state of things which could not fail, sooner or later, of involving the British provinces in a war. Scinde and Gwallior, however, demanded his attention in the first instance. He gave it, and the results were, the permanent annexation of the former to the Company's possessions, and the establishment with the latter of relations which must conduce, ere long, to the absorption of the weaker into the vortex of the greater power. And then he began to march an army of observation towards the Sutlej. But Lord Ellenborough's brilliant policy was too rapid for the four-and-twenty kings of Leadenhall Street. In the exercise of their undoubted right, though much to the astonishment of all concerned, Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and Sir Henry Hardinge, in the spring of 1844, proceeded, overland, to assume the reins of government at Calcutta.

From the first beginning of British power in the East, there has been, both in the Company and among the people and government of England, the greatest horror of the extension of dominion which has been constantly going forward. When tidings arrived, in 1765, of the assumption of regal power over the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, men experienced, amid the triumph, a sort of dread of the consequences, for which they did not know how to account. Warren Hastings, in like manner, was condemned and afterwards persecuted for obeying an impulse which was resistless; and every governor-general since has assumed power, pledged to pacific measures, which he has invariably been compelled to abandon. among all who have undertaken the serious charge of the Indian government, perhaps not one ever quitted England more honestly desirous of avoiding war than Sir Henry Hardinge. For himself, he had seen enough of battle to hinder any personal ambition, as a warrior, from swaying him. He knew, also, that at home the effect of the Cabul campaigns had been to render even Sir Charles Napier's triumphs in Scinde unpopular rather than otherwise. And almost the last advice which his old master gave him, ere parting, was to shun a rupture with the Sikhs altogether, if it should be possible so to

But

do; if not possible, to defer the evil as long as might be, and to put the enemy, ere he struck a blow, wholly in the wrong. Never, surely, was advice more prudent or more just offered; never was just and prudent counsel more faithfully followed. Sir Henry Hardinge, though awake to all that was passing in the Punjaub, would not permit so much as one additional regiment to approach the Sutlej. He satisfied himself that the garrisons of Ferozepore and Loodiana were of sufficient strength to hold them till succour could be sent; and refused, therefore, to throw into the territories of the protected chiefs one man more than was needed to keep up the communications between these advanced posts and the frontiers of the provinces.

The summer of 1845 was marked by frightful excesses in Lahore. Murder and debauchery went handin-hand together; and the Ranee herself, as well as her chief adviser, Jowar Singh, no longer disguised their purpose of coming to blows with the English. On the part of Jowar Singh, this was but the prosecution of a policy which had long been in favour with him; and as he was heartily detested by the rest of the Sirdars, they made it a pretext for conspiring against him and putting him to death. But the Ranee was swayed by different motives. From day to day her army became more unmanageable; and she desired, above all things, to get rid of the nuisance, even if her deliverance should come with a victorious British force to Lahore. Accordingly, after having long withstood the clamours of her officers, she gave a hearty, yet a reluctant, consent to the proposed invasion of the protected states; and a plan of operations was drawn up, which indicated no slight knowledge of the art of war on the part of those from whom it emanated.

Meanwhile, there were frequent and anxious consultations at Calcutta in regard to events as they were and as they might be expected to be. The governor-general continued to urge the maintenance of peace; and expressed his disbelief of any design on the part of the Sikhs to provoke a rupture. At the same time he recommended, and caused to be carried

into effect, the concentration of a considerable army about Meerut, Umballa, and Delhi; and Sir Hugh Gough, the commander - in- chief, placing himself at its head, both the government and people of India stood still, as it were, to watch the results.

So early as the month of June affairs had assumed an aspect so alarming that it was judged prudent for the governor-general to visit the western provinces in person; and to confer on the spot with the commander-in-chief in regard to the measures which in the event of certain anticipated contingencies it might be judicious to adopt. Accordingly, late in the autumn, Sir Henry Hardinge proceeded up the Ganges, and on the 26th of November met Sir Hugh Gough at Kurnaul, where arrangements were made such as it was supposed would render the army available for any emergency that might arise. But though it was well known by this time that the Sikh columns were in motion, though a strong advanced guard had actually touched the Sutlej opposite to Ferozepore, and other columns were reported to be in movement towards other points on an extended frontier, Sir Henry Hardinge restrained the forward movement which Sir Hugh Gough had begun; and kept his force in such a position, as that it might march concentrated and entire as soon as the territory should be fairly violated, and not before.

