a general who had never before commanded an army, should baffle the skill and energy of a numerous veteran army, commanded by a general of the highest military reputation in Europe? At a moment when they certainly could not wish for new enemies, who could have thought that the convention would have wantonly provoked every neighbouring state by ridiculous and hostile decrees? When unhappy and distracted France was suffering under the most cruel internal commotion, and on the point of exhausting her strength by civil war as much as her bitterest enemies could wish, who could have imagined that they would contrive a scheme, the effect of which was to assuage commotions, unite her councils, and inspire her with a vigour she never had shewn before? Could any body who had seen Robespierre odious to the great majority of the convention, and with difficulty allowed to speak, have imagined that this very man, who seemed to hate mankind and was formed for being hated by them, was ever to acquire power by popularity, and be able to exercise a degree of tyranny over those zealots of freedom, which it could hardly be expected the mutes of a seraglio would have long submitted to?

To return to the period we left. When the king and those around him seem to have shut their hearts from any other view, and to have centered all their hopes of comfort and security in conforming to the regulations of the constitution, it was peculiarly unlucky that there was not perfect concord in the king's council on other points of conduct. Though there is reason to believe that all the ministers wished well to their country, the most distinguished for talents and energy among them were of very different characters. M. de Narbonne, the minister of war, was a man of spirit and enterprise, of very pleasing manners, of a great share of wit, and various other accomplishments. M. Bertrand, the minister of the marine, was more advanced in life, of a clear and masculine judgment, of unremitting application, but of plainer manners than is usual with his countrymen. He had managed

the public affairs as intendant in the province of Britanny, during a difficult period, with great steadiness, and equally to the satisfaction of the king and the province.

As it had been remarked by M. Bertrand, that some of the ministers during the first assembly had been brought into trouble by communicating with the committees, owing to their words or actions having been misrepresented, he proposed to his colleagues, that they should communicate and correspond directly with the assembly, as ordained by the constitution, and never with the committees. This being approved of by the king, was agreed to by all the ministers, except M. de Narbonne, who at this time enjoyed a great share of popularity, was praised in the journals of Brissot and Condorcet, while M. Bertrand was abused in both. M. de Narbonne imagined that it was only by preserving his popularity that he could be of service as a minister either to his king or country. He therefore corresponded with the committees, went often there, was always well received, and appeared to be on a friendly footing with several leading deputies of the Gironde party. This conduct was highly displeasing to M. Bertrand and some of the other ministers, and, with other subjects of disagreement, was the cause of M. de Narbonne's quitting the office of minister. After his resignation, as the misunderstanding between him and M. Bertrand had been commented on in Brissot's journal, the latter thought it expedient to resign also. The consequence was the entire dissolution of this administration, -an event much to be regretted; because perhaps it was the only administration since the revolution, in which all the ministers were at once attached to the king and to the constitution. M. de Narbonne soon afterwards joined the army under M. La Fayette, whose conduct in support of the constitution he approved, and thereby drew upon himself the hatred first of the Jacobins, and finally of the Gironde party.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The Jacobin Administration—War with the Emperor-The Austrian Commillee revived-Memoirs of Madame de la Motte— The King's Household Troops reduced-Seditious Scenes in the Gardens of the Tuilleries-Divisions in the Council-Decree for an Army of Twenty Thousand Men-Views of the Jacobins-Observations of Camille Desmoulins-King negatives the Decrees-Roland dismissed-Dumourier resigns— M. La Fayette writes to the National Assembly-Appears at the Bar-A project for the Escape of the Royal Family-Reflections on the Behaviour of the King, Queen, and Princess Elizabeth.

