could be desired. The whole duty of enrolment, organisation, payment, drill, and discipline is entrusted to Staff Officers of Pensioners. The numbers of men of all services, pensioners and others, vary in different districts, which are of two classes: 400 to 800 being second-class divisions, 800 to 2,000 constituting first-class divisions.

In addition to this Army of Reserve we have à body of Yeomanry Cavalry, consisting of Regiments raised in different counties, and numbering some fifteen thousand men. They are, for the most part, country gentlemen, well mounted (many of them on the same horses which they ride in the hunting-field), and the horses are in almost every case the property of the troopers or of their near relatives. Where can any better material for Cavalry be found? more especially for Irregular Cavalry, in whom, for outpost, escort, or orderly duty, a knowledge of the country and habits of self-reliance are invaluable. Each troop is thoroughly drilled in its own district every year before it joins the Regiment, and eight days are devoted entirely to Regimental drill. These troop-drills are carried on without the cost of a farthing to the country, and often at considerable inconvenience to the men, who have some distance to ride to and from the place of exercise.

But after all said and done, this numerically and patriotically strong Force has been found deficient in organisation. No scheme had up to 1868 been devised for its mobilisation. The appointment of a single General to command the entire Force was a step in the right direction, and it is probable that long before the national defenders are called upon to display their skill, gallantry, and devotion, the Reserve and the Volunteers will form a combined armament as useful in the complete character of its organisation as it is creditable for its zeal and numbers.

CHAPTER XLVI.

The Expedition to Abyssinia in 1868-The War in New Zealand.

In the course of the narrative which occupies the foregoing pages, the failure of several expeditions projected with little wisdom, and conducted with less skill, has been recorded. The objects of those expeditions may have appeared to the minds of their projectors politically necessary, and their choice of untried leaders was not entirely without precedent; but as disasters of a serious character, rather than the success which had been anticipated, followed upon the enterprises, there is warranty for the assumption that the conception and execution of the projects were alike faulty.

It is now the historian's pleasant office to narrate the leading incidents of an enterprise as thoroughly justifiable in its inception as it was ably and successfully carried out.

For commercial purposes a Consulate had been established in Abyssinia for some years. It was believed that an opening might be made for the introduction of European manufactures into a part of the African continent which had thitherto been entirely dependent upon its home-made goods; and a further hope was entertained that Gospel truth might be propagated in the highways created by peaceable trade. Missionaries consequently resorted to Abyssinia with the usual commendable purpose, and for some time pursued their praiseworthy calling with energy, if not with effect. But neither the Consul nor the missionaries found favour in the sight of Theodorus, the King. A man of dissipated habits and tyrannical disposition, he was impatient of the presence of foreigners who were not subservient to his ends and obedient to his wild decrees. After several disputes with Mr Cameron, the Consul, he cast him into a dungeon, and loaded him with fetters. This act of tyranny he followed up by the incarceration of the missionaries. A representative of the British Government, despatched with a letter to remonstrate with the King, was treated with indignity, and all pacific overtures were utterly disregarded. Reckless of human life in his moments of intoxication, Theodorus constantly ordered the execution of his helpless subjects, and the members of the tribes with whom he was continually at war; and a similar fate was anticipated by the European captives. Earnest appeals on their behalf were addressed to the British Government, and it was suggested that force should be employed to effect their rescue. two important considerations weighed with the authorities and the public'in delaying the adoption of this suggestion. The expense would be heavy, involving three or four millions sterling, and the chances were great that a manifestation of hostility might lead to the immediate massacre of the unhappy prisoners. Much time was consumed in debating the question, and, strange to say, public writers were not wanting who derided the idea of a costly expedition merely to save a few lives. At length the voice of humanity was heard, and England, awakening to a sense of her own dignity, resolved upon the despatch of an Army that should be large enough to penetrate the country—a terra incognita to the major part of the European world-and either snatch the victims of his wrath from the hands of King Theodore, or, should they have been sacrificed, take signal vengeance upon the savage monarch by destroying his strongholds and annihilating his Army.