On the 20th of November, Major Broadfoot, political agent for Lahore, had sent off a despatch full of important intelligence to the commander-in-chief. It completely removed an impression which up to this date seems to have prevailed in various quarters, that the army in and about the Sikh capital did not exceed 15,000 men, and established the fact, that not fewer than seven divisions, each mustering from 8000 to 10,000 men, had been instructed to carry the war beyond the country of the Punjaub. One division only was to abide at home for the preservation of the public peace and the defence of the capital, while the remaining six were to pass the frontier, each upon a point of its own. The points threatened were Roree and the hill country about it, Loodiana, Horrekee, Ferozepore, Scinde,

and Attock. It is true that even in this despatch doubts were expressed as to the execution of so gigantic a scheme, and, indeed, of the commencement of hostilities at all. But Sir Hugh, like a gallant soldier as he is, considered that these doubts had no very sure foundation to rest upon. He therefore ordered the columns to concentrate; and was a march or two on his way to the banks of the Sutlej itself when Sir Henry Hardinge stopped him. For Sir Henry Hardinge, be it remembered, had other considerations than those which weighed with the commanderin-chief, to take account of. And he felt that, even in a point of view strictly military, it was as well, perhaps better, to continue his central position till the storm burst, because he should in that case be able to move upon it, and meet it, let it come from what quarter it might.

Anxiously, and with exceeding diligence, were the commissariat arrangements pressed forward. Depôts of stores and provisions were formed in various quarters, convenient in the event of operations, while camels, horses, and other beasts of burden, were hired or purchased wherever the agents of government could find them. More troops, also, were called up from the interior, and directed to concentrate in front of Sirhinde; but nothing was done to precipitate hostilities. At the same time, directions were given to the different chiefs of the protected states to have their contingents ready, so that they might offer to the invader the best resistance in their power, and secure time for the army to concentrate.

In this state things remained during the month of November, and up to the 4th in the month following. On that latter day, however, Sir Henry Hardinge, finding that his remonstrances were not attended to by the Sikh government, commanded the Sikh valkeel, or ambassador, to quit his camp; and proceeded in person from Umballa towards Loodiana, making a peaceable progress, according to the customs of his predecessors, through the territories of the friendly chiefs that intervened. For both he and Major Broadfoot seem still to have considered, that an invasion upon a great scale was little to be apprehended. That plunderers

would cross the river all men now anticipated, and that out of the mischief produced by them causes of war would arise, could not seriously be doubted. But that the Sikhs would take the initiative in this war does not appear to have been dreamed of by any one about the governorgeneral, or in his confidence. Men remembered how, on former occasions, Sikh armies had approached the farther bank of the Sutlej, occupied their camp there for awhile, and retired again; and Sir Henry, not less able as a politician than as an officer, wisely argued that he had no more right to remonstrate against their doing so again, than they had to complain of the measures which had been adopted to render Ferozepore safe against a sudden assault. For it is worthy of remark, that in addition to the old fortress which imperfectly commanded it, Ferozepore had recently been covered by stout field-works, the construction of which, by-the-by, was recommended by the Duke of Wellington, as soon as tidings of the confused state of the Punjaub reached him. Accordingly, the governor-general, considering that Sir John Littler, who occupied Ferozepore, would, with the 5000 men whom he had under his orders, be able to hold the place, so long as his provisions lasted, contented himself, while travelling towards Loodiana, by directing that the different corps in the rear should move up one upon the other, and that the whole should be in readiness to push forward, if required, by the morning of the 11th at the latest.

This forward movement brought together about 7500 men of all arms, with thirty-six guns, chiefly light sixpounders. Its object was to have in hand a force wherewith to bring relief to Ferozepore should it be invested; but as Sir Henry Hardinge considered that 7500 men, however trustworthy, would not be able to fight their way through 50,000, he rode over to Loodiana, with a view of ascertaining how far it might be possible to draw a reinforcement from thence. And here, before we proceed farther, it may be as well to describe a little more in detail than we have yet done, the theatre on which these operations were conducted; because, unless he carry in

his mind's eye a tolerably correct map of the seat of war, we defy any man to make head or tail of descriptions that begin in marches and end in battles, and noise, and smoke.

