ceedings, after having declined it before the committee. The motion for reconsideration, finally prevailed, and the third of February was fixed for the hearing. The Overseers assembled that day, in the Senate Chamber, their former meetings having been in the much larger hall of the House of Representatives. They were addressed in the forenoon by Mr Everett, and in the afternoon by Mr Norton in defence of the memorial. The former confined himself, principally, to the question of history and fact. In an introductory attempt to explain the alleged inconsistency on the part of the memoralists, in having sought a hearing of the Overseers, after having declined it before the committee, and generally to justify the manner in which the memorial had been brought forward, he was called to order, and desisted from that part of the defence. The argument of Mr Norton was principally on the subject of the expediency of adopting the principles of the memorial. His very able speech, marked No. 10 in our list of titles at the head of this article, has since been published; and it will therefore be in our power to lay an analysis of it before our readers.

At the opening of the meeting of the Overseers, at which that body was addressed on the subject of the memorial, by Mr Justice Story, Mr Lowell had moved three resolutions, as a conclusion to the Report; setting forth,-1st, that the resident instructers had not an exclusive right to be elected members of the Corporation ;-2dly, that there is nothing in the charter nor in the usage of the College, requiring the members of the Corporation to reside; and-3dly, that it would be unwise and indelicate in the Overseers, to express any opinion on the subject.

These resolutions, for what reasons we do not know, were withdrawn, and on the opening of the meeting of the Overseers, the day after the defence by Messrs Everett and Norton, the following were substituted in their stead.

"Resolved: That it does not appear to this Board, that the resident instructers at Harvard University have any exclusive right to be elected members of the Corporation.

"Resolved: That it does not appear to this Board, that the members of the Corporation forfeit their offices by not residing at the College.

"Resolved: That in the opinion of this Board, it is not expedient to express any opinion on the subject of future elections."

Mr Gray then followed in support of these resolutions, in a speech of considerable length; and at an adjourned meeting in the afternoon, Chief Justice Parker and Mr [late] Justice Jackson spoke on the same side of the question. The vote was at length taken unanimously in favour of the resolutions.

At a meeting of the Overseers held shortly after, Judge Jackson was presented for confirmation, as a member of the Corporation, and was rejected by a vote of 18 to 20. This rejection was pretty generally ascribed to the fact, that though the Overseers opposed the claim of the memorial, as a matter of right, they favoured the introduction of resident instructers as a matter of expediency. The next week, however, Judge Jackson was again nominated, as a member of the Corporation, and chosen by a vote of 30 to 21. It was denied by those opposed to the memorial, that the Overseers divided, either on the ground of right or expediency, in reference to the claim of the memorial, in the question of concurrence in the selection of Judge Jackson; and it was hinted that the dividing line was political. This intimation, however, we regard neither as very likely to be true, nor very highly complimentary to the Overseers. Since this time, Mr Justice Story of Salem has also been elected a member of the Corporation, in the place of the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis resigned.

It would be manifestly impossible, as we have already observed, to go over the whole ground of this controversy, but we shall endeavour to give a sketch of its leading points. [To be continued.]

Essays on some of the First Principles of Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology. By ASA BURTON, D. D. Pastor of the Church of Christ in Thetford, Vermont. Portland. 1824. 8vo. pp. 414.

THERE is a most interesting promise made to the reader in the Introduction to this volume.

The author of the following Essays, when he first entered on the study of theology, felt the importance of forming a just and true theory of the human mind. This feeling prompted him to read with atten

tion all the most noted and distinguished authors, he could find, on the subject of pneumatology.—He expected, by studying them, to digest a true system. This course he pursued for several years. When he had carefully attended to English, Scotch, French, and German authors, instead of finding increased light, his mind was more darkened and perplexed with respect to several parts of this very important subject. Failing of success in this way, he determined to lay aside reading authors, except occasionally, and make an attempt by an exertion of his own powers, to arrange his thoughts systematically on the principles and operations of the human mind. In this way, he has succeeded, in some good measure, to his own satisfaction.

We do not know when we have had our hopes raised higher than by these remarks. The author seemed to us to view his subject with the eye of a philosopher, and to be resolved on taking the only true route to a perfect mastery of it. It is not a science to be built upon reading. The facts, the materials to be analysed, the instruments of observation and inquiry, every thing in a word that the student wants, lies within himself. This makes out the vast superiority of the science of mind. It is true, previously written treatises on the subject are to be consulted,-but it should be, as the enterprising and inquisitive traveller goes to his geography or his map, to compare them with the country through which he journeys and the scenes around him, and to mark how true or how false they are to their original.

