tinued to delay the surrender of Mantua. It does not appear that any attempt was made to intimidate a man of honour by such unworthy proceedings. Napoleon's project of burning Trieste, though objected to in the first instance, was too congenial to the spirit which animated the French government of the period to be altogether lost upon them. After Wurmser's defeat the general is, therefore, desired to acquaint the Emperor of Austria, that such a measure will be immediately resorted to unless an ambassador is sent to Paris for the purpose of concluding a peace. Napoleon obeyed, and addressed a letter to the emperor, written in the real carmagnole style, which so well accorded with the Vandal threat it contained. No answer was ever sent, and it may be a question whether it was delivered. During the interval of repose of which we have been speaking, Napoleon resided principally at Milan; and though he was the conqueror and absolute ruler of the country, he was more on the level of ordinary society, and more within the reach of observation, than at any subsequent period of his life; and it is known to many who, like the author of these sketches, had afterwards opportunities of mixing in Italian society, that the most intellectual members of that society looked upon him as a man of moderate capacity and of very limited information. Those who thought so, however, were silent, while sycophants and panegyrists were loud enough, and with the world at large the loudest talkers generally carry the day.

Having seen how the French were situated, let us observe how matters stood with the Austrians, when they prepared for their third invasion of Lombardy. In Germany success had crowned their efforts. Jourdan had been defeated, and Moreau forced to retire. The troops which had guarded the northern passes of the Tyrol thus became disposable, and were enabled to join Davidowitch, who had reformed his army in that province after the rout of Calliano. Friuli, Quasdanowitch, who had been separated from Wurmser at the battle of Bassano, had assembled the remnants of his corps behind the Piava. Both generals were rapidly

In

reinforced; regiments were brought from the interior of Austria, new corps raised, the dépôts were emptied, and all recruits and convalescents fit for service hurried on to their respective battalions, so that by the end of October nearly 50,000 men were ready for the field. Marshal Alvinzy was placed in command of this hastily collected force. As the principal divisions of the French army were stationed at Trent, Bassano, Verona, and Villa França, the Austrians must have known, independently of their frequent communication with Mantua, that the fortress was not closely blockaded, and in no very immediate danger; and yet with this knowledge clearly be fore them, they hurried this new army on to its relief, without a single fair ground on which a prospect of success could be founded.

The Austrians could bring about 40,000 into action; but the long series of defeats had avowedly injured the morale of the old troops, from whom the new ones would naturally take their tone and feeling. The French, leaving 10,000 or 12,000 men to observe Mantua, and acting on a theatre of war of extraordinary strength, could take the field with about 30,000, all tried soldiers, emboldened by victory and by the confidence they placed in themselves and their leaders, advantages that far overbalanced the numerical superiority of four to three, which their adversaries possessed. Nor was there any good reason for believing that the new commander would be able to atone for the deficiency of his army. It is evident that Alvinzy belonged to the same class with Wurmser and Beaulieu: like them, he was a brave, able, and honourable man; but, like them, he was without the high energy of character and fiery genius which could alone rally the sinking spirit of an army, rekindle the hopes and aspirations of the brave, and carry the whole mass, torrent like, along with him in a daring and gallant career. Fortune smiled upon his first efforts, and boldness might have won her; but it was wanting, and the goddess having shewn the leaders of mighty hosts who was the real disposer of victory, returned to her first favourite, to abide at his will till,

According to the new plan of operations proposed by the Austrians, the main body of their army, consisting of about 25,000 men under the field-marshal himself, was to advance towards Bassano and the Brenta, while Davidowitch, with 14,000 men, should attack Trent, force the pass of Calliano, and then aid, as circumstances might best direct, the main army in striking a decisive blow in the neighbourhood of Verona. Marshal Wurmser was to support the movement by a general sally from Mantua. The difficulty of making separate corps act in perfect concert and fall on at the proper time and place renders all such complicated operations extremely precarious, however much they may heighten success and augment the trophies of victory when the day is won. But to win the day must be the first object sought for; and the Austrians evidently threw away their best chance of success when they neglected to combine their army before they fought a general action. Events had surely rendered it apparent that the French army was far more active and movable than their own, and more capable of executing rapid manoeuvres. A standup battle, fought in open field, and with all forces, was their game, for it would have given them the benefit of the acknowledged steadiness of their troops, of the tactical training of the soldiers, and of their power of moving with accuracy. In such a

field, also, their numerical superiority would have told to advantage, instead of being frittered away between separate corps, whose partial success brought no gain to the general cause. The Austrians courted defeat at the outset, and were yet nearly proving successful.

