nents of a close understanding with this country. Nor did they fail to appeal to self-interest. It was contended that if Russia desired to restore her prestige the line of least resistance lay through Persia.

We must not under-estimate the strength which these arguments seemed to possess at the time. Even to some able minds they may well have appeared convincing. Nevertheless, some dispassionate and far-sighted thinkers made their views felt by degrees with irresistible force. In St. Petersburg M. Isvolsky was too deliberate and accomplished a statesman, and he was too well served elsewhere, to allow himself to be led into another cul de sac under the plausible pretext that it was the real avenue to success. The definite alliance with Berlin would have disheartened the great majority of the French people, and dried up both their sentiments and their contributions. Germany, released at last from any effective pressure on the part of the Dual Alliance, would have asserted her initiative in all directions and before very long would have effected a rapprochement with France, making Berlin at last wholly independent of Russia. In Asia, the risks of any struggle against the combined forces of England and Japan would be enormous. Since the shores of the Persian Gulf itself could never be reached, or at least could never be held in face of British sea-power, anything which might be gained in the Middle East would not compensate for further and final losses in the Far East. And above all these was another defect in the project of a Russo-German combination.

It failed altogether to promote the historic purposes of Russia in the Near East. Now here and no otherwhere lies the vital region of Russian policy. The Turk is no longer to be despised. With German assistance in railway-building, army-making, and war-thinking, the Ottoman Power is not only more formidable than ever for defence, but may even be capable of aggression in the Caucasus, in northern Persia, along the whole flank of the future communications of Russia in the Middle East. M. Isvolsky, spreading out the map before him, and propping his head with his hands, could hardly miss the main conclusion. Nothing more fatal could be imagined for any nation than such a position as Russia would occupy if she pledged herself to the unconditional support of the policy to which the Kaiser is committed. Germany, dominating Austria-Hungary, and manipulating the Turk, would control directly or indirectly the Baltic and the Black Sea alike. The Tsar's subjects would be as completely deprived of all free exits to the sea as before the time of Peter the Great. If there were space for the purpose, it would be well worth while to work out these speculations in

detail, and to show that by one means or another a German alliance such as the reactionaries in St. Petersburg and Moscow at one time desired would have turned Russia into nothing less than an imprisoned empire. In the Far East she would have remained at the mercy of the combined military and naval forces of Japan. In the Baltic she would be dominated by the combined military and naval force of her ally, Germany. In the Persian Gulf she would be met by British sea-power, backed by the more serious military reorganisation which definite Russian hostility would have already forced us to constitute. For the same reason we should have been compelled by the law of self-preservation to change our attitude towards the Turk. Thus in the Black Sea, whether Constantinople remained under German influence or came under our own, Russia would be more completely checkmated than ever. If these reasonings in the end prevailed it was not because Russian policy had become aggressive at German expense, but because cool statesmanship on the Neva clearly perceived at last that the closest possible understanding with England and France must continue for a long period to come to be the fundamental interest of foreign policy in St. Petersburg with a view to the surest defence and promotion of all the purposes most vital to the future of the empire of the Tsars.

Hence the Triple Entente has come gradually into definite existence, but it is still animated by an experimental spirit. Nothing could be more mistaken than to represent it as an apparatus of attack against Germany or as an attempt to complete the encircling of that Power. We have accomplished a first and a second stage in the work of building up that permanent alliance between France, Russia, and this country which ought to be the steady object of sane and resolute statesmanship in all three nations. We are still far from the final attainment of that end-yet we have moved towards it as rapidly as is consistent with the safety of Europe. The Temps, in urging that the pace should be forced, is almost certainly mistaken. Sir Edward Grey could hardly have driven faster without upsetting the coach. If he is supported in this country with sufficient patience and discretion he will doubtless arrive at his destination in good time. The Anglo-Russian Convention was, as we have said, the first step in the work of effecting a general and permanent settlement between London and St. Petersburg. But that instrument by itself represented a détente rather than an entente. What was desirable was that the two Powers should begin to act together amicably for positive purposes. It will be remembered that the AngloRussian Convention was at once and emphatically defended in

these pages. For a moment those who grasped Sir Edward Grey's policy as a whole seemed to be in a conspicuous minority. There is probably not a single responsible opponent of the Convention who would not be prepared at the present moment to modify his strictures. More interesting now than ever and more critical for the future is the question of Persia. There for all immediate purposes the policy of the Anglo-Russian Convention has been nothing less than brilliantly vindicated. Thoughtful men may well tremble when they realise what might have happened had the present troubles in Persia broken out a few years ago. Many Russians and many Anglo-Indians were prepared to destroy that nation, and to dismember it like an Asiatic Poland. But it had been sinking into deeper decay for many generations, and its real independence was already disappearing. If the rivalry between England and Russia had remained acute the parliamentary faction at Teheran would have looked to the former Power, the Royalist faction to the latter. The unity and independence of Persia would have perished for ever in civil war unless the whole country had fallen under Russian domination. Here again by the Anglo-Russian rapprochement in its preliminary phase war was not plotted but prevented.

