to pretend that it is an ineradicable one. The fact is due to an old system, for which the previous training was admirably fitted. That system can exist no longer; but till we have fairly shaken off its trammels, let us prefer that form of fighting which gives us the best opportunity for the use of those high qualities which under it were developed. It may be that our soldiers will not at once recover as an army the reputation which Colonel Gawler justly boasts that they always possessed as skirmishers, where they were known by experience, not by vague report. But, at least, unless all that was taught by our grand old discipline has disappeared, they will not skirmish much worse after many an hour's heavy artillery-fire than they would have done before it. It has always been when both sides have been long pounding that the true worth of our soldiery has come out.* This is the precise trial to which modern war subjects infantry on the defensive. If they can meet it, and are not utterly overmatched in numbers, victory is theirs. * "La mort était devant eux," says Foy of our infantry at Waterloo ; "la honte derrière. En cette terrible occurrence, les boulets de la garde impériale, lancés à brûle-pourpoint, et la cavalerie de France victorieuse ne purent pas entamer l'immobile infanterie britannique. On eut été tenté de croire qu'elle avait pris racine dans la terre, si ses bataillons ne se fussent ébranlés majestueusement quelques minutes après le coucher du soleil, alors.”—Foy, p. 323. 99 RETAINING POWER OF SMALL BODIES. FROM a general consideration of the facts I have been urging, another very important deduction may also be drawn. The temporary retaining power of a relatively small number of men has very largely increased, and this is yet more notably so in the case of small bodies expecting reinforcement. If infantry has acquired so great a power of resisting the attacks of infantry or cavalry, it results that the only method by which a position at all favourable to defence can be carried, is either by first accumulating against some special part of it an overwhelming fire of artillery, or by long turning movements. Now a body expecting large reinforcements is to a great extent protected against the dangers of being turned: the accumulation of artillery against a special position can never be a very rapid operation. The subsequent "preparation" for attack is also lengthy. Hence there seems every reason why a moderate force, if able to secure a good defensive position, should hold its own for a much more considerable period than formerly. It will suffer more than formerly if it has to fall back after the attack has developed; but a body expecting reinforcement is not easily forced to fall back. THE MARCH. (a.) MODE OF FORMING THE COLUMNS OF MARCH WHEN A COLLISION WITH THE ENEMY MAY IT is necessary to deal in succession with various kinds of marches, all within range of possible collision with the enemy. I take first the march during the opening of a campaign, before an enemy's position is accurately known, and when the two armies may be at a considerable distance from one another, though the distance is uncertain. In this case there seems no reason why armies should not, in ordinary country, be habitually preceded by large numbers of their cavalry, as was Napoleon's custom when he had sufficient to employ.* On more than one occasion he narrowly escaped being severely punished, because, either from not having enough light cavalry to spare for this work, or from having neglected the precaution, * Operations of War, p. 423. he was without the information with which they usually provided him.* The brilliant use which the Prussians made of the same arrangement in the late campaign shows, as might be inferred from a consideration of the facts, that, under modern conditions, this advanced position has become more than ever the right one for all the light cavalry of an army. The necessity for ample information as to the enemy, even if it be acquired at some risk, or even loss, has become more than ever pressing: the character of the action of cavalry on the battle-field has materially modified. For reasons * Notably at Görlitz in 1813, and on the day before Montenotti. The most striking instance of the importance which he attached to the matter is the truce after Bautzen. That truce, one of the most direct causes of his fall, in so far as it was due to military calculations, seems to have been really wrung from him, more by the sense of the risks to which he had been exposed from being without cavalry, than even to his annoyance at the extent to which their loss deprived him of the fruits of victory. On the other hand, Captain Baring has pointed out that in the Ulm campaign the cavalry outposts were on the Danube at the very beginning of the great march. + Captain Lahure speaks as if the Prussians had in this campaign invented the idea of "independent cavalry corps," an expression by which he appears to imply, amongst other uses, this of cavalry pushed forward far in front of the army. It is some consolation to learn from the other 'Conference Belge,' probably the most complete military monogiaph in existence, that the names of Murat, Kellerman, Seidlitz, are not yet in danger of being forgotten. One may be permitted to remark, however, that the difference in 1815 between the Prussian army and our own was, that our front was watched by an “independent cavalry corps," and that the Prussian was not; that we did obtain full information as to what occurred in front of us, and that the Prussians, to our mutual cost, did not, at all events, succeed in conveying early intelligence to us. |