Such as have maintained notions at variance with mine, in Christian meekness and candour, may be assured of my perfect good-will towards them, and of my earnest wish that whichever of us is in the right, may succeed in establishing his conclusions. As for any one who may have assailed, or who may hereafter assail me, with unchristian bitterness, or with sophistical misrepresentation, much as I of course lament that such weapons should ever be employed at all, I can truly say, (and I doubt not you will say the same for yourself,) that I had far rather see them employed against me, than on my side. There is also this consolatory reflection for any one who is so attacked: that weak or sophistical arguments are then the most likely to be resorted to, when better cannot be found;-that one who indulges in invective, affords some kind of presumption, that he at least can find no such reasons as are even to himself satisfactory;-and that misrepresentation is the natural resource of those who find the positions they are determined to oppose, to be such, that if fairly stated, and fully understood, they could not be overthrown. Such attacks, therefore, tend rather, as far as they go, to support, than to weaken, in the judgment of rational inquirers, the cause against which they are directed.

You may have observed too, that there are some particular charges often brought, without proof, against an author, which are not only unfounded, but are occasioned by qualities the very reverse of those imputed. You may have heard a writer censured as "sophistical," precisely because he is not sophistical; and as "dogmatical," because he is not dogmatical. With a work that is really sophistical, the obvious procedure is, either to pass it by with contempt, or, if the fallacies seem worth noticing, to detect and expose them. But if men find the arguments opposed to them to be such, that they cannot prove them sophistical, it is yet easy (and it is not unnatural) at least to call them so. The phrase "sophistical arguments," accordingly, is often in reality equivalent to, "such as I would fain answer, but Not that in such cases the imputation is necessarily insincere, or even necessarily false. One whose reasoning powers are not strong, may really suspect, though he cannot point it out, a latent fallacy in some argument which leads to a conclusion he objects to; and it may so happen that his suspicion is right, and that a fallacy may exist which he has not the skill to detect. But then, he is not justified in pronouncing the argument sophistical, till he is prepared to make good the charge. A verdict without evidence must always be unjust, whether the accused be, in fact, innocent of guilty,

cannot."

Dogmatism again, to speak strictly, consists in assertions without proof. But one who does really thus dogmatize, you may have often seen received with more toleration than might have been anticipated. Those who think with him, often derive some degree of satisfaction from the confirmation thus afforded to the opinion, though not by any fresh argument, yet by an implied assent to such as have convinced themselves: those again who think differently, feel that the author has merely declared his sentiments, and (provided his language be not insolent and overbearing) has left them in undisturbed possession of their own. Not so, one who supports his opinions by cogent reasons: he seems, by so doing, to call on them either to refute the arguments, or to alter their own views. And however mildly he may express himself, they are sometimes displeased at the molestation thus inflicted, by one who is not content merely to think as he pleases, leaving others to do the same, but seems aiming to compel others (the very word "cogent," as applied to reasons, seems to denote this character) to think with him, whether they like it or not. And this displeasure one may often hear vented in the application of the title "dogmatical;" which denotes, when so applied, the exact reverse of dogmatism; viz., that the author is not satisfied with simply declaring his own opinions; (which is really dogmatism,) but, by the reasoning he employs, calls on others, to adopt them.

I am aware, however, that truth may be advocated, and by sound arguments, in a needlessly offensive form. It has always been my aim to avoid, as far as may be without a sinful compromise of truth, every thing tending to excite hostile feelings, either within or without the pale of my own church. And I cherish a hope, that I may have done something in the present work towards softening the feelings of the candid among Romanists and, Protestants towards each other. I have not indeed attempted this, by labouring to extenuate or explain away the

erroneousness of the Romish tenets and practices; because this would imply, ac cording to my views, a sacrifice of truth. But to trace those errors to the principles of our common nature, and, while we strongly censure the faults themselves, to acknowledge our own ever-besetting danger of falling into the like, is, I trust, a more conciliating, as I am convinced it is a truer view of the subject, than to cast the whole burden of blame on a particular church, and to exult in our own supposed perfection.

You will recognize in the following pages a series of discourses delivered before the University, and the whole or the greater part of which you heard. I have inserted passages in several parts; but have made, on the whole, little other alterations. It would not have been difficult to give the work more of a systematic form, and to adopt a style more removed from that which is suited to delivery: but I was inclined to think, that such, alterations would have had no tendency to make the subject better understood, and might rather have lessened the interest of it. I accordingly determined to print the whole very nearly as it was delivered.

The views I have taken are not anticipated in any work Lam acquainted with. Several writers indeed have glanced slightly, incidentally and partially, at the principle here attempted to be established, or have advanced some steps towards it. Bp. Lavington has compared a part of the Romish errors with those of some modern enthusiasts; and Middleton, another part, with those of the ancient Pagans; but they have stopped short of the general conclusion to which my own observations and reflections, combined with yours, have led me.

I have, however, availed myself, in several instances, of the suggestions of various. writers; to whom, as far as my memory would serve, I have made reference. It so happens that some of these, including yourself, are living authors whom I have the pleasure of knowing personally and I am not sure that I may not, on that ground, incur censure for citing them with approbation; as if I must unavoidably be biassed by partial feelings. I would rather, however, incur the suspicion of such partiality, than of not daring to do that justice to a friend which would be due to a stranger. And it should in fairness be remembered, that though it is very possible to overrate a friend, yet, as it is also possible that a writer of real merit may possess personal friends, so, it would be hard that this should necessarily operate to his disadvantage, by precluding them from bearing just testimony in his favour.