We are sorry now to say that we have already given Mr Burton all the praise we can afford him. He has performed little of the promise which he made us so generously in the be ginning. His work is indeed a failure,-a total failure, we think. The style, which our brothers of the North American, if we understand them, call extremely uninteresting and bad, seems to us incomparably the best part of it. For it contains a great many crudities, a great many truisms, a great many things which are not true, a great many things we have repeatedly seen better stated before, without any new valuable matter that we have as yet been able to discover. sad falling off this from our high expectations!—We feel like disappointed adventurers, who go to a land where hidden gold is promised, and return penny less.

A

We will take a little out of the volume now in support of our remarks. In the first place Mr Burton tries to prove that the human mind has faculties. And a faculty he defines to be" a preparedness, a fitness, a capacity, or an adaptedness for hose various operations of which we are daily conscious." Reflect for a moment, reader. There is an attempt here to

show that the mind is previously fitted and adapted to do what it does continually, to think, to understand, to will, for example. Mr Burton may state the proposition for himself. "And now the inquiry is whether there is in the mind a faculty or preparedness for thinking, a preparedness for feeling, a preparedness for willing; or whether there is not." An adventurous spirit he, who should take up the affirmative here incautiously. Our author musters almost half a dozen passages of metaphysics in support of it. But this is not near all. Not content with throwing the feeble light of reason on the dark question, he calls in likewise the aid of Revelation. Indeed it rests mainly with him upon Scripture proofs.

God is the author of our being. He is perfectly acquainted with the nature and properties of our minds. He can give us a just description of men. According to his word, men possess three distinct properties or faculties. An understanding, which is the seat of knowledge; the heart, which is the fountain of depravity; and the will, as the cause of all the visible effects wrought by us.

The last time Christ appeared to his disciples after the resurrection, it is said, "then opened he their understanding, that they might understand the scriptures." Here the understanding is that faculty, by which his disciples were to obtain a knowledge of the great doctrines of the gospel. By this they would perceive the truth; and become acquainted with the gospel scheme of salvation, and be able to teach it to others. Also Eph. i. 18. "The eyes of your understanding being enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints." The eyes of the understanding were enlightened, for this purpose, that saints might know, or clearly and distinctly perceive the objects of their hope and desire.

And so on through. We will not contest the point with our author about the existence of the mental faculties; but as a theologian he ought to know that the sacred volume was not given us to explain metaphysics by. The moral reformation of man was its single purpose, and the most familiar language was made use of, because this is the most easy and intelligible, though it may not square exactly with the refined researches of philosophy.

Having thus settled the obscure question, whether the human mind is fitted, or has a capacity, for thinking, understanding, willing, &c.; that is, whether it possesses faculties or not, Mr Burton next proceeds to inquire what these faculties are. And he insists upon it that the understanding, the will, and the heart have this character. The heart is a faculty of the mind!! Memory however he thinks does not

deserve so high a character. He comes to the same conclusion too about conscience.

So

Now we see, that conscience does perceive; it therefore does not feel. As it perceives, if we call it a faculty, it is the same with the understanding. But of what use is it to have two perceiving faculties? if we say, it is the nature of conscience to feel, to love and hate; then it cannot perceive. And if its nature is to feel, it is, if a faculty, the same with the heart or taste. And of what use is it to attribute to the mind two feeling faculties?

Here are our author's leading principles on Taste :-" 1st. Taste, like the understanding, is undefinable, being a simple property." "2d. The taste, OR THE HEART, is a feeling faculty." "3d. Taste is the spring of action in all moral agents." 4th. Taste is a moral faculty. Here is the fountain of all virtue and vice."

But we are tired of this business. We were going to say something of the new meanings which our author gives to the most familiar language, because we think this has been a great source of error and confusion to him throughout his book. An example of it occurs in the quotations we have just now made in the use of the word Taste. The Scriptures, we are told,"call this faculty the heart." The heart is not only a faculty of the mind, but this faculty is the same with the taste!! And Mr Burton seriously professes to use the terms in this sense as often as they may occur in his book. "Whenever I may use the word heart to signify a faculty of the mind, I mean the same thing by it [as] I do by the word

taste."

It is high time for us to stop. We owe it in justice to our author, and certainly to ourselves, to say that we have not had the patience to read this volume through. When we saw in prospect before us the deep questions of moral agency, of liberty and necessity, of the nature of good and evil, of God's foreknowledge and decrees, &c. &c. &c. and observed cursorily how they were handled, sometimes, as it seemed to us, without being understood even in the terms of them by the author himself, our courage gave out and we lay down the book in despair,-perhaps it may contain mines which we have not had the talent to touch.