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sum which any government in the United States would venture to submit to the consideration of Congress. Our navy is already
created, and national feelings, as well as the conviction of its · boundless services to ourselves and the whole civilized world, during twenty years of tremendous and fearful conflict, will support the British nation in the necessary expense of maintaining its superiority; but the distance between creating and upholding such an implement of attack and defence is immense.
But further, if the maritime population and the finances of America should improve so as to enable them to form a navy, local circumstances of a very important nature would prevent it. The shores of the United States are nearly equal to the whole extent of coast which Great Britain presents to the sea. On the most extended part of that line, viz. from the Capes of Virginia to the southernmost boundary, there is no port in which a ship of the line, or even one of the larger class of frigates, can be received; in fact the whole southern coast of America is destitute of harbours, for the rivers on which Charlestown and Savannah are built, have bars which, except at spring-tides, preclude the entrance of even the smallest frigates. The great rivers Chesapeak and Delaware, though capable of admitting large ships, afford no security against a superior naval force. New York, Newport in Rhode Island, and Boston, though tolerable harbours, may be easily blockaded, and the ships that rendezvous there be rendered useless, whilst a small naval force might scour: every harbour and river to the southward of them. A country so extended as America would find difficulties in forming a naval force, which are not experienced in Great Britairi. In a case of great emergency the whole of our naval population might be concentrated at any one point, so as in six or eight days, if it were necessary, to man a larger fleet than was ever yet equipped; but if America had an equal fleet in the only ports which will admit it, so long a period must elapse before her maritime population could be collected, even if the power of impressment were exercised, that the whole might be very leisurely destroyed before the hands could be brought together to man them.
America, above every other country, is interested in maintaining the peace of the world. She has indeed prospered by the troubles of Europe, but it was only so long as she kept herself free from hostilities with all parties; and as far as she has received any check, it has been owing to her having forsaken the course which Washington, the greatest character she has produced, both prescribed and followed. It is especially her interest to keep on friendly terms with this country if she wishes to preserve and extend her commerce, and to find a certain market for her domestic produce. From the return made to Congress for the year ending
contin peace will country France.sest amounts, and none 100%
30th September 1818, it appears that the total value of her exports amounted to 73,854,437 dollars, of which Great Britain alone took 44,425,553, being nearly two-thirds of the whole, and more than four times the value of the second largest amount, or 10,666,789 dollars, taken from them by France. On the other hand, it is the interest of this country, and we may safely add the wish, to preserve peace with America. It is her interest, because that great continent bids fair to become the best mart for her manufactures; and she cannot possibly harbour a thought to disturb the general peace, so necessary for all Europe, and more especially perhaps for herself. It is with regret, therefore, that we find Mr. Bristed predicting a naval contest in terms altogether calcu
lated to stimulate and hasten the struggle which he foresees. It is | true, as he says, “two suns cannot keep their stations in one sphere;'
but that of his adopted countrymen has not yet climbed this envied height; and, to our homely conception, the period is far beyond mortal ken which shall witness the portentous opposition of the two luminaries,' and the decline of that whose beneficent beams have so long cheered and invigorated the world. It is the wildest of all possible infatuations to