Once more I intreat you to accept my apology for the liberty I have taken, and to believe me,

With deep-felt esteem and veneration,

Your faithful and affectionate friend,
RICHARD WHATELY.

CONTENTS.

§. 1. Deceit employed by the Jews against the Christians, 41.

§. 2. Tendency to justify frauds employed for a good end, 42.

§. 3. Connexion of this fault with the one treated of in the foregoing chapter, 43. Self-deceit the final result, 43.

of the Israelites and of the Romanists, 14. §. 4. Difficulty of appreciating the strength

tians would be tempted into persecution, 73. True Christianity the only effectual security against it, 74.

10. What things are liable to be falsely regarded as necessarily implying intole rance; refusing to admit, in every case, the plea of conscience, 74. Union of civil with spiritual or ecclesiastical office, 75. Requisition of a certain religious persuasion as a condition of personal friendship, or of any thing to which there existed previously no claim of right, 76. Defence against aggression, 78, Which must not, however, be expected to exempt the sincere Christian from mortifying opposition, 78.

CHAP. VI.

OF TRUST IN NAMES AND PRIVILEGES. 1. Disposition of the ancient Jews to rely on their privileges and titles, 79. §. 2. Tendency to the same fault in the primitive Christians, 80.

§.

3. Exemplification of the universality of this tendency, from the Romish church, 81.

§. 4. Danger of a corresponding nature ex ists equally among Protestants, 82

§.

5. Recapitulation of the several points in which we may take warning from the example of the Romanists, 83.

§. 3. Mistakes as to what constitutes the spirit of persecution; which does not consist either in the tenet that the salvation of §. heretics is impossible, 63. Or in maintaining the wrong side, 64. Or in excessive severity, 64. Or in revengeful motives, 65. Or in punishing opinions, 65. Or in actual infliction of punishment, 65. §. 4. How heretics are to be treated, conformably with the character of Christ's kingdom, 66. Attempts to explain away his declarations and precepts, 67. §. 5. Scriptural arguments against intolerance, to be preferred, for popular use, 68. §. 6. Blindness of many reasoners to the abstract arguments against it, 69. §. 7. Causes of the greater hostility often felt against infidels and heretics, than against the vicious, 69. Comparative unfrequency of avowed infidelity, 70. Support derived from authority, shaken, 70. [[A.] On the application of the term CATHOPersonal affront to the Christian's understanding, implied by the infidel, 71. Suspicion of moral corruption as biassing the infidel's judgment, 71.

§. 8. Extent and influence of this hostile feeling, 71..

$.9 Reasons for believing that anti-chris

§.

6. Cautions to be used in guarding against undue reliance on the sanctity of the titles we bear, and the societies we belong to, 84.

APPENDIX.

LIC to designate "a member of the church of Rome," 86.

"Auricular

[B.] On "Self-righteousness," and other
kinds of spiritual-pride, 88.
confession," 91. Impossibility of framing
such a self-preserving system, as shall
supersede personal vigilance, 91..

THE

ERRORS OF ROMANISM

TRACED TO

THEIR ORIGIN IN HUMAN NATURE.

CHAP. I.

SUPERSTITION.

the times in which he lived, and the peculiar circumstances in which he began his reign-the successor of an idolatrous prince, and reigning over an idolatrous people-the higher admiration we shall feel for his exemplary obedience to the divine law.

§. 1. THERE are few things probably | abuses which had grown up, is apt to that appear at the first glance more strange strike us, at first sight, as so very obvious to a reader of the Old Testament, than and imperative, that we are hardly disthe frequent lapses of the Israelites into posed to give him due praise for fulfilling idolatrous and other superstitious prac- it. But the more attentively we consider tices;—the encouragement or connivance often granted to these by such of the rulers as were by no means altogether destitute of piety;—and the warm commendations which are accordingly bestowed on such of their kings as avoided and repressed these offences. Their law had been delivered and its authority main- It should be remembered, that not only tained with such strikingly awful solem- the avowed violators of the first comnity, and its directions were so precise mandment, but those also, who, though and minute, that a strict conformity to it they transgressed the second, yet professed appears, to us, hardly to amount to a vir- themselves the worshippers of Jehovah tue, and the violation of it, to an almost exclusively, would be likely to tax with incredible infatuation. It is not without impiety that, unsparing reform of abuses, a considerable mental effort that we can which even those former kings, who are so far transport ourselves into the situa- described as "doing that which was right tion of persons living in so very different a in the sight of the Lord," had yet not condition of society from our own, as to ventured to undertake. Indeed his enemy, estimate duly the nature and the force of Sennacherib, reproaches him on this very the temptations to which they were ex-ground: "If ye say, We trust in the posed, to make fair allowance for their Lord our God, is not that he whose highbackslidings, and to bestow adequate ap- places and whose altars Hezekiah hath plause on those of them who adhered taken away steadfastly to the divine commands.

The conduct of Hezekiah, for instance, who " removed the high-places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and broke in pieces the brazen serpent that Moses had made; (for unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it) is likely perhaps to strike some readers as so far from being any heroic effort of virtue, that the chief wonder is, how his predecessors and their subjects could have been so strangely remiss and disobedient, as to leave him so much to do. Things however being in such a state, the duty of remedying at once the

But many, even of those who perhaps endured his putting a stop to the irregular and unauthorized worship of Jehovah in those high-places, might yet be scandalized at his venturing to destroy the brazen serpent; an emblem framed originally by divine command, and which had been the appointed and supernatural means of a miraculous deliverance. If such a relic were even now in existence, and its identity indisputable, it would not be contemplated, by any believer in the Mosaic history, without some degree of veneration. How much stronger would that veneration be in the mind of an Israelite, and