On the dissolution of this administration, the king was advised by M. Cahier de Gerville to form an administration of a popular nature, as the best means of acquiring the confidence of the nation, and of precluding those marks of jealousy and ill-humour that were shewn against all his measures. M. Dumourier, the same who has since rendered himself so famous, was appointed minister for foreign affairs; M. La Coste for the marine; M. Duranton minister of justice; and a short time after M. Roland, a man of a grave character and republican principles, who had formerly been inspector of commerce and manufactures, was named minister for the interior; M. Claviere of Geneva, a person celebrated for his knowledge in finance, minister of contribution; and M. Degraves, a man of a mild and diffident character, and in a weakly state of health, succeeded M. de Narbonne as minister of war. This was called the Jacobin administration; although Lacoste, Duranton, and Degraves never had been of that society, and the other three within a very short time were more obnoxious to the Jacobins than any men in France.

The assembling of emigrants on the frontiers of France, particularly in the Austrian Netherlands, the countenance given to them by foreign princes, the proclamations issued by the king's brothers, and a variety of other cir

cumstances, had long rendered it probable, notwithstanding the pacific declarations of the emperor Leopold, that an attack was intended upon France.

In the disordered state of that country, it is natural to imagine that war would have been considered as an additional evil, and to be avoided with the utmost care. It has been believed, however, that it was not viewed in that light by the republicans; but rather as a means of accomplishing their favourite object. Brissot in his journal insinuates as much.- Sans la guerre,' he says, la France ne seroit pas république ;' but the journal alluded to appeared immediately after the republic had been declared by the convention, when the highest merit the party could claim was that of having contributed to it. But however ardently they may have wished for war, they had no need of using any address to have it declared; for the young prince who succeeded his uncle Leopold soon settled that point by the answer he ordered to be made to the requisitions of M. de Noailles, the French ambassador at the court of Vienna, and by him transmitted to M. Dumourier. This answer imported that the only terms on which peace could be continued were, that the French monarchy should be restablished, according to the plan proposed at the royal sessions at Versailles in June 1789, which exacted the restoration of the nobility and clergy as orders, the restoration of the lands of the church, the guarantee of the feudal rights of the German princes in Alsace, and the restitution of Avignon and the county of Venaissin to the pope.' Dumourier, who considered this answer as equivalent to a declaration of war, prevailed on the king to communicate it directly to the national assembly, where, as was foreseen, it excited the utmost indignation; and on the 20th of April the king, accompanied by his council, went to the assembly and proposed that war should be declared against the king of Hungary and Bohemia. The proposal was heard with universal applause, and decreed by the assembly with unanimity.

The first military operations of the French, however,

tended to confirm an opinion pronounced with an air of triumphant infallibility by many, that the disciplined army of Austria would drive the militia of France before them like a flock of sheep to the capital, that the old despotism would be restored with awful splendour, and the emperor rewarded for his services by the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine This has not exactly taken place; but the events of the war have produced an effect which nobody foresaw, but which seems equally alarming-the inhabitants of a populous and extensive country, from being the best tailors, hair-dressers, cooks, and dancingmasters in Eurupe, and equal to most as manufacturers and men of letters, have suddenly been converted into soldiers, nothing inferior to the most warlike of their neighbours. This has at length induced many of their ancient rivals, in spite of every sentiment of jealousy, heartily to wish, for the tranquillity of all concerned, that the French were reinstated in their former superiority as dancing-masters, hair-dressers, &c.

Notwithstanding the applause with which the king's proposal of war was received, yet the formation of the new administration did not produce the effect which Cahier de Gerville expected. The king had enemies who were vexed with every measure which tended to render him popular, and used every means to counteract their effect.

The king's circumspection in adapting his conduct to the forms of the constitution, the popularity which he had acquired by proposing the declaration of war, alarmed them so much, that they thought it necessary to revive a tale which had formerly been circulated, and had afterwards been discredited, namely, that a society of persons chosen by the queen frequently met in the apartments of Madame de Lamballe, on purpose to concert measures to assist the emperor in his invasion of France, and to send occasional instructions how to proceed. This was called the Austrian committee; and it was imagined that it would raise a greater indignation, and on that very ac