But

Ten thousand fighting men drawn from the

*

Bombay Establishment constituted the expedition, and Sir Robert Napier, of whom honourable mention has been made in connection with the wars and mutiny in India, was appointed to the chief command. A Force more complete in its equipment and organisation, or better adapted to the object in view, never yet took the field. The European part of the Army consisted of the 3rd Dragoons, the 4th, 26th, 33rd, and 45th Regiments of Foot, several batteries of Artillery, and companies of Engineers. An Engineer Officer himself, acquainted by report with the formidable character of the country he was appointed to invade, Sir Robert Napier appreciated the value of an arm without which no roads could be made nor any siege attempted. The European branch of the Force was supplemented by Punjaubee Pioneers, Bombay sepoys, Madras Sappers, Scinde Horse, and Bombay and Bengal Light Cavalry. The accessories of the expedition were upon a scale of unexampled completeness. There was a Land Transport Train comprehending 4,682 camels, 9,793 mules, 954 ponies, 4,278 pack bullocks, and 534 draught bullocks; materials for the construction of railways and telegraphic lines, apparatus for photographers and signallers, appliances for sinking wells, and all the requisite instruments for conducting a trigonometrical survey of the country. To this efficient Force was added a considerable body of seamen from the convoying men-of-war, who formed a Naval Brigade, to be employed in gun and rocket batteries; and in order that there should be no scant supply of water while the troops remained at the place of debarkation, the Peninsular and Oriental Company, whose vessels were employed in transporting a portion of the troops, erected distilling machines on the shore, where salt water was rapidly made a palatable and wholesome drink.

The means were well adapted to the momentous end. Happily, Sir Robert Napier was not hampered in his arrangements by the interference of other authorities. To himself alone the Government wisely committed the plan and execution of the enterprise. Its magnitude was not realised

* Sir Robert Napier bore a name that had acquired a sort of monopoly of Military glory. Sir Charles, Sir William, and Sir George Napier held conspicuous places on the rolls of fame, and there were others of the name who had reaped distinction. Sir Robert had fought and been wounded at the battle of Ferozeshah, and again at the siege of Mooltan. He was a Chief-Engineer at the battle of Goojerat, carried out all Lord Dalhousie's works in the Punjaub, shared in the battles round Lucknow as chief of Sir James Outram's Staff, was engaged at Gwalior and other places during the mutiny, and fought in the great campaign which ended in the capture of Pekin. He was the son of Captain Napier, an artillerist of the highest character, who attained the rank of Major in 1812, and died soon afterwards.

66

until the hour of triumph arrived. It required three or four months for the completion of the great work. In that time the invading Army had penetrated 400 miles of the most difficult country in the world. Sometimes it clambered heights 10,000 feet above the level of the sea, and then descended into deep valleys only to scale other lofty acclivities scarped by nature and often nearly perpendicular. Alps on Alps arose." As the Army advanced the Abyssinian monarch concentrated his power in the fortress of Magdala, which he fondly believed was inaccessible to an enemy, and utterly impregnable. Several powerful tribes held the country between Magdala and the starting point of the Army. Some of these were hostile to Theodorus, and some were favourable to his interests from very fear of his wrath and power. Sir Robert Napier courted the co-operation of the former, and menaced or bought over the latter. The barriers interposed by Nature to the advance of the British troops were so great that a skilful soldier, with a handful of troops and a few guns, might have effectually checked the progress of the expedition until the change of season had added another and still more formidable obstacle to its success. But Theodorus apparently believed that lofty rocky barriers were in themselves sufficient impediments. He was profoundly ignorant of the marvellous resources of science, and unduly estimated the power of European perseverance. Thus, until Sir Robert Napier reached the pass of Arogie, contiguous to Magdala, not a shot was fired on either side. The story of the climax of the long and tedious march, which, as told de die in diem in the journals, read like chapters of Herodotus, or pages of the Anabasis, may be given in the words of Sir Robert himself:

"6 Relying on the admirable spirit of my Force I was prepared to commit myself against Magdala. Besides the view which I had obtained of Magdala and its approaches, I received most valuable information from a chief named 'Beitwuddun Hailo,' who had recently deserted from Magdala. Having engaged in some intrigues with Menelek, King of Shoa, he knew well that his lot would be instant death on his master's arrival. It is difficult to give, by description alone, a sufficient idea of the formidable position which we were about to assail.

