admission from the other party, ten years before, that the debt was then still unpaid, to be fully and satisfactorily explained(a)(1).

[*]With regard to the latter case, however, it should be observed that, although the unproductiveness of the estate might be accounted of importance as an auxiliary circumstance, the principal ground of the determination was the acknowledgment ten years before that the debt then subsisted. It is quite clear, that where an admission of the demand has been made within twenty years, the allegation of a discharge cannot possibly be maintained (b).

II. Judgments, whether for debts recovered or acknowledged, or for damages found, cannot under ordinary circumstances be enforced, unless they have been acted on within the preceding twenty years; the laches of the parties is held to afford primâ facie evidence that such judgments have been satisfied (c)(2).

This rule is of much importance in practice; for as judgments are liens on the freehold estate of the per

(a) Toplis v. Baker, 2 Cox, 118. (b) Trash v. White, 3 Bro. C. C. 289, 291. See also Mede v. Earl of Bandon, 2 Dow. 268.

(c) Flower v. Lord Bolingbroke, 1 Stra. 639; Willaume v. Gorges, 1 Camp. 217. See also Kemys v. Ruscomb, 2 Atk. 45.

(1) Rent secured by indenture will be presumed to have been paid after the lapse of twenty years. Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 210. (2) Kennedy v. Denoon, Con. Rep. 617. 2 Con. Rep. 146. Paynes exr. v. Dudley, 1 Wash. 196. Day exr. v. Pickett, 4 Munf. 104.

son against whom they are obtained(a), and take precedence of all subsequent encumbrances and interests -binding the estate even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser,—it is in no small degree conducive to the security of purchasers in general, that after a certain time the land should become effectually relieved from them.

The presumption arising from the long forbearance [*]of the cognisee is, however, in all cases liable to rebuttal. It will therefore be destroyed by showing that interest has been paid, or that the cognisor has acknowledged the existence of the debt, within the last twenty years. For the same purpose the cognisee may prove, that he has not been able, in consequence of prior encumbrances, to extend the lands affected by the judgment(b).

But if twenty years have elapsed since the judgment was obtained or last recognised, the general rule will not be departed from, although the judgment creditor may be able to account for his forbearance, by evidence that the debtor has long been in extremely embarrased circumstances, and according to the opinion of those who know him incapable of paying the debt(c) (1).

(a) Stat. 13 Edw. I. c. 18.

(c) Willaume v. Gorges, 1

(b) Winchcomb v. Winchcomb, Camp. 217.

2 Cha. Rep. 101.

(1) Forbearance of a judgment debt for twenty years unexplained, raises a presumption of payment, but this may be rebutted by proof of absence or insolvency. Boardman v. De Forest, 5 Conn. R. 1. Willis v. Washington's admr. 6 Munf. 532.

III. Warrants of Attorney to confess Judgment are, for the same reasons as judgments themselves, liable to be affected by the creditor's delay. The lapse of twenty years will determine their validity (a) (1).

IV. The same period of time will also bar claims under Decrees of Courts of Equity, the existence of such claims being held on the common principle inconsistent with remissness to enforce them (b).

[*]V. Statutes-Merchant, Statutes-Staple, and Recognisances, which resemble judgments in binding the lands of the cognisor, are like them liable to the presumption of satisfaction or a discharge (c). And it is probable, that delay for twenty years to put these general liens into force would raise that presumption; for, although in none of the authorities referred to was such particular period relied upon, yet as the doctrine of presumption has in so many similar instances proceeded by analogy to the statute of limitations, there is every cause to think that the same

(a) Hulke v. Pickering, 2 Barn. 766. and Cress. 555.

(b) Comber's case, 1 P. Wms. 766. It is observable, that, decrees in equity act only in personam not in rem, and do not affect the real estate of the party. 1 P. Wms.

(c) Lady Hatton v. Jay, 1 Cha. Rep. 117; Dennis v. Nourse, ib. 106; Popham v. Desmond, ib. 135; Burgh v. Wolf, Toth. 258; Smith v. Rosewell, ib. 277; Abdy v. Loveday, Finch, 250.

(1) Vide Ross v. Darby, 4 Munf. 428.

analogy would be observed in deciding on the efficiency of old securities of the kinds in question.

The negligence of the cognisee will not be excused by reason of the lands which are subject to his lien having devolved upon an infant; because though, in such case, the land would not be extendible at law, still the cognisee might have obtained relief in a court of equity (a).

It has also been held, that no sufficient answer to the length of time is furnished by proof of the cognisee having been placed under obligations to the cognisor, and of having been prevented from seeking payment of the debt through motives of gratitude or fear(b).

The grounds, on which the prima facie satisfaction [*]of statutes and recognisances may be repelled, are of course the same as those which prevail in regard to judgments :—for example, receipt of interest, or an acknowledgment of the debt, within the preceding twenty years, the being prevented by prior encumbrances from extending the debtor's land,-and (not improbably) the creditor's absence from the kingdom.

VI. Concerning Bonds, all the cases and dicta which have mentioned the subject, concur in authorizing the proposition, that if since the time limited for

(a) Middleton v. Shelly, 1 Lev. (b) Corey v. Corey, Finch, 331.

198.

payment of the principal money secured, or since the last acknowledgment of the debt subsequently to that time, a space of twenty years has intervened, it furnishes an inference that the debt has been satisfied (1).

The earliest cases on this subject came before the courts of equity, where it was usual to administer relief against old bonds upon which the obligees were proceeding at law; and there so far back as 1635, twenty years without a demand seem to have been held sufficient ground to grant the relief sought for(a).

Sir Matthew Hale was the first judge who introduced the doctrine into the courts of common law, and twenty years was the period laid down by him as affording the presumption of payment. In this he was followed by Lord C. J. Holt(b); and the rule, as obtaining [*]in courts both of law (c) and equity(d), has since been repeatedly recognised.

(a) Carpenter v. Tucker, 1 Cha. Rep. 78; Coles v. Emmerson, ib.; Geofrey v. Thorn, ib. 88; Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Wms. 395; Powell v. Godsale, Finch, 77; Moyle v. Ld. Roberts, Nels. 9.

(b) Anon. 6 Mod. 22; and Anon.

11 Mod. 2.

(c) Moreland v. Bennett, 1 Stra. 652; Searle v. Lord Barrington, 2 ib. 826. See also 1 Burr, 435; 4 Burr. 1963; Cowp. 109; 1 T. R. 270. 272.

(d) See 3 P. Wms. 396; 2 Atk. 144; 12 Ves. 266; 19 Ves. 199.

(1) Wells v. Washington's admr. 6 Munf. 532. Levy v. Hampton, 1 McCord, 145. Clark v. Hopkins, 7 Johns. 556. Rooseboom v. Bil. lington, 17 Johns. 182. Blake v. Quash, 3 M'Cord, 340. Quince v. Schauber v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 59.

Ross, 2 Hay. N. R. 180.