Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionPenguin Books, Limited, 1779 - 264 стор. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a philosophical work written by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Through dialogue, three fictional characters named Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes debate the nature of God's existence. While all three agree that a god exists, they differ sharply in opinion on God's nature or attributes and how, or if, humankind can come to knowledge of a deity. In the Dialogues, Hume's characters debate a number of arguments for the existence of God, and arguments whose proponents believe through which we may come to know the nature of God. Such topics debated include the argument from design - for which Hume uses a house - and whether there is more suffering or good in the world (Argument from evil) |
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abfolutely abfurd adjuſted affert againſt alfo almoſt analogy animal argument Atheiſt attri becauſe cafe caufe cauſe cerning circumſtances CLEANTHES conclufion confefs confequences contrivance dæmon defign Deity DEMEA difcover difpute divine eafily eſtabliſhed eternity exiſtence experience faid PHILO fame farther fcepticiſm fceptics fcience feems fenfe fenfible fentiments fhall fhould fible fimilar firſt fociety fome fpecies fpirit ftill fubject fucceffion fuch fufficient fuppofe fuppofition fupport furely fyftem greateſt happineſs himſelf Human legs human reafon hypothefis impoffible inference infinite inftances intelligence itſelf juſt laſt leaſt lefs mankind mifery mind moſt muft muſt nature neceffary neceffity never obferve objects occafion œconomy oppofition perfect philofophical pleaſure poffible pofition prefent preſerve pretend principles purpoſe queſtion reafon recourſe religion replied CLEANTHES replied PHILO reſembles rience ſeems ſenſe ſtate ſtill ſtrange ſyſtem thefe themſelves theogeny theſe thing thofe thoſe tion turally underſtanding univerfe uſe vulgar whole
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Сторінка 262 - If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance : And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind...
Сторінка 24 - To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other men ; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing.
Сторінка 222 - What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence resembles the human.
Сторінка 131 - The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation.
Сторінка 197 - I SCRUPLE not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word, infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy, and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions.
Сторінка 165 - But it seems a great partiality not to perceive that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him, and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent or his attributes to be altered.
Сторінка 186 - Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able ? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing ? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil ? You ascribe, Cleanthes (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to Nature.
Сторінка 64 - ... to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation, vastly different from the former?
Сторінка 104 - First, by this method of reasoning you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite, what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You will still insist that, by...
Сторінка 232 - Supposing there were a God who did not discover himself immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence than what appear on the whole face of nature? What indeed could such a Divine Being do but copy the present...