covet one so moderate as not to be impatient and passionate against all such as cannot think so too; but of such a temper as to be able to converse peaceably with such as may have freedom in my family, though not of it, without giving offence; and I take this to be the best way of gaining good people to our opinions."

Dr. Fitzwilliam, to whom these remarks were addressed, had been her father's chaplain, and entertained a devoted attachment to Lady Russell, whom he had known from her infancy. His letters and advice were of considerable service in consoling, her mind after the loss of her husband, and she cherished through life the greatest regard and veneration for him, even in his conscientious scruples against taking the oaths at the accession of William and Mary, in consequence of which he was obliged to vacate all his preferments. In one of her letters to this highly respectable, though non-juring, divine, she says, "I am very sorry the case stands with you as it does in reference to the oath, and still wonder (unless I could find kings of divine right) why it does. And all this in the acceptation of a word which I never heard two persons declare the meaning of, but they differed in the sense of it."

We shall not undertake a definition of this litigated phrase, because it is but of secondary consequence what words men use to express their duties, if the duties themselves be rightly understood and performed. We believe, however, without being advocates for arbitrary power, or the moral impeccability of kings, that the doctrine of divine right, and even passive obedience, may admit of a very sober, scriptural, and we will add constitutional meaning. We certainly should not select such expressions in order to inculcate our ideas of the nature of civil obedience; if for no other reason than because they are susceptible of very different significations, and would probably be identified in the minds of most persons with ideas of a nature hostile to the freedom of the subject and the responsibility of government. But surely there is no man who acknowLedges the sacred Scriptures as his guide, but will allow that the obedience of the subject rests on far higher grounds than it is at present fashionable to assign, and we believe that many of the mischiefs of these awfully eventful times arise from the lax notions which are prevalent on matters of this nature.

The plain fact is, that the Creator himself placed man under civil government. The governments which at present exist were not formed out of a falsely called state of naturea state of no-government, but are modifications of the original government under which the first generations of men were brought into existence. They have been repeatedly changed

in the course of ages according to the infinitely varied characters and conditions of mankind; but the first principle-obedience to civil government as a divine institution-remains for ever the same.

It is not contended that any one form of government, or any one dynasty of governors, is of divine right. Our Creator lays down the general principle of obedience for us, and it is our duty to obey; but the form and manner of government he leaves to be settled by the exigencies of each particular case. The particular government of each nation is a strictly social compact; it is the rule under which in that country the general duty of civil obedience is to be exercised. The duty itself, however, rests upon a higher authority, and is grounded on a wider foundation.

We submit to government generally, because government is a thing of "divine institution;" we submit to the authority of kings, lords, and commons, in our own country, because that is the peculiar modification of government which in the course of ages has grown up under Divine Providence in this realm. To disobey the king is to despise the broad sanction under which he reigns, and not only to violate the social compact of this particular nation, but the antecedent and universal command of God.

Nor does this theory give any countenance to slavish principles. The revolution of 1688, or, as we should prefer calling it, the reformation, were not that term already appropriated,was perfectly justifiable on these principles. The nation did not plunge into the alleged "state of nature," in order to form a social compact and government; they did not become a mere multitude; but continuing a civil society, with all the rights and duties appertaining to such an institution, they contrived a method of preventing their own dissolution. Thus they gave to their posterity the benefits of a free and well-ordered constitution; while they established the throne of their sovereign on the strong basis of a public act of the nation. But the claim on each private subject to obedience mounts higher; the act of the nation which points out whom he is to obey as his sovereign does not essentially constitute the obligation to obedience. He is to obey rulers, because such is the command of God; he is to obey George the Fourth and those placed in authority under him, because they are the specific rulers whom the constitution of the country presents for his allegiance and submission. If any part, or the whole, of the existing system were altered by public authority, the duty of obedience would be the same, though the objects of it would be changed. The principle of the private citizen's submission has no neces

sary connection with the sovereign's public title. The former, to be of any practical utility, must be something universally known and easy to be understood; the latter is necessarily implicated with the variety of details of which the great body of the people are very incompetent judges. If therefore a plain man were to ask us "Why must I obey the king?" we should not say because the Act of Settlement vests the public authority in him, but simply because to do so is the ordinance of God. But if a non-juror, admitting the principles of dutiful obedience to authority, should say, "Why must I obey the house of Brunswick rather than that of Stuart?" we should reply "Because the voice of the nation, constitutionally expressed, has determined the point." The obligation of each private ctizens is to obey "the powers that be;" how they came by that power, or how they exercise it, are questions which belong only to the collective body. It would be our duty therefore as individuals to obey every lawful injunction of the recognized ruler, even though we should disapprove all his measures, and at the very moment we were exerting ourselves in every possible way, which the laws of the country might authorize, to induce him to change them. Such at least is our own view of “divine right" and "passive obedience," a view which gives full scope for the exercise of the public voice, even to the extent of changing the fundamental principles of the constitution, while it binds each individual in his personal capacity to submit to the existing civil authority, as the ordinance of God, and to confine his resistance," where he thinks resistance his duty, within the prescribed laws of the community; which are binding upon him till changed by public consent. The expediency of altering them has nothing to do with the question of obeying them.

