also be inferred, if the inference be a necessary consequence from the acts done" (a).

III. A third class of legal presumptions has been referred to the nature and general incidents of property. These may perhaps be reduced to the two following:-that possession of property carries with it the right of beneficial enjoyment; and that the ownership of real estate comprises a title to all the usual appendant rights and privileges.

As to personal property of a moveable nature, the general rule is, that possession constitutes the criterion of title (b); and for this reason, that no other means exist by which a knowledge of the fact to whom it [*]belongs, can be attained (c). Hence a vendor of personal chattels is never expected to show the origin of his right; nor is a purchaser, without notice of the claim of the real owner, compellable to make restitution (d). With regard to real property, a different rule, generally speaking, obtains. There, possession, though coupled with receipt of the profits, is by no means conclusive of the absolute ownership;

(a) Per Lord Hardwicke in As- 256. 277. et seq. ton v. Aston, 1 Ves. 268.

(d) But see the cases of Cado

(b) 1 Ves. 360; 1 Atk. 168; 7 gan v. Kennett, Cowp. 432; FoT. R. 234; 13 Ves. 122. ley v. Burnell, 1 Bro. C. C. 274; Hoare v. Parker, 2 T. R. 376; Hartop v. Hoare, 3 Atk. 44; and Earl of Macclesfield v. Davis, 3 Ves. and Be. 16; from which it appears, that a purchaser from tenant for life of personal chattels, will not be secure against the claims of those entitled in remainder...

(c) An exception to this rule presents itself in the case of ships; the title to which, since the Register Acts, may be conclusively ascertained by searching the register. Ex parte Yallop, 15 Ves. 60; ex parte Houghton, 17 Ves. 251; Monkhouse v. Hay, 8 Pri.

for land is held, not by possession, but by title: and a purchaser is always expected to require production of the documents proving what interest the vendor has. But even in the case of land, possession is not altogether unimportant as an evidence of title.(1) For where, as it sometimes happens, a purchaser professes inability to nianifest his right otherwise than by the fact of present possession, accompanied perhaps by an unauthenticated statement showing whence the right is derived; a purchaser, under such circumstances, though exposed to the adverse pretensions of legal, will, it should seem, be relieved against the demand of equitable, claimants (a) and the like protection will be afforded[*] to a purchaser, whose vendor, having been enabled to conceal the fact of his holding only in trust, produced a good legal title, and thereby fraudulently effected the sale (b).`

To the preceding, we may subjoin, as further instances of the force of possession, considered as prima facie evidence of title to land, that mere occupancy, however recent, will support, or form an available ground of defence in actions of ejectment, against all, except such as can show in themselves a superior right

(a) Millard's case, 2 Freem. 43; Lowther v. Carlton, 2 Atk. 139; Sweet v. Southcote, 2 Bro. C. C. 66; Pennington v. Beechey, 2 Sim.

and Stu. 282.

(b) Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 60; also in Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 681.

(1) Biggers' Admr. v. Ålderson, 1 Hen. & Munf. 54. Lee v. Tapscott, 2 Wash. 276. Farrar v. Merrill, 1 Greenl. 17. Trotter v. Harris, 2 Jew, & Young, 285. La Frambois v. Jackson, 8 Cowen,

589.

to the possession (a) (1) ; and again, where the dispute respects simply the quantity of interest, which possession and pernancy of the rents imply, the presumption is in favour of a seisin in fee, not of a seisin for any less estate (b).

To the ownership of estates in land, there are, de communi jure, certain rights and privileges annexed, which, though not essential to the enjoyment of the property, contribute perhaps materially, to its value or convenience. Now these,-to illustrate the second instance proposed at the beginning of this section,are considered, until the contrary be shewn, as remaining with, and constituting part of the possession from which it follows, that, though the rights and privileges spoken of may be capable of being disunited from their subject, an adverse claimant of them to hold in severance must, in order to succeed in his pretensions, [*]be able to adduce direct proof of title. "When it is said," observes the learned annotator on Coke upon Littleton, "that a person is entitled to a right or property, by common right, but that it may belong to another, it is intended to say that the right or property in question is by the common law annexed to some particular property of

(a) Catteris v. Cowper, 4 Taunt. (b) Jayne v. Price, 5 Taunt. 547, and note, 548.