Napoleon, apprehensive that Davidowitch might fall with superior numbers on General Vaubois, who was stationed at Trent with his division, ordered him to drive in the Austrian posts and alarm them for their own safety. This measure, at the very moment when operations were about to commence, naturally led to the result which it was intended to avert. Vaubois attacked

the Austrians at St. Michael on the 2d November without any decisive result; the consequence was that the Austrians concentrated their forces and fell upon him on the 3d and again on the 6th and 7th, and hit him so severely that he was driven from Trent, Calliano, and Mori. Here Davidowitch, astonished no doubt at the giant strides he had made, thought proper to halt and remain inactive for eight days, at the very time when minutes were worth ages. The cause of this incomprehensible delay, which occasioned the failure of the whole enterprise, has never been explained. The Austrians, who have so fairly and liberally furnished the documents necessary for a right understanding of these campaigns, have left this difficult point still in the dark. On the 17th November Davidowitch awakened from his stupor and attacked the French in the position of Rivoli; the Republicans were again defeated, and, as it would seem, with great loss; they fell back to Castello Nova, where they were next day followed by the Austrians, who were thus close in rear of Napoleon's left wing and within a single march of Mantua. And where now, when victory was in sight, were the field-marshals? where was Alvinzy, and where Wurmser? The answer is a sad one; but the tale, however afflicting, must be told, and many a tale of woe must follow before we see the light of hope and gladness break through the dark gloom which these reverses cast over the political horizon of Europe.

On the 5th November Alvinzy reached the Brenta, the French troops giving way before him. Napoleon, though informed of Vaubois' ill-success on the 3d, determined nevertheless to save the foe the trouble of a longer march, and to advance himself to a very dangerous distance indeed from his basis of operation and give them the meeting. He attacked them at Citadella on the 6th, but was forced, after a severe struggle, to withdraw from the combat. He informs us, indeed, that this was owing solely to Vaubois' second defeat and the capture of Mori by the Austrians, the news of which reached head-quarters at two o'clock on the morning of the 7th.

Unfortunately for this statement, Mori is fifty miles from Bassano, and was only taken on the forenoon of that very day. Napoleon fell back to Verona, and was slowly followed by the Austrians, who, on the 11th, established themselves at Villa Nova, thus putting almost an end to their own forward movement. With Verona and Legnano, both capable of making some resistance, in their front, with the Adige to be forced under the very guns of so formidable and well-prepared an enemy as the one they had to encounter, it is really not easy to see what they could expect to achieve; but what they could not do for themselves the enemy was nearly doing for them.

Prince Hohenzollern, who commanded the Austrian advanced guard, informed Alvinzy that, owing to the success of Davidowitch, the French were in full retreat across the Mincio, in consequence of which he recommended that Verona should be instantly attacked. The fieldmarshal paused upon this project, and as it was strongly objected to by the chief of the staff, a reconnaissance was determined upon. A body of about 5000 men advanced almost close to the walls of Verona, while another brigade took post on the heights of Caldiero to cover their retreat in case of accidents. The precaution was a salutary one, for Napoleon no sooner perceived this threatened onset than he brought out his divisions and drove the Austrians back on this support. The troops now assembled in the strong position of Caldiero amounted to about 8000 men, and these also it was resolved to dislodge. Alvinzy, however, determined to risk a general action for their support, and when, on the morning of the 12th, the French, after failing to force the position in front, turned it on both flanks, they found themselves assailed in their turn by the whole of the Austrian army; they were forced to retire, leaving a few guns and about a thousand prisoners in the hands of the enemy. This was a victory, no doubt, but not of a character to break either the moral or the physical force of the French army, or very much to raise the courage and confidence of the victors. Napoleon says that a heavy shower of sleet

and rain induced him to break off the battle. As sleet and rain would tell as much against one party as against the other, it is more likely that the unlooked-for appearance of Alvinzy, who fell on the flank of the divisions which were turning Caldiero, decided the measure. False

hood would seem to have been so congenial to this extraordinary man, that he could hardly speak the truth even when it told to his advantage. At this time Davidowitch was, as the reader will recollect, recovering from the astonishment into which his own victories had thrown him, while within the walls of Mantua, Wurmser was tranquilly awaiting the result of what others should achieve in his fa

vour.

Napoleon's position at Verona was so strong and central that to have awaited the attacks of the enemy would probably have been his best policy; for, unless they struck in perfect concert, at exactly the same time, they were not likely to effect much against him. On the other hand, any movement on his part, either to his front or left, was giving one of his adversaries an opening. If he moved to the front against Alvinzy, he left an opening for Davidowitch; if he moved against the latter, the former had it in his power to pass the Adige unmolested; if he moved away to his right, he gave both his adversaries an advantage; and yet this was the move he made, and such is war that it proved successful. A proof, we shall be told, that genius is superior to rules; but war has only principles and no rules, and a mere challenging of fortune, however successful, is no evidence of genius, as this very tale should prove.

During the night between the 14th and 15th of November bridges were thrown over the Adige at Ronco, about eight miles below Verona, and a sufficient force having been left to defend that town against an off-handed attack, the whole army began their march towards the point of passage before daybreak on the morning of the 15th. As the troops proceeded at first by the Mantua road, they could not, we are told, immediately comprehend the object of a march which seemed to indicate a retrograde movement, and it was only when their conversion to

the left was effected that the blaze of their leader's genius and the sublime conception of which we have now to speak, flashed fully upon their benighted minds.

