the use which was constantly made by Lee of Jackson's force. Probably, therefore, it may be assumed that the severity of fire along the front of a position will cause the first attempts to be nearly always made against one or other flanks. Obviously, however, as soon as this comes to be a recognised principle, and the assailing body begins to extend round to a flank, the defender will extend against him, and the problem will be to know exactly at what point the possible degree of extension is reached and passed. It will therefore require all a general's care to know how far to trust the defensive power of his own line, and when his enemy has overstrained his. At present we have no data on which to found a judgment as to what the defensive power of the breech-loader, in cases of extreme extension, is likely to be against very good troops. It is a question which it will take all the genius of the greatest generals to solve in each particular case. The elements concerned in the matter are obviously of infinite variety; the moral are probably more important than the material.* * It may be sufficient to point out generally that the detail of retreat from a position, whether on the offence or on the defence, does not fall within the terms of the proposed subject. It is necessary, however, to the completeness of the argument in favour of the proposed general scheme of fighting on either side, to observe that the risks of retreat are not enhanced by attempting to meet the difficulties of our present form of fighting by organisation and successive reserves, rather than by in vain straining to maintain a close-order fight which inevitably dissolves in practice. The distinction between the form in which the Prussians and French severally fought after each had begun to realise the necessity for change, was not that the French were less scattered than the Prussians; on the contrary, they are expressly said to have been much more so. The distinction was this, the Prussian training had prepared them to be in hand though scattered. The French, unprepared for any other use of skirmishes than an auxiliary one, were out of hand as soon as they were scattered. The detail of retreat has been suggested by Prince Hohenlohe. 165 THE DEFENCE. (d.) MODE OF COMBINING AND EMPLOYING THE DIFFERENT ARMS FOR RECEIVING THE AT- THE defensive, like the offensive, appears chiefly to require such modifications as will give the weapons fuller play, and will as far as possible diminish the effect of the extreme destruction of the enemy's fire. Under this aspect, some rules which have passed down to us from times when the effect of fire was less the all-governing consideration than it is now, seem to require modification. It will almost always be infinitely better for the defender to select such a position as will enable him to bring a thoroughly sweeping fire to bear on all points, than to defend ground which presents physical difficulties to an enemy's approach, but affords the latter some degree of cover from fire. This is now true, even in a case in which the defender is restricted entirely to the defensive. The objections which have always existed to having in front of a defensive position much difficult ground, retain all their force in the usual case of a defensive preparatory to offence. Perhaps, however, sometimes the most difficult ground of all over which to pass from defence to offence will now be that which is perfectly open, but on the further side of which an enemy can secure a satisfactory position. It has been stated on good authority, though not, so far as I am aware, in any of the histories of the war, that at Spicheren the French skirmishers were unable to remain in advance of the main body, because, in consequence of the extreme steepness of the ground in front of the position, they could not have made any safe retreat in presence of the terrible fire of those advancing against them. This in itself suggests a new objection to the assumption of positions dependent for their strength on the steepness of the fall of the ground. In almost all cases where a position has fallen during the late war, except when the defender's ammunition has been exhausted, the approach has been made over difficult ground not well exposed to fire. The first thing, therefore, to be obtained, if it can be in any way secured, even at a sacrifice of more perfect cover, is as clear a view and field for fire as may be; not less than 2500 yards if possible.* I cannot help thinking that we are too apt to underrate the importance of this in our preparations for defence. Nothing can be more admirable than the principles advocated in our field-exercise book on the subject of rapid intrenchment. But for one place * Das heutige Gefecht, p. 29. that has fallen, because the men on the defensive had not sufficient cover, a dozen have fallen because the obstacles to fire in the front have not been cleared away. The very fact that men are on the defensive, and therefore stationary, gives them, if they use the natural cover obtainable, so much less exposure than those who must move rapidly from position to position, that it ought to be the object of the defence to emphasise this advantage which they already possess, by depriving the assailants of all chance of finding shelter. It would seem, therefore, quite as important to train men habitually to calculate how much ground can be cleared in a given time, and in what way it can best be done, as to teach them how to throw up intrenchments. Moreover, what were obstacles advantageous to the defendant in former times have ceased to be so. In principle, no doubt, an obstacle running perpendicularly to the front of a position, and ending there, will now as ever divide an assailant's forces, and therefore be of advantage to the defender. But it seems no longer to be true that this applies to hedgerows and minor obstacles of that kind. Formerly a bayonet-charge might have driven back the enemy along one side of a hedge, without its being possible that he should be supported from the other side. The risk might then have been serious. Now the support against the counter-assault afforded by skirmishers. moving up to the hedge and firing through it, would be almost as great as if the hedge were not there. |