"The fortress of Magdala is about twelve miles from the right bank of the Bashilo, but the great altitude and the purity of the atmosphere exhibited the whole outline distinctly. The centre of the position is the rock of Selassie, elevated more than 9,000 feet above the sea, and standing on a plateau called Islamgie, which is divided into several extensive terraces, with perpendicular scarps of basalt; a saddle connects these ter

races with the hill called Fahla. Fahla is a gigantic natural bastion, level on the top, entirely open, and commanded by Islamgie. It domineers completely, at an elevation of 1,200 feet, over all approaches to Islamgie; the sides appeared precipitous, and the summit, surrounded by a natural scarp of rock, accessible only in a few places, and from eighteen to twenty feet in height. Nearly concealed from view by Selassie and Fahla, the top of Magdala was partially visible. The road to Magdala winds up the steep side of Fahla, subject to its fire, and to the descent of rocks and stones. One part of the road is so steep that few horses, except those bred in the country, could carry their riders up or down it. The whole road is flanked by the end of Selassie and the broad side scarp of Islamgie. Altogether, without taking into account Magdala itself, the formidable character of its outworks exceeded anything which we could possibly have anticipated from the faint description of the position which had reached us. The refugee chief, Beitwuddun Hailo, was very anxious that I should try the south side, at the Kaffir Burr (gate), from the opposite range called Janta, saying, 'If you want to take Selassie go from hence; but if you want Magdala you must go from Janta.' This, however, would have been impossible. I had not force enough to divide, and I could not place this vast combination of natural fortresses between me and my direct line of communication. I also perceived that the real point to be taken was not Magdala but Islamgie, where Theodore had taken post with all his guns, and that Fahla was the key to the whole. On the 7th I descended to the bed of the Bashilo, and reconnoitred the crossing. The ordinary approach to Magdala is by the Arogie ravine, which commences under Islamgie, and is bounded on its right by a spur which extends from Islamgie, in a serrated ridge, to the Bashilo. A similar spur

from Fahla stretches to the water of the Bashilo, and bounds the ravine on its left. The highest point of this ridge is about 2,000 feet above the bed of the Arogie ravine. The grand features of the ground rendered it impossible for me, with my small Force of Infantry, to hold both sides of the ravine. I considered Fahla the key of the position, and determined to occupy the ridge, bearing in different parts the names of Gimborgi and Affijo, which leads to that imposing outwork. Established on this ridge, I could operate on either side of Fahla, as might seem expedient on closer examination.'

When the advanced guard of the British reached the Arogie Pass and contiguous plain Theodorus sent his entire Force to meet them, and an encounter took place, which resulted in the complete defeat of the Abyssinians, with very heavy loss, and the dispersion of the sur

"The British loss was only twenty wounded, two mortally; this disparity of loss resulted from the determined and persistent attack of the Abyssinians against a better disciplined and better armed Force-not better armed, however, as re

garded the 23rd Pioneers, whose smooth-bore is hardly equal to the double-barrelled percussion gun of the Abyssinians. There was no hasty flight. The enemy returned again and again to the attack, wherever the ground favoured them. I issued orders to provide against the pursuit being carried too far up the hill, which could only have ended by our retiring and giving renewed confidence to the enemy. On the morning of the 11th, Lieutenant Prideaux and Mr Flad arrived in my camp, accompanied by Dejach Alema, a son-in-law and confidential chief of Theodore, with a request for peace. I replied that if Theodore would bring all the European captives to my camp, and submit to the Queen of England, I would promise honourable treatment for himself and his family. Lieutenant Prideaux returned to Magdala with the letter containing these terms. In the course of the forenoon he returned again to the British camp with Mr Flad, but without Dejach Alema. He brought a letter without seal or signature from Theodore, refusing my terms. My letter was returned. I sent back Lieutenant Prideaux and Mr Flad to intimate that no other terms would be granted. I considered that a fuller atonement than the surrender of the captives, when they could be retained no longer, was absolutely required, and must be exacted; and painful as was the thought of the possible consequences to the captives if Theodore's rage should become excited, I relied for their safety on the apprehension of a renewal of the conflict, which demoralised Theodore's troops, and from which Theodore himself was not free, as was involuntarily betrayed by Dejach Alema. I relied also on my threat, which I impressed on Dejach Alema, of unrelenting pursuit and punishment of all who might in any way be concerned in the ill-treatment of the European captives. I pointed out how the power of Great Britain had already reached Magdala; that no corner of Abyssinia, however remote, could screen any one whom we wished to punish. Lieutenant Prideaux was met on his return to Magdala by Mr Rassam and the remainder of the British prisoners and several of those of other nations, all of whom arrived in my camp before evening. My further conditions were not complied with. At the request of Dejach Alema, I had promised to abstain from hostilities for twenty-four hours. After the lapse of forty-eight hours Theodore had not surrendered himself. Reliable informa