The river Sutlej, after leaving its source among the mountains, flows in a tortuous course through the great plain of Hindostan, and forms, for many miles, the boundary be tween the Punjaub and a country, which, though under British protection, did not till within these few months form an integral portion of the British empire. Two detached stations on the northern frontier of this district were, indeed, in our possession, namely, Loodiana and Ferozepore; but, besides that they were isolated, being cut off from our own territories by the lands of chiefs not altogether to be relied upon, they stood apart full eighty miles, and could not, therefore, in any case, render mutual assistance to one another. Both were fortified,-Loodiana, however, most imperfectly, Both stood exposed to sudden danger, for they were close to the margin of the river; and on both it was necessary to keep an eye, inasmuch as some thousands of good troops, besides the wives and families of their officers, were stationed in each, according to the established usage of many years.

The general aspect of the protected Sikh states has little, in point of beauty, to recommend it. The country is flat, cultivated near the neighbourhood of towns and villages, but not fruitful even there, because the soil is sandy. Elsewhere, jungles of stunted shrubs a good deal overgrow it, interrupting the vision, and rendering the movement of troops in line, and especially of cavalry, difficult; and there is great want of water. And the roads are but indifferent.

Loodiana lies up the stream, as compared with Ferozepore. It is, likewise, nearer to Umballa by fifty miles at the least, though you may reach the one without coming within sight of the towers of the other. It is a town of greater note than Ferozepore, both because of the wealth of the shops, and that its agreeable climate renders it a favourite place of resort to European families. But in a military point of view it is very

little to be regarded; its defences consisting of a common wall and a fort, which could not withstand the fire of a battering train for half a day.

Among other arrangements which he judged it expedient to make, Sir Henry Hardinge had directed a magazine of provisions and military stores to be formed as far in advance as Busseean. This small town stands where the roads from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, and is admirably placed for the supply both of Ferozepore and Loodiana, being about equidistant from both. Upon it he requested the commander-in-chief to direct his march, while he himself, as we have already stated, went on to Loodiana. Ile there found that, though some hazard must of necessity attend the measure, it would, upon the whole, be judicious to bring the strength of the garrison at once into the field, and filling the fort with invalids, to depend upon them for the protection of the ladies and the general defence of the place. Accordingly, about 4000 out of the 5000 men who held Loodiana, were, with their artillery, directed to march upon Bussecan, where, upon the 13th, they formed a junction with the head of the column which had been moving from Umballa.

Not a day had passed since the troops began to concentrate, without bringing in its rumour as to the purposes and proceedings of the Sikhs. All these, however, were so contradictory one of another, that it was impossible to found upon them any definitive plan; for now Ferozepore, now Loodiana, and now other places farther to the north-east, were described as threatened; but the 13th put an end to every thing like doubt upon the subject. It was then ascertained that the enemy had actually crossed the river in force two days previously, and that Ferozepore was invested. In a moment the plans of the governor-general and commander-in-chief were matured. To relieve Ferozepore, at all hazards, was their great object; and in order to effect that end, the columns were put in motion and pushed on by double marches.

In all operations of this sort, when an enemy numerically superior has the choice of the initiative, a de

fensive force cannot fail to be put much upon its mettle, as well as to suffer great fatigue, and it may be inconvenience, for lack of provisions likewise; and seldom in the annals of modern warfare have soldiers been more tried than those which acted in the month of December last under Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge. From the 14th to the 17th they were en route from before dawn till well on to midnight, no time being afforded so much as to cook the meat which they carried in their haversacks. On the 18th, after compassing a distance of twenty-one miles, they halted at a place called Moodkee about noon, and had just began to light their fires and to make ready for cooking, when the word passed that the enemy was advancing, and the regiments stood to their

arms.

