standing, be taken to fulfil the covenant (a). So if the covenant be to pay money to trustees to be by them laid out in land, and the covenantor purchase himself, the difference in the agent will not be considered material (b). In these cases, the circumstances prescribed,—the consent of the parties interested in the first, and the intervention of the trustees in the second,-are regarded merely as expedients to prevent improper purchases wherefore, if the lands bought be not improper, but adapted to the ends of the intended settlement, as the principal object designed from compliance with the forms required is then attained, and as the covenantor himself might have viewed the matter in this light, his non-compliance furnishes no argument adverse to the conclusion, that his object was to complete the engagement. Neither is the presumption of intent to perform a covenant rebutted by the fact of an antecedent mortgage [*]remaining on the purchased estate; nor again, as it should seem, by the estate being mortgaged at the time for a sum borrowed to enable the (a) Lechmere v. Lechmere, 3 P. Wms. 211; Forr. 80, 92; 1 Cox, 166. (b) Sowden v. Sowden, 1 Bro. C. C. 582; 1 Cox, 165; 3 P. Wms. by Cox, 228, n.; Wilson v. Foreman, Dick. 593; more fully stated 10 Ves. 519, 520; Davys v. Howard, 6 Bro. P. C. by Toml. 370. Care must be taken to distinguish between these cases and that of Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511. In the latter case, trustees of a money settlement had power, with the wife's consent, to lay out the trust money in land. The husband obtained the trust money from the trustees, and purchased a real estate. This estate was held not to be subject to the uses of the settlement; there being no positive stipulation that land should be purchased, but only a proviso, that the trustees might, if they thought fit, invest the money in land, such investment being with the consent, not of the husband, but of the wife alone. buyer to complete his purchase(a). An option to settle a rent charge instead of land, if not acted on, will also be thought insufficient to destroy the presumption, which arises from a purchase being actually made (b). But in order that a purchase may go in performance or satisfaction of a covenant, it is necessary that the estate be of a nature corresponding with the terms of the stipulation, and suited to the end proposed. Where local situation or the species of tenure is particularized, a departure from the agreement in either of these points will, it should seem, exclude the presumption, that the party intended, by such a purchase, to complete the contract. It would be against probability to suppose, that land situate in one county should be bought with a view to discharge an obligation for purchasing land in another; or that copyhold or leasehold estate should be bought in satisfaction of a covenant for the purchase of freehold. Where the locality or tenure, however, is not specified, the question must, it is conceived be decided by the fitness or unfitness of the property to meet the purposes intended. A provision, for example, to be made for a wife during widowhood, and then for the children in equal shares, may reasonably enough be construed as admitting of being fulfilled by a purchase of leasehold property. [*]But if the object be a strict settlement, so that the lands purchased should become part of a family estate, lands of leasehold tenure at least (c), (a) Deacon v. Smith, 3 Atk. tings, 2 Vern. 97. 328. (b) Ibid; and Tooke v. Has (c) 3 P. Wms. 225; Forr. 92. and in some instances copyhold, could scarcely be so taken. Leaseholds are in many particulars incapable of the modifications of which freeholds are susceptible, and they devolve in a different line of representation; and copyholds, from the customs peculiar to the manors whereof they are held, may be equally unadapted to answer the purposes of the projected settlement. stances. Lord Hardwicke is said to have expressed a doubt whether copyholds could at all go in performance of a covenant for purchasing, because of the general nature of the tenure, and the liability to forfeiture (a). But the question seems not to turn on these circumIt rather depends on the fact of the purchase corresponding or not with the terms and intent of the agreement. If there be not any positive inconsistency in this respect, the engagement may properly enough be accounted fulfilled by the gift or descent of copyhold(b): though should such inconsistency really exist, an opposite decision must necessarily follow. And in Pinnell v. Hallett (c) accordingly, it was held that a copyhold estate could not be taken in satisfaction of a covenant to settle land, of which the wife was to be made tenant for life, without impeachment of waste; and that being of the nature of Borough [*]English, descendible to the youngest son, it was inappropriate to the purposes of a settlement, by which the eldest was to be made tenant in tail. (a) 1 Ves. 541. (b) Wilks v. Wilks, 5 Vin. Abr. 293; 2 Eq. Abr. 35, S. C.; Preb ble v. Boghurst, 1 Swans. 309, and the decree, Ib. 580. (c) Amb. 106; 2 Ves. 276. A rent charge comes sufficiently within the description of an estate of inheritance to go in performance or satisfaction of a covenant to settle property of that nature (a). But houses in cities are not held to fall within the same rule. Their liability from so many causes to destruction renders them unfit to answer in terms what is clearly meant to be in its nature indestructible (b). Farm-houses, on the other hand, are an exception to this principle, since they are a necessary appendage to landed property (c).. Reversions expectant upon lives are clearly incapable of being applied in discharge of covenants of this sort, as the provision contracted for is intended to be of immediate, not of remote benefit (d). The purchase of contingent interests is still less capable of being so construed (e). In cases properly of satisfaction the provision made must correspond with that agreed upon both in quality and in quantity of interest; otherwise, the former will be adjudged a bounty. Thus a pecuniary legacy will not prevent a claim to specific performance of a [*]contract for the settlement of land, or for the gift of an annuity (f). So a determinable or limited interest will not be deemed to satisfy a right to that which in degree is absolute. And therefore land, however (a) Middleton v. Pryer, Amb. Wms. 553; also 1 Atk. 428; and 393. Alleyn v. Alleyn, 2 Ves. 37. (b) Pinnel v. Hallet, 2 Ves. 276; Amb. 106. (c) Ibid. (f) See Probert v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 441; Wilks v. Wilks, 2 Eq. Abr. 35; also 7 Bro. P. C. by (d) Forr. 92; 3 P. Wms. 225. Toml. 461. Sed vide 3 Atk. 328. (e) See Crompton v. Sale, 2 P. large the rental, given only for life, will not discharge an engagement to settle an estate in fee: the compensation may, in the event, prove most inadequate,— whence the improbability of a substitution having been intended (a). This latter rule, we may notice, appears to hold as well in cases partaking of the nature of performance, as in cases strictly of satisfaction. And as, on the one hand, an estate for life will not be presumed to be given in lieu of an estate in fee; so, on the other, an estate in fee will not be held to satisfy an estate for life, unless the annual value be equal to the sum stipulated for (b). Scantiness of direct income is but indifferently compensated by a gift of the absolute ownership of property, which, to supply continually recurring deficiencies, must be sold in fractions. In addition to the foregoing particulars, which, according to circumstances, may be resorted to for the purpose of rebutting the legal intendment, it may fur ther be remarked, that the fact of the provision actually furnished having proceeded from another motive than that of discharging the covenant, or of its having been [*]given as an increase of bounty, will serve to negative the presumption (c). In the mixed case of performance and satisfaction, the presumption may also (a) Alleyn v. Alleyn, 2 Ves. 37. (b) Eastwood v. Vinke, 2 P. Wms. 614; Broughton v. Erring. ton, 7 Bro. P. C. by Toml. 461. (c) Mathews v. Mathews, 2 Ves. 635; Hooke v. Grove, 2 Eq. |