“Then it was,” says the imperial historian himself, that officers and soldiers who had traversed these districts when in pursuit of Wurmser, began to perceive the intentions of their general. 'He intends,' they said, to turn Caldiero, which cannot be stormed, by a front attack; unable to contend in open plain with only 13,000 men against 40,000, he is transferring his battle-field to causeways surrounded by vast marshes, where numbers will not avail, and where every thing will be decided by the bravery of the heads of columns.""

If the reader will have the kindness to divest his mind of the recollection, that the strategical monologue here ascribed by Napoleon to his army has been seriously repeated, not merely by the crowd of ordinary writers, but by men of high talents and the greatest and best deserved literary fame, then will his own smile furnish the only comment which it can require. Of some of the assertions, however, we must say a word.

Unless we suppose Napoleon to have lost nine or ten thousand men in the actions of Bassano and Caldiero, which would be out of all question, the divisions of Massena, Augereau, Macguire, Guyeux, the reserve and the cavalry must still, by his own previous shewing, have amounted to at least 20,000 men; nor was it possible for Alvinzy, from the number with which he took the field, to have above 2000 or 3000 more. But, leaving this exaggeration of numbers entirely untouched, as the practice is much too frequent with all modern generals, it certainly required the assurance of Napoleon Buonaparte to assert in the face of the world, that an advance upon narrow causeways afforded the assailants an advantage over the defenders, and that to contract the opening by which an enemy was to be struck at was a benefit to the attacking instead of the attacked party. The head of a column composed of forty or fifty modern infantry soldiers could, of course, effect absolutely nothing against masses; and,

to pass over altogether the frightful enfilading lines that causeways must often present to the fire of artillery, there is not a cultivated marsh land on the face of the globe, from the Delta of the Ganges to the fens of Holland and Lincolnshire, in which a single causeway could be found that would not by branch causeways, roads, outlets, and adjoining patches of dry ground, offer ample opportunities for the defenders to extend their front and fire in a manner ruinous to the advance of any column, however brave: as indeed Napoleon was about to experience. We are bound to add, however, even for his own credit, that the whole of this pretended project which he ascribes to himself was, by his own shewing, a mere after-thought, resulting from the events that accidentally took place.

His intention was to turn the position of Caldiero and to attack the Austrians in their left flank. The causeways led into the open plains round the position where he intended to fight, and therefore he followed them; and he tells us himself that he was greatly chagrined when it was discovered, from the steeple of Ronco, that the Austrians were leaving their ground and making a counter movement, so as to present a front instead of a flank to the advancing foe.

The French army having crossed the Adige on the morning of the 15th, advanced in two columns along the two causeways leading in the direction of Caldiero. Massena's division took the left and followed the causeway that opens into the plains at Porcil, and ended their easy day's work by driving out the few Austrian light troops that occupied the village; but at Arcole sterner doings were in progress.

The right column, with which was Napoleon himself, moved along the causeway leading up the right bank of the Alpon, a small river which falls into the Adige at Ronco. This river is rarely fordable late in autumn, but is crossed by a bridge at the village of Arcole, where the causeway leading out of the marshes leaves the right bank and ascends along the left. It therefore became necessary to obtain the command of this bridge if the movement was to be proceeded with, and it was for the

of the columns through the marshes; but there is a causeway along the left of the Alpon as well as upon the right; and for about a mile below Arcole, this left dyke runs close to the river and parallel to the one by which the French were advancing. It was lined with infantry; two light battalions, with some field-pieces, defended the village; and no sooner did the French attempt to cross the bridge and force an entrance, than so murderous a fire was opened on their front and flank, that they were instantly forced to give way. It was clearly apparent to all that nothing could be effected except by force of sacrifices and by excess of daring; nor were gallant efforts wanting. Augereau seized a standard and planted it with his own hand upon the bridge, but in vain; the column was broken, scattered, and driven back. Onset followed onset in sanguinary succession; General Lannes, Verdier, Bon, and Verne, were wounded in fruitless efforts to gain the fatal pass. Napoleon himself dismounted, rallied the troops, reminded them of Lodi, and seizing a standard, again led them forward; but in vain;

within thirty yards of the enemy the column is again arrested by the terrible fire of musketry, and the Austrians rushing upon the foe, drove the broken and confused mass in headlong rout into the morass, whence Napoleon himself was only extricated by the exertions of some of the grenadiers.

The baffled commander, convinced at last that nothing was to be effected by these repeated and sanguinary front attacks, ordered General Guyeux to cross the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo, and to ascend the left bank of the Alpon and dislodge the Austrian infantry from behind the causeway that flanked the advance against the village. This movement succeeded completely; the Imperialists no sooner saw their position turned than they fell back, allowing the long-contested pass to be carried at the first renewed onset. Arcole was now gained; but it had lost its value, and was no longer the object for which so much gallant blood had been shed during the previous combats. Alvinzy no sooner saw that the French were advancing in force from Ronco, than he withdrew the