Ever to be prepared for a repulse is the great safeguard in all encounters of cavalry with cavalry. However brave and determined a body of horsemen may be, there is a limit to their energies, and sooner or later we must expect the first line to falter. For even supposing their efforts to be successful in the first instance, it is always probable that the enemy will bring up his reserves, and then the scattered squadrons of the first line will be forced to yield, and to rally behind the second. Good cavalry on such occasions spread out on their retreat, and make room for the reserve squadrons to come up; but young cavalry, if overpowered, are apt to crowd together, and the second line is thus in danger of being carried off with the dense mass of fugitives. Whenever this is to be feared, the intervals may be made of double width, by uniting two columns into one, as in the following diagram. Such double columns offer the advantage of solidity combined with great mobility, presenting, as they do, a respectable front, which can be increased fourfold by successive deployment right and left, and

ruin of both. Figure 13 represents the order of battle for a brigade of sixteen squadrons, drawn up in two lines, as prescribed in Cooke's U. S. Cavalry Tactics, § 619.

Fig. 13.

threatening by an outward movement of each separate squadron, the flanks of an enemy who should be too ardent in pursuit.

A cavalry officer must know how to mask his intentions, and be able under all circumstances quickly to present as large a front as is compatible with the safety of his flanks. He must know beforehand that he seldom comes upon the enemy exactly in the position in which he expected to find him; for the latter does not willingly afford an opportunity of carrying out a preconcerted plan of attack, while the least move on his part necessitates a countermove, which must always be made without hesitation. It is important, therefore, to calculate with the utmost precision the exact time required to carry out a movement, and never to attempt one unless confident that there is time to complete it; for cavalry caught in the act of forming must be overthrown if its adversary knows how to profit by the opportunity.

To draw the enemy into some movement which forces him to expose his flank, should always be the great aim of a cavalry commander. "A manœuvre," says De Brack, "which I have

seen invariably attended with success, when two lines are watching each other without stirring, both waiting for a favorable moment to attack, is to make a squadron break forth in column from behind one of our flanks, and press forward, as if to turn the enemy's flank. They will immediately wheel into column to prevent this; then at once sound the gallop and bear down upon them; you have every chance of success. This manoeuvre is the whole art of war in miniature." A similar stratagem has been suggested on a large scale for three lines of cavalry, the first consisting of light horse deployed in line, the second of reserve cavalry equally deployed, and the third of cavalry of the line, formed in small open columns, as in the following diagram :

If the enemy is vigorous, he confidently expects to throw back the light horse upon the second line, whose deployment he is apt to consider a mistake, and he advances resolutely to the charge. As soon, however, as he has come within proper distance, our first line suddenly wheels out at full speed from the centre, as if to make a most formidable flank attack, and just in time to clear the front of the second line, which, meanwhile, has taken the gallop. Not being prepared for this, the enemy

is not likely to make the same manœuvre ; he will rather press his charge in order to take our first line in the flank; thus he will meet our second at a disadvantage in point of weight and velocity; or he will make a general flank movement, and be caught in the act by the latter. At any rate, there will be some moment of hesitation and confusion, the least of which will prove fatal to him.

The difficulty of advancing with a long line, and the danger of being driven back on all points at once, often make it expedient to use echelons instead of attempting to charge on a large front in line. Moreover, an attack in echelons possesses the advantage of not engaging all our forces at once, and of enabling us to employ the part not engaged for the support of any threatened point. It is especially when troops must deploy from column into line, as when debouching from a defile, that the order in echelons offers peculiar advantages, for it does not require the troops to wait until all shall have come into line in order to commence the charge; it is sufficient if only the first echelon is formed, the other meanwhile coming up in succession. So long as the deployment is not completed, the enemy will remain uncertain as to the real point of attack, and this uncertainty is all in our favor. For suppose, with our first two or three echelons we threaten his left; he will naturally reënforce it. We can then, with the rest, attack his weakened right, which is likely to yield before superior forces, for the rapidity of our movements will not allow any successful counter mancuvring. If the leading echelon is victorious, it takes the enemy in the flank; while the others attack him in front; if defeated, the succeeding echelons will charge him in flank, should he venture to pursue the vanquished.

All the necessary dispositions to charge ought to be made beyond reach of the enemy, and under cover of a line of skirmishers. The officers commanding these must keep a watchful

eye upon the flanks, so as not to overlook any movement toward them favored by the ground or covered by woods or enclosures. The skirmishers are generally accompanied by some officers or non-commissioned officers, sent out to reconnoitre the ground over which the attack is likely to be made, and to notice every local feature which may be turned to account, or may prevent their own troops from attempting to charge amid obstacles that might involve them in destruction; such as marshes, quicksands, stumps of small trees, even ditches and hollow ways. The former put a stop to all encounter, the latter may prove very dangerous if not parallel to the front. If the enemy is ambitious to clear them, by all means let him do so, and fall on him before he has recovered his order or resumed his speed.

If, when advancing toward an enemy, he turns to retreat, the attack is made in open order with part of the troops, the remainder following in regular order at the trot. Such open attack, called "charge as foragers," is more effective on an enemy retreating in disorder than one made in a compact mass, as the horses have more freedom than when moving in the ranks. Each man, moreover, acting for himself, makes for the nearest foe, and is more likely to catch the enemy and inflict loss upon him than if all pursued in a body.

Cavalry seldom meet each other in a charge executed from both sides at full speed; the squadrons in which there is the least courage and discipline, hesitate, waver, and generally turn before joining issue. Sometimes, also, two brave corps of cavalry approach each other slowly and seemingly in default of spirit, though their lines are yet unbroken, and no obstacle intervenes. With them it is not lack of courage, but an instinctive appreciation of each other's valor, which for a moment possesses and restrains them. But let aught occur to break the spell and rouse their passions, and the collision will