sumes a very different aspect. From unreasonable delay on the part of the vendor to pursue his claim, a presumption arises either that the fraud charged never existed, or that after it was committed, the party, for valuable consideration, had confirmed the purchase, had released his equity, or had consented to abandon it(1). And if it can be shown, that the vendor was acquainted with the fact of the imposition, and has been since free from the purchaser's control, -under these circumstances, a lapse of twenty years where the property is land (a) (2), and of six years, as it should seem, where it is personal estate (b), will extinguish his right to equitable relief (3).

The period from which acquiescence is calculated where the bargain is obtained through undue advantage of the pecuniary difficulties of a vendor aware at the time of the sacrifice of his interests, is the completion of the purchase (c). The subsequent con

(a) Townshend v. Townshend, 1 Bro. C. C. 550; 1 Cox, 28, S. C.; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Scho. and Lefr. 607-610, 636; Medlicott v. O'Donnel, 1 Ball and Beat. 156, 165-6; Whalley v. Whalley, 3 Bli. 1.

́(b) Booth v. Earl of Warrington, 4 Bro. P. C., by Toml. 163; South Sea Company v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms. 143.

(c) Hovenden v. Lord Annesley; Medlicott v. O'Donnell, supra; Western v. Cartwright, Sel. Cha. Ca. 34; Earl of Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Bro. C. C. 633; Hickes v. Cooke, 4 Dow. 16. See also Bicknell v. Gough, 3 Atk. 538, and Lord Redesdale's observations thereon, 2 Scho. and Lefr. 635; Morony v. O'Dea, 1 Ball and Be. 609; likewise 2 Ball and Be. 118;

(1)Bunce et al. v. Walcott, 2 Conn. R. 27. Prevotz v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481.

(2) Ward v. Van Bakkelen, 1 Pagie, Ch. 100. Prevotz v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481.

(3) Walker v. Walker, 16 Serg. & Rawle, 379.

tinuance [*]of his difficulties forms no excuse (a); for, generally speaking, the court does not consider the embarrassments of its suitors as any legitimate reason for their neglect. "If it did, there would be an end of all limitation to actions in cases of distressed persons; should relief be given after twenty years on the ground of distress, so it might after thirty, forty, or fifty years; there would be no restriction whatever, and all property 'would be thrown into confusion”(b). Another argument is, that Parliament has not thought fit to admit poverty into the class of legal disabilities; and equity, in dispensing its aid, adheres in this as in other particulars, as nearly as possible to the provisions of legislature.

[*]So long as the vendor remains ignorant of the fraud which has been practised upon him, no lapse of

above decision by Lord Thurlow, and the decision in Gregor v. Molesworth, by Lord Hardwicke (2 Ves. 109,) laches by a plaintiff may be taken advantage of by demurrer, see Lord Redesdale's Treatise on Pleading, 3d Edit. 173; his Lordship's remarks, 2 Scho. and Lefr. 637; and Mr. Belt's note, 3 Bro. C. C. 633.

and Winchcombe v. Hall, 1 Cha. 637-8. That notwithstanding the Rep. 40. It is observable that, although in Deloraine v. Browne, where the bill was demurred to on the ground of time, Lord Thurlow overruled the demurrer, thinking the length of time could not be taken advantage of in that way, though it might perhaps at the hearing, and the principle question therefore between the parties remained undecided; yet this case has always been considered, and has been even judicially cited, as an authority to show that the long forbearance of a plaintiff constitutes an answer to his demand. See per Sir R. P. Arden, M. R., 4 Bro. C. C. 268. and per Lord Redesdale, 2 Scho. and Lefr.

(a) An exception to this rule occurs where the sale is of a reversionary interest. See Gowland v. De Faria, 17 Ves. 20; Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball and Be. 330; and infra 398.

(b) Per Lord Redesdale, 2 Scho. and Lefr. 640. See also Hickes v. Cooke, 4 Dow. 16.

time will render the purchaser's title valid; for until discovery the right of the party does not completely arise (a), and to presume a release or dereliction before such discovery would be absurd. As the conscience of the purchaser moreover is affected by the fraud, he cannot set up the remoteness of the transaction as a bar in his favour, since it is an invariable rule in equity that frauds unknown shall not be barred by time.

