 | John Hill Burton - 1846 - 510 стор.
...from any other, that the idea of self is derived ; and consequently there is no such idea For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can... | |
 | David Hume - 1854 - 470 стор.
...After what manner therefore do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it ? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular percep/ tion or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can... | |
 | Frederic William Farrar - 1865 - 354 стор.
...intellect alone. We are never objects of sense to ourselves.' Ferrier, Inst.of Mctaph. p. 80. 'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...stumble on some particular perception or other of heat, light, or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception.'... | |
 | Alexander Bain - 1868 - 588 стор.
...is nothing to give us the impression of a perennial and invariable self. ' When I enter," he says, ' most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heitt or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.' Miud is nothing hut a bundle of conceptions,... | |
 | 1893 - 578 стор.
...complementary inconsistency will be found in Hume and the Associationists. When Hume says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the... | |
 | Manchester Literary Club - 1880 - 772 стор.
...or from any other that the idea of self is derived, and consequently there is no such idea. Again : When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as... | |
 | Friedrich Albert Lange - 1880 - 422 стор.
...for them ; nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular percepVOL. II. L tion or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.... | |
 | Alfred Hix Welsh - 1880 - 182 стор.
...other, that the idea of self is derived ; and consequently there is no such idea . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can... | |
 | James Hibbert - 1880 - 96 стор.
...substratum. Hume's criticism of the doctrine of personal identity was very acute. " For my part," he says, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hate, pain or pleasure.... | |
 | 1881 - 636 стор.
...substance is not cognisable ? Kant also finds, as the result of his profound introspective research, that " when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...always stumble on some particular perception or other". When I eliminate all attributes, that which I deem substantial remains unknown. Our reason is discursive,... | |
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when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can... 