There is one circumstance in the progress of this campaign which strikes a European soldier with surprisc. Notwithstanding that there was present with the British army a cavalry force, most efficient as far as it went, and, in point of numbers, by no means contemptible, the intelligence at head-quarters seems to have been neither rapid nor very accurate. The advance to Moodkee, for example, appears to have been made under the persuasion that the enemy were still in their lines about Ferozepore; and the troops halted and established their bivouac, the same opinion still prevailing among them. Now one would have thought that the judicious use of a division of light cavalry, might have prevented this. Better mounted by far than any other horsemen in Asia, the Company's cavalry must be different from what we take it to be, if it be unsafe to send forward patrols and supports many miles a-head of the army which is advancing. Had this been done on the 18th, it is impossible that the arrival of the Sikhs within half an hour's march of the camp could have taken place without due warning given. As it was not done, the general has good cause to thank the steadiness and valour of his men, that he was not attacked more at unawares than really befell, and driven from the field.

The alarm being given, the whole army stood in its ranks; and

the cavalry, with the horse artillery, being directed to feel to the front, moved forward. They passed through a country much overgrown by low jungle; and saw, in consequence, nothing to guide them, except heavy clouds of dust in the air. Presently the flash and report of a gun, with the whiz of a round shot over their heads, told them that hard knocks were coming. They formed up rapidly, and in good order; and moving on, as well as the jungle would allow, arrived in due time in presence of the enemy. And now began a conflict, of which it is impossible to write without bestowing unmixed praise upon the devoted heroism of every individual that took part in it. About 12,000 British troops, of which less than 3000 were Europeans, found themselves confronted by 40,000 Siks, not undisciplined and half-armed barbarians, but brave men, trained in the school of the French empire, and confident in their own prowess, as well as in the overwhelming superiority of their artillery. For while our people brought about forty light pieces into the field, more than double that number, -most of them twelve-pounders poured destruction into our ranks; and knocked down guns, tumbrils, and horses, with an accuracy which shewed that artillery practice was familiar to their owners.

Of a battle thus begun, and waged throughout with stubbornness on the part of the English and exceeding bravery by the enemy, it were idle to attempt a technical description. Regiments went at it with hearty good-will; and when the British artillery was fairly swept aside by the superior weight of the fire that fell upon it, the bayonet and the sabre came into play, and carried all before them. The Sikhs were beaten at every point, and leaving seventeen guns behind, retreated, though in good order, just before dark. It was impossible to follow them, partly because the men were too much fatigued to go through with a rapid march, partly because the loss sustained had been heavy, and there was need, in some sort, to reorganise ; so upon the field which they had won, and surrounded by the dead and the dying, the victors lay down that night and slept.

There was great suffering every where for want of water. Hunger men may endure for days together; but a burning thirst, in a tropical climate, is terrible; and when the fever in the blood becomes aggravated by such exertions as the British army had that day made, the whole world seems valueless in comparison with a cup of cold water. None came, however, for several hours; yet the gallant fellows bore the privation without a murmur; and when the following day brought them a reinforcement of two European regiments of infantry, with a small battery of heavy guns, they felt that they were irresistible. Nevertheless, the general, with great good sense, gave them two entire days to refresh; he had nothing to gain by precipitating matters. Ferozepore had been saved by the battle of the 18th; and his communications with the place being in some sort restored, he had time to warn Sir John Littler of his purposes, and to prepare him for co-operating in their accomplishment. These were the chief advantages of delay; besides that, others probably occurred to him, namely, the opportunity which was afforded for the coming up of the corps which had been directed to march from Delhi, Meerut, and other stations. And on the part of the Sikhs, it was doubtless considered that their very numbers would render a long halt on one spot impossible for them; for no country, however fertile, can sustain the pressure of sixty thousand men many days. Wherefore, the general did right in halting on the field which had been won; and possibly would have done still better, had he prolonged the halt till their necessities should have forced the enemy to act on the offensive. However, it did not so appear to the hero of Maharadjpore. A regular fire-eater, Sir Hugh Gough entertains no predilection for the Fabian manner of making war; and who will have the hardihood to charge him on that account with an unsoldierlike love of his profession ?

Having collected the wounded, buried the dead, secured the captured guns, and restored order to the ranks of his regiments, Sir Hugh Gough, at an early hour on the morning of the 21st, again put his