tion reached me that his Army was recovering from their defeat, that many soldiers who had been unable to return to Magdala on the night of the 10th had since rejoined their ranks, that fresh defensive arrangements were being made, and that Theodore and his chiefs even contemplated a night attack on the second Brigade, encamped on the lower ground. I therefore prepared to attack the enemy's position. I had originally intended first to assault Fahla from the side which fronted our camp, and was screened from the fire of Islamgie and Selassie. But under the altered condition of the enemy, Theodore having by death, wounds, and desertion lost half of his Army and his bravest chiefs, I determined to attack Islamgie by the King's road. All arrangements for this had been considered, and the positions for the artillery reconnoitred and fixed upon, when information was brought to me that Theodore had left Magdala, and that many of the chiefs, with their followers, wished to surrender. I agreed to accept their submission, and ordered Sir Charles Staveley to advance on Islamgie, relaxing no precautions that I had considered necessary for the attack.

"The scarcity of water rendered it impossible to retain any considerable body of Cavalry before Magdala; my personal escort, under a Native Officer, only remained, and, with a few details of other Corps, was sent under command of Lieutenant Scott, A.D.C., to watch the west side of Magdala, where they took up a good position until the arrival of the Cavalry, under Colonel Graves, who completed the investment up to the Kaffir Burr Gate, which was watched by the Gallas. The Bashilo was held by the Head-quarter Detachment of the Scinde Horse, under Major Briggs, and detachments of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, 3rd and 12th Cavalry, under Major Miller, to secure that point and provide against the escape of the enemy in that direction, by the Minjerra ravine. A detachment of the Beloochees under Lieutenant Beville ascended by the spurs of Fahla, and occupied that important position, where they were reinforced from the 2nd Brigade by the Head-quarters wing of the 10th N.I., under Colonel Field. The artillery was placed in posi tion, and the troops advanced, preceded by Captain Speedy, of the Intelligence Department, with a small escort of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Loch, to communicate with the Chiefs who wished to surrender, and to prevent any misunderstanding. No resistance was offered. Sir Charles Staveley effected an entrance to Islamgie and Selassie through a difficult crevice in the rocky escarps. It would be impossible to arrive at any correct estimate either of the number of armed men who laid down their weapons, or of the masses of people-men, women, and

children-whom we found on Islamgie. It was necessary to collect and guard the arms that were surrendered. It was also necessary to send down all the disarmed soldiers, and the miscellaneous multitude that followed them, to the plain below, before I could proceed actively against Magdala. Theodore himself, having abandoned his attempt to escape, was making preparations for defence, and offering us defiance in front of Magdala. By three o'clock, the Abyssinians having nearly all cleared away from Islamgie, I ordered the attack on Magdala to be at once carried out. The entrance of Magdala is 300 feet above the terreplein of Islamgie, and the ascent is by an extremely steep and rugged path. Viewing the very difficult nature of the approach, I made the attack as strong as possible, and massed the whole of my artillery fire to cover it, in order to overpower the enemy's resistance, and prevent the heavy casualties which I should otherwise have incurred. The assaulting force consisted of the 2nd Brigade, led by the 33rd (Duke of Wellington's) Regiment, accompanied by detachments of the Royal Engineers and Madras and Bombay Sappers and Miners, to clear away obstacles-the first Brigade to be a close support. I concentrated the fire of the Artillery on the gateway and the north end of the fort, which were crowded with the houses of the soldiers, avoiding, as much as possible, the higher part of the interior, occupied by the Abys sinian prisoners and non-combatants. The enemy carefully concealed themselves from view, so that the place seemed almost deserted, though, when entered by our troops, it was found to be thronged with soldiers who had thrown away their arms, released prisoners, and the numerous voluntary and involuntary followers of Theodore's fortunes. The artificial defences consisted of stone walls, loophooled and surmounted by strong and thick barricades of thorny stakes with narrow stone gateways; the lower one built upon the interior, the higher one being 70 feet above the lower, and approached by a very steep, narrow path winding amongst the soldiers' huts.

