the wife should appoint. There was no issue of the marriage. In 1759, the mortgagee brought a bill for redemption or foreclosure, and in the result obtained a decree for sale of the property and for payment of the principal and interest of the mortgage debt. The sum produced by the sale was much more than sufficient to satisfy the mortgage but the surplus, instead of being retained upon the trusts of the settlement, was applied to other (a) Doe d. Foley v. Wilson, 11 East, 56. (b) Swanton v. Raven, 3 Atk. 105. (c) 1 Ball and Beat. 489. (1) And see How v. Schuyler, 4 Johns. Ch. 7. Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320. Jackson v. Widger, 7 Cowen, 433. purposes. The wife lived fifteen years after this transaction, without complaint: and a lapse of other seven years occurred before a bill for the recovery of the misapplied funds was filed by her heir at law. Lord Manners, however, as to that claim, dismissed the bill. He thought that as the wife, who (it appeared) had lived separate from her husband, was aware of the whole proceedings, had had the means of enforcing her right, and yet had lain by, and as her heir had also remained so long inactive, the demand could not then be attended to. 'The destruction of a settlement and the wrongful disposition of the property settled will not be reliev ed against, unless complaint be made within a reasonable time. Thus, where, in 1708, soon after the second marriage of W. S., a mortgage term, pursuant to previous articles, was settled on himself for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to the first son of the [*]marriage in tail; and in 1739 the settlor and his wife, by release and fine, conveyed the estate for an inadequate consideration to uses for the benefit of a child of the first marriage; a bill brought, thirty-five years after, by a claimant under the settlement of 1708 was dismissed. Lord Commissioner Ashhurst said: "The first point is, that the defendants are purchasers for a valuable consideration, and that the settlement of 1708 was voluntary. If this had been all, we should have thought with the plaintiff: but as to the case of the defendants, they claim under the deed of 1739, and have been in possession ever since. It is said by the plaintiff, that the defendants took the term as a trust, with notice; but it is unnatural to infer a fraud in this case, for then the mother must be presumed to have defeated the provision for her own children. In this view, one would rather infer, that the parties knew the settlement to be voluntary, or that some compensation was made to the children of the second marriage. Then as to trusts being an exception to the statute of limitations,-the rule holds only between trustees and cestui que trusts. It is true, that a trustee cannot set up the statute against his cestui que trust; but this is merely the case of a trustee by implication, and as such affected by an equity. But that equity must be pursued within some reasonable time. And both courts of law and equity preserve an analogy to the statute of limitations (a)(1). So, in transactions between father and son, where the latter under the influence of paternal authority is [*]induced, without any or for some trivial consideration, to defeat or abridge his reversionary rights, a court of equity, after long acquiescence, and especially if the destruction of interests since acquired by bona fide purchasers be involved in the determination, will not relieve. In Brown v. Carter(b), à son, who was tenant in (a) Townshend v. Townshend, 1 Bro. C. C. 551. (b) 5 Ves. 862. See also Tweddell v. Tweddell, 1.Turn. 1. (1) Shaver v. Radley, 4 Johns. Ch. 316. Decouche v. Savetier, Kane v. 3 Johns. Ch. 190. Coster v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. 522. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90. Goodrich v. Pendleton, 3 Johns. Ch. 384. Murray v. Coster, 20 Johns. 576. Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. 266. Harrison v. Harrison, 1 Call. 419. Spottswood v. Dandridge, 4 Hen. & Munf. 139. Wallace v. Duffield, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 527. Jones v. Pearson, 2 Hawkes, 269. Hamilton v. Shepherd, 2 |