*

be, since possible existence may still remain to it—as a fine head of hair to a man who has just had his head shaved. He says, next: "When we bring these two judgments (concepts) together in the proposition A is B, the new judgment which we make has nothing to do with the existence either of A or of B, nor has it really anything to do with existence as such. The existence both of A and of B has been already presupposed in the two concepts, and when these two existing things are brought into apposition, no third existence is thereby supposed to have been created." Most certainly not. What madman ever thought that by saying, "A cat is a carnivorous beast," he created even one existence? But, assuming that Mr. Romanes means, "No third existence is thereby supposed to have been affirmed," we may again ask, what madman ever thought that by saying, "A cat is a carnivorous beast," he affirmed a "third existence"? What is affirmed in such a predication is, that a cat is a real creature which possesses those attributes which distinguish the class of animals termed carnivorous. Herein actual being or existence is implied. But the assertion might have been, “A mermaid is a creature half a woman and half a fish," and here again being or existence is implied. But it is no longer actual, material existence, but ideal existence. Nevertheless, such ideal existence is really existence of a kind. There is such an idea: my mind possesses it while I write, and whatever I actually possess must at least be. Such reality in ideal existence must be admitted by Mr. Romanes, since he tells us "the

p. 172.

existence of both A and B has been already presupposed in the two concepts." But the two things thus coupled can only be distinct ideally, since no two materially distinct existences can really be identically the same. We cannot say of two leaves the most alike to be found in a whole forest, that one is the other.

Mr. Romanes further contradicts himself expressly when he says that "the proposition A is B" has nothing. to do with existence. For he has told us, "The existence both of A and B has been already presupposed in the two concepts." But if "existence" is supposed in each of the two concepts by itself, surely their conjunction cannot immediately drive such existence out of both of them; and if not, at least as much existence as was in them separately, must be present in the express judgment their conjunction produces! Mr. Romanes will hardly try to explain this confusion of thought by referring to his qualification "as such" in his phrase, "The proposition A is B has really nothing to do with existence as such." Of course, no one is so absurd as to pretend that when we say A is B, our main intention is to call attention to, and to insist upon, the fact that A exists and B exists. No one could possibly mean that when we say, "A cat is a carnivorous beast," our main intention is to call attention to, and insist upon, the fact that a cat exists and a carnivorous beast exists. The meaning of the predication we have just stated, and we have truly stated also that existence is implied therein.

Every judgment, therefore, and every concept also, implies existence. That each judgment, indeed, does so

must be admitted by every disciple of John Stuart Mill, who tells us that the apprehension of the truth of any judgment we make is not only an essential part, but the essential part, of it as a judgment: "Leave that out, and it remains a mere play of thought on which no judgment is passed." But if this is correct, every judgment must have to do with existence; for how can anything be true which may not "be" at all! When Mill denies, in the passage cited by Mr. Romanes,† that the copula in the affirmation, "Socrates is just," does not signify existence, he either contradicts himself (which is nothing new), or he means that the signification of existence lies not in the "is," but exclusively in one or both of the two words, "Socrates," and "just"-which would be a very singular assertion. The quotation from Hobbes (so highly approved by Mill), to the effect that "the placing two names in order may serve to signify their consequence, if it were the custom, as well as the words "is, to be, and the like" is very true, but tells in no way against our position. The word "is," is full, indeed, of significance when it is used; but it may be perfectly well understood, and its meaning truly exist, in sentences wherein no distinct word is set apart for its expression.

We repeat that we quite agree with Mr. Romanes in saying that the distinction between man and brute consists not in verbal predication, but in mental affirmation or conception. "The subsequent working up of names into propositions is merely a further exhibition of the * In his "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 346. "Logic," vol. i. p. 86. See "On Truth," p. 247.

self-same faculty." * But, then, we do not mean by naming, what Mr. Romanes means; because we are not, as he is, followers of "Nominalism." We read with amazement his remark about Realism, "which," he tells us, "neither those who think with Mr. Mivart nor any other psychologists with whom I have to do are likely nowadays to countenance."

He goes on, "If I do not apologize for having occupied so much space over so obvious a point, it is only because I believe that any one who reads these pages will sympathize with my desire to avoid ambiguity, and thus to reduce the question before us to its naked reality." We gladly take this opportunity to say we are sure not only that Mr. Romanes has tried to be clear, but also that he has succeeded. Ambiguous terms we have noted, but their ambiguity is due to no carelessness on Mr. Romanes's part, but to the fact that he has not yet succeeded in fully understanding the position of his opponents. So far," he continues, "it will be observed, this question has not been touched. I am not disputing that an immense and extraordinary distinction obtains, and I do not anticipate that either Mr. Mivart or any one else will take exception to this preliminary clearing of the ground, which has been necessitated only on account. of my opponents having been careless enough to represent the Proposition as the simplest exhibition of the Logos." As to this we have already remarked enough.

"Wherein," he then asks,t" does this distinction truly consist? It consists, as I believe all my opponents + p. 175.

p. 174.

will allow, in the power which the human being displays of objectifying ideas, or of setting one state of mind before another state, and contemplating the relation between them." To this we reply, it truly consists in the power of "objectifying ideas" in the sense of perceiving objects as real external existences, and so forming ideas or concepts: not, be it observed, in recognizing their objectivity; that is a further and a reflex act. We mean only that direct ideal apprehension which an ordinary child (who hardly yet reflects at all) enjoys when objects present themselves to his senses while his consciousness is not absorbed in other ways. Again, we deny that "objectifying ideas" is equivalent, as Mr. Romanes says, to "setting one state of mind before another state, and contemplating the relation between. them." That is another very special kind of reflex mental act, and its presence is by no means necessary for the existence of true conception.

He adds, "The power to think is '-or, as I should prefer to state it, the power to think at all—is the power which is given by introspective reflection in the light of self-consciousness." But the power "to think at all" must exist before "introspective reflection," or else the latter could never come into existence. If we never had any conscious ideas directly, how could we ever know by reflection that we had them? Such a reflex act is strictly a recognition, or a "consciously knowing over again" what we have "consciously known before." We could never learn by reflection that we had known what we had never been conscious of; for had we been unconscious of it, we could not have known it. It is