"The attack was ably conducted by Sir Charles Staveley, and gallantly carried out by the troops. Fortunately the defences were very unscientifically constructed, and though the attack was met by a short fire from the enemy, yet they could not direct it on the head of the storming party without exposing themselves to the rapid and fatal fire of the Snider rifle, and our loss was, in consequence, very small. The Royal Engineers and Sappers, and leading sections of the 33rd Regiment, were long before they could force an entrance, and during this time nine Officers and men received wounds or contusions. At length an entrance was found by means of the ladders near the gate, and by the leading men of the 33rd, who

scaled a rock and turned the defences of the gateway. The enemy were driven to the second barricade, and when that was carried all resistance ceased. Amongst the dead near the outer gateway were found several of Theodore's most devoted chiefs-one of them, Dejach Enjeda, had urged Theodore to murder all the captives, a course from which he was dissuaded by others. Close to the second gateway lay the body of Theodore. At the moment when the barricade was forced by the 33rd, Theodore fell, as I have since learned, by his own hands. His troops immediately fled-some by the Kaffir Burr gate, which we found choked with arms that had been cast away in their flight. Of these fugitives, the greater part fell into the hands of the Gallas, and the remainder, seeing the fate of their comrades, and hearing the taunting invitations of the Gallas, returned to Magdala and surrendered.'

Very little booty was captured by the Army It consisted chiefly of spears, swords, carpets, silver ornaments, crosses, and croziers taken from various churches by the common spoliator, Theodorus, bibles (curiously illustrated), guns, pistols, gauntlets, saddles, bridles, &c. All these articles were sold by public auction for a few thousands of pounds, and the proceeds distributed among the troops. The only articles retained were three silver drums, which were presented as trophies to the Regiments who took the foremost part in the actions at Arogie and the storming of Magdala, and a crown or two, a seal, two robes, and some jewels, which were forwarded to Queen Victoria.

Sir Robert Napier having destroyed Magdala, leaving it merely "a blackened rock," marched back his Army in precisely the same order in which it had advanced, and when he reached the plain of Dalsulo he reviewed the force in presence of the rescued captives, and addressed it in the following terms:

"Soldiers of the Army of Abyssinia,-The Queen and the people of England entrusted to you a very arduous and difficult expedition, to release our countrymen from a long and painful captivity, and to vindicate the honour of our country, which had been outraged by Theodore, King of Abyssinia. I congratulate you with all my heart on the noble way in which you have fulfilled the commands of our Sovereign. You have traversed, often under a tropical sun, or amidst storms of rain and sleet, four hundred miles of mountainous

It is singular that in his despatch Sir Robert Napier should have omitted to mention the share which the 1st Battalion 4th Foot had in the action. That Battalion was actually in contact with the enemy, and had the only casualty of the war amongst the Officers. The Colonel who commanded was wounded, and received the C.B. in consequence.

and difficult country. You have crossed many steep and precipitous ranges of mountains, more than 10,000 feet in altitude, where your supplies could not keep up with you. When you arrived within reach of your enemy, though with scanty food, and some of you for many hours without either food or water, in four days you passed the formidable chasm of the Bashilo, and defeated the Army of Theodore, which poured down upon you from their lofty fortress in full confidence of victory.

"A host of many thousands have laid down their arms at your feet. You have captured and destroyed upwards of thirty pieces of artillery, many of great weight and efficiency, with ample stores of ammunition. You have stormed the almost inaccessible fortress of Magdala, defended by Theodore, with the desperate remnant of his chiefs and followers. After you forced the entrance, Theodore, who never showed mercy, distrusted the offer of mercy held out to him, and died by his own hand. You have released, not only the British captives, but those of other friendly nations. You have unloosed the chains of more than ninety of the principal chiefs of Abyssinia. Magdala, on which so many victims have been slaughtered, has been committed to the flames, and remains only a scorched rock. Our complete and rapid success is due, first to the mercy of God, whose hand I feel assured has been over us in a just cause; secondly, to the high spirit with which you have been inspired. Indian soldiers have forgotten the prejudices of race and creed to keep pace with their European comrades. Never has an Army entered on a war with more honourable feelings than yours; this has carried you through many fatigues and difficulties; you have only been eager for the moment when you could close with your enemy. The remembrance of your privations will pass away quickly, but your gallant exploit will live in history. The Queen and the people of England will appreciate your services. On my part, as your Commander, I thank you for your devotion to your duty, and the good discipline you have maintained. Not a single complaint has been made against a soldier of fields injured or villages wilfully molested in property or person. We must not forget what is due to our comrades who have been labouring for us in the sultry climate of Zoula and the pass of Koomaylee, or in the monotony of the posts which maintained our communications. Each and all would have given all they possessed to be with us; but they deserve our gratitude.

"I shall watch over your safety to the moment of your re-embarkation, and to the end of my life remember with pride that I have commanded you. (Signed) "R. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General,

"Commander-in-Chief.

Camp Dalsulo, April 20, 1868."