"The freedom of dispute," remarks Bishop Horsley, in his sermon before the Lords, on the 30th January, 1793, "in which for several years past it hath been the folly of this country to indulge, upon matters of such high importance as the origin of government, and the authority of sovereigns, and the futility of those principles which the assertors, as they have been deemed, of the natural rights of man, allege as the foundation of that semblance of power which they would be, thought willing to leave in the hands of the supreme magistrate, (principles rather calculated to palliate sedition than to promote the peace of society, and add to the security of government) this forwardness to dispute about the limits of the sovereign's power, and the extent of the people's rights, with this evident desire, to set civil authority upon a foundation on which it cannot stand secure, argues, it should seem, that something is forgotten among the

writers who have presumed to treat those curious questions; and amongst those talkers, who, with little knowledge or reflection of their own, think they may talk safely after so high authorities." What that something is, his lordship proceeds to point out, and we earnestly recommend the notification to all, who in this day of" rebuke and blasphemy,” are inclined to overlook the very important fact, that we are not left destitute of information on these subjects from the very highest authority, from Him "who made man," who "knew what was in man ;" and we will add, who will bring man to an account for the use which he has made of the code of laws revealed for the guidance of his principles and conduct. "It surely is forgotten," continues his lordship, "that whatever praise may be due to the philosophers of the heathen world; who, in order to settle, not to confound, the principles of human conduct, set themselves to investigate the source of the obligations of morality and law; whatever tenderness may be due to the errors into which they would inevitably fall in their speculations concerning the present condition of mankind, and the apparent constitution of the moral world, of which, destitute as they were of the light of revelation, they knew neither the beginning nor the end, the Christian is possessed of a written rule, delivered from on high, which is treated with profane contempt, if reference be not had to it upon all questions of duty." To that sacred volume we refer our readers for the best principles upon all subjects of this kind; and we may do it the more confidently, because, as Bishop Horsley justly remarks, those Divine writings give authentic records of the first ages, and of the very beginning of mankind; and might, therefore, from their antiquity alone, independently of their Divine authority, claim to be consulted in all inquiries where the resolution of the points in question depends upon the history of mankind. In this appeal, no person would have more cheerfully concurred than the devout wife and widow of Lord Russell; a woman who, while she justly dreaded and deprecated the slavish principles then currently taught under the abused terms of Divine right and passive obedience, would have been among the first and most zealous to condemn the new systems of civil obligation, which atheistic philosophy has invented in their place.

ART. XX.-HISTORY, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, AND PRESENT STATE OF MONTENEGRO.

Voyage Historique et Politique au Monténégro, contenant l'Origine des Monténégrins, Peuple autochthone ou aborigène, et très peu connu; la Description topographique, pittoresque, et statistique du Pays; les Moeurs de cette Nation, ses Usages, Coutumes, Préjugés; son Gouvernement, sa Legislation, ses Relations Politiques, sa Religion, &c. &c. Par M. le Colonel L. C. Vialla de Sommières, Commandant de Castel-Nuovo, Gouverneur de la Province de Cattaro, depuis l'année 1807, jusqu'en 1813. 8vo. 2 Vols. Paris, 1820.

IT is not a little singular, that, while a laudable spirit of research has of late years induced many to circumnavigate the globe, in quest of new discoveries, countries and nations exist comparatively near us, that are very imperfectly known. This is particularly the case with the Montenegrins, who are the subject of the work now under our consideration, and concerning whom almost every system of geography extant is totally silent. The compilation of Mr. Pinkerton contains only seven lines, which are transcribed into the Cyclopædia recently edited by Dr. Rees. The accurate French Geographer, Vosgien, most probably for want of correct information, omits them altogether; and the same omission occurs in the well known dictionary of La Martinière, and the voluminous French Encyclopædia. The author of the present work has therefore contributed an interesting addition to the science of geography, by communicating to the public the result of the inquiries, which his proximity to the Montenegrins enabled him to make with peculiar advantage, during the six years he held the office of Governor of Cattaro (from 1807 to 1813), which province and city, our readers may perhaps recollect, Buonaparte found it convenient to wrest from Austria by the treaty of Presburg, in 1806, and annex to his short-lived kingdom of Italy, cure the integrity of his dominions."

"to se

The tract of territory occupied by the Montenegrins is that chain of lofty mountains, which extends, from north to south, from the valley of Garba, along the Turkish province of Herzegowine to the borders of the district of Castel-Nuovo, and from east to west throughout the province of Cattaro. It is computed to be about one hundred miles in circumference, and presents a surface of four hundred and eighteen square miles. This country is situated between the eighteenth and nineteenth degrees of longitude, east of London, and between the fortysecond and forty-third degrees of latitude; it is surrounded on