326.

(1) Jackson v. Miller, 6 Cowen, 751. Jackson v. Porter, 1 Paine, 457; and see Jackson v. Denn, 5 Cow. 200. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59. Jackson v. Hazen, 2 Johns. 22. Jackson v. Harder, 4 Johns. 202. Jackson v. Rechtmyer, 10 Johns. 314. Camp, 1 Cow. 619. Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 13. Blanchard, 2 N. H. Rep. 456.

Jackson v. Wendall v.

which the party is owner: yet that it is not so inseparably or inalienably annexed to this ownership, but that the party may transfer it to another. So that in all these cases, the presumption is in favour of him to whom the right or property is said to belong by common right; yet this does not exclude the possibility of its belonging to another. To another, therefore, it may belong; but, if he claims it, he must prove his title to it. On the other hand, the party to whom it belongs of common right is under no obligation of showing his title to it; to him, in the intendment of the law, it belongs, till there is a proof of the contrary. To exemplify this doctrine: the lord of a manor is lord of the soil of the manor of common right; that is, if it be admitted or proved, that he is lord of the manor, his right to the soil so far necessarily follows, that it is not incumbent on him to produce any proof of it. He may, therefore, of common right, dig for gravel, unless it is to the prejudice of his tenants. But this right is not inseparable or inalienable from the seignory. The lord may grant it to the tenants ; to the tenants therefore it may belong. But if they claim it, it is incumbent on them to prove their title to it" (a). Another example, we may add, of the [*]same kind, is the primâ facie title of the different landholders in a manor, to rights of common on the lord's waste; and a further, that of the owner of the surface of land, to the minerals and inferior strata. The presumption, that the possessor of a several fishery is owner of the ground covered by the water (b), and that where a highway runs over the waste of a manor,

(a) Co. Litt. 261 a, n. I.

(b) Lofft, 364. See Co. Litt.

122 a, n. 7.

the soil belongs to the lord (a), are additional instances. But in all these cases, it is observable, the intendment of law may be encountered by testimony, showing a severance of the particular right from the original possession (b) (1).

On a principle similar to that which decides the soil of a highway over a manor waste to belong to the lord, it has been held, that where a road passes between the lands of different proprietors, and it cannot be shown who originally made the dedication, the right to the soil is in the owners on each side to the central line of the way (c) (2). In like manner, the strips of waste land lying between a high-road and the adjoining enclosures, are supposed primarily to belong to the owners of such enclosures (d). But here again, in both of these cases, the presumption may be rebutted, by proof of the dedication having been made by a particular proprietor; or by evidence that the ground which the way and the waste strips severally occupy, formerly constituted, [*]or still continue to form part, of the lord's common. (e).

(a) Lofft. 358; 1 Roll. Abr. 392. 1. 5. See also Headlam v. Hedley, 1 Holt. N. P. Rep. 463; and Grose v. West, 7 Taunt. 39. (b) See 1 Roll. Abr. 401; 16 Ves. 390; Co. Litt. 122 a, n. 7.

(c) Lofft. 359; 7 Taunt. 41. (d) Grose v. West, 7 Taunt. 39; Headlam v. Hedley, 1 Holt. Rep. 463; Steel v. Pricket, 2 Stark. 463. (e) Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Stra. 1004; Grose v. West, 7 Taunt. 39.

(1) The presumption is that waste land adjoining a road belongs to the owner of the adjoining inclosed land. Pring v. Pearsy, 7 B. & Cr. 304.

(2) Ownership of land adjoining either side of a road is prima facie evidence of a right to the soil extending to the centre of the road. Cooke v. Green, 11 Price, 736.