The best result of Sir Edward Grey's policy in its initial form was that it laid the foundation for the next stage. The Anglo-Russian Convention made possible the Reval meeting. The area of accord was extended from Asia to Europe. For the first time there is indicated a plain line of policy upon which for a long period to come it should be possible for the partners in the Triple Entente to co-operate. It is officially admitted that Sir Edward Grey and M. Isvolsky have agreed upon a common programme for Macedonia. The Foreign Secretary has abandoned his proposal-which in itself was probably strategical rather than constructive-that a Governor-General independent of the Porte should be appointed to rule the vilayets. No one was under any delusion as to the fact that this scheme would have separated Macedonia from the Sultan's dominions, and could only have been enforced at the edge of the sword against the combined resistance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. But, as we have pointed out repeatedly, the vigour and daring of the British scheme startled the Powers out of their lethargy. If it did not induce them to go as far as Sir Edward Grey proposed, it at least prepared them to accept some scheme of genuine reform lest a worse thing might befall them. It is clear that St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, acting together, can put forward with great effect a moderate yet perfectly definite programme.

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No reader of the two White Papers recently published can fail to see that in the beginning of the present year a sudden and remarkable change passed over the spirit of Russian diplomacy. At first the very modest British proposals for mobile columns of gendarmerie to suppress the bands were curtly repelled by Vienna and St. Petersburg acting in concert. Less than three months later a far more startling despatch from Sir Edward Grey is accepted by M. Isvolsky as a basis for negotiations. At the Reval meeting these negotiations were carried to a satisfactory result. It would be premature to attempt to speculate upon the details of the new agreement. The details do not so much matter. What is important and historic is the fact that for the first time in more than a hundred years England and Russia, with France in full partnership with them, are agreed in principle upon the Near Eastern Question. M. Isvolsky, in his despatch written in the middle of last March, pens the following momentous passage: The British Communication, in referring to Article XXIII. of the Treaty of Berlin, mentions the appointment of a Governor for Macedonia as a measure the best calculated to secure the execution of reforms and the pacification of that province. Whilst in principle favouring this plan we are compelled to recognise that it has no chance of being adopted unanimously by the Powers nor accepted by the Sultan." The admission of the principle is more remarkable than the statement, undeniably true, that complete Macedonian autonomy is not at present possible. M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward Grey, however, have at least agreed that the expenses of the Civil administration, now scandalously starved for want of funds, shall become the first charge upon the Macedonian Budget. The Porte must either reduce the number of the troops massed in the three vilayets, or must pay them out of its own purse. Our Foreign Office has upon every fitting occasion expressed its determination to refuse consent to the continuance of the 3 per cent. increase in the Customs duties unless the stipulations accepted by the Sultan's Government are duly carried out. But these points, as we have said, are of comparatively little moment. If Russia and England, carrying France with them, are agreed in aim upon the Near Eastern Question so far as it is a Macedonian problem, they may advance gradually, but with patience and continued pressure the steady weight of that diplomatic combination will prove in the end irresistible. This, as we have said, is the second stage of the AngloRussian understanding. It should ensure for a considerable period to come the amicable co-operation of the two Governments, and it practically establishes the triple entente as a working reality, forming a no less definite factor in European politics than the Triple Alliance itself.

It now remains to examine the prospect for the future. At each of the three critical points with which Russia and England must be chiefly concerned the conditions of active co-operation seem to be established. Austria has secured her concession for the railway through the Sanjak, and has practically declared her intention never to consent willingly to the creation of that autonomous Macedonia under the suzerainty of the Sultan which is favoured in principle by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward Grey alike. At the same time the Kaiser is at last in a position to continue the most picturesque and hazardous of his enterprises, and in the next few years the Bagdad Railway will be carried across the Taurus and the Euphrates. The most difficult sections of the whole line will then be constructed. There will be no financial or technical difficulty in completing the track up to the head of the Persian Gulf. The difficulty will be political, and it will menace peace. Apart from the pan-German dream of direct dominion beyond the Bosphorus, the Bagdad Railway will enable the Ottoman race to mobilise as never before its full fighting power, and the Turks will be prepared on each of their frontiers to carry out under Prussian guidance a Prussian plan of campaign. Even at present the strategical situation in the Caucasus causes serious anxiety to Russia, and in a few years, as the railway network extends throughout Asia Minor, the Turk, with German officers to lead him, a German railway system at his disposal, and practically with a German alliance behind him, would probably prove, if Russia fought alone, a more dangerous enemy than any man could have anticipated when the Treaty of San Stefano was signed within sight of the walls of Constantinople.

Take the next point-Persia. There seems to be every probability that the Shah will recover his authority, and that the Mejliss and the revolutionary clubs will be argued with if necessary at the point of the sword. We shall see. Let us in the meantime be logical. We cannot in the same breath extol the idea of maintaining a Duma in Teheran and denounce the idea of setting up a Duma in Calcutta. It is time to give some attention to the effect of our criticisms upon the Indian imagination when we praise the progress of what we are pleased to call liberty in countries hardly more ripe for parliamentary Government than India itself. In the meantime there is no doubt that Germany, incredible as that statement may seem, has stretched her hand even unto Teheran. That confidential journalist to the Wilhelmstrasse, Professor Schiemann, has commenced to write of Persia precisely as he writes of Morocco. The subjects of the Shah are urged to remember that they are members of the great Mohammedan