So, in the case of a sale obtained through abuse of influence, until that influence ceases, the lapse of time will not operate to the advantage or prejudice of either party. The acquiescence of the seller, while he is prevented from showing his repugnance, clearly cannot be presumed; and the continuance of the controul is a fact which tends only more strongly to prove the reasonableness and necessity of the principle (b).

When, however, the vendor becomes conusant of the fraud, and is freed from the controul of the purchaser, he no longer continues an object of extraordinary favour. It follows, that for any delay which then takes place, he alone must suffer. Indeed, if under these circumstances long quiescence did not preclude redress, the very imputation of fraud might be the means of committing a fraud; for in the interim [*]that evidence may be lost, by which such imputa

(a) Roche v. O,Brien. 1 Ball and Be. 330; Dunbar v. Tredennick, 2 Ib. 304. See also 2 Ball and Be. 129.

(b) Alden v. Gregory, 2 Eden, 280; Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball and Be. 330; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292.

tion might at first have been repelled (a). After a lapse of twenty years, therefore, to use the words of Lord Redesdale(b), the opposite party has a right to say,-You shall not bring this matter into discussion now, when it is only through your own neglect that you did not do so within the time limited by the statute(1).

In this place, as serving further to illustrate the principle under consideration, it may be remarked, that titles to leasehold property, which have been fraudulently obtained from an executor, have on some occasions been held unimpeachable after long unmolested enjoyment. Executors, it is notorious, have a right by virtue of their office, to sell or mortgage any part of the personal estate,—even such part as may have been specifically bequeathed; and the purcha ser or mortgagee, under ordinary circumstances, is not obliged to inquire whether the sale or mortgage be necessary. But this rule obtains only where the object of the executor is unknown. For should the purchaser or mortgagee proceed after having notice that the act intended is a fraud on particular legatees, he then becomes implicated; and equity, on the ground of his participation in the fraud, will hold him to take only as trustee (2). The case, it is obvious, is still stronger where the transaction originated in a

(a) 1 Fonbl. on Equity, 5th Edit. 331; 3 Atk. 39.

(b) 2 Scho. and Lefr. 634. See also 1 Ball and Be. 166.

(1) Prevotz v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481.

(2) Graff &c. v. Castleman, &c. 5 Rand. 195. Knight v. Yarborough, 4 Rand. 566. Dodson &c. v. Simpson, 2 Rand. 294.

collusive arrangement between the executor and the purchaser [*]or mortgagee, for their mutual benefit. Nevertheless, in both these cases it has been held, that the persons beneficially interested must, in order to obtain the assistance of the court, pursue their rights within a reasonable time; otherwise that the long delay will furnish such a presumption of acquiescence as, unless satisfactorily accounted for, the purchaser or mortgagee may successfully use in defence. And it seems, that for this purpose, supposing the defrauded parties are aware of the fact, twenty years will be sufficient. We may add, that it is indifferent whether the interests of the legatees be immediate or reversionary (a)(1).

II. As to Purchases by Trustees. With a view to prevent as far as possible the abuse of confidence. Equity has laid down the rule (from which rule, except under its own superintendence, or in certain cases where the consent of the cestui que trust being sui juris is expressly given, no deviation is ever made), that no person, who as trustee or through any confidential employment relative to an estate which is about to be sold has acquired a knowledge of its peculiar advantages, shall be permitted either directly or indirectly to become the purchaser (2). The per

(a) Bonney v. Ridgard, 1 Cox, 145; 17 Ves. 97, 98, cited, S. C.; Andrew v. Wrigley, 4 Bro. C. C.

125.

See also per J. Leach, V. C., 5 Mad. 55.

(1) Bunce et al. v. Walcott, 2 Conn. Rep. 27. (2) McCarts v. Bee, 1 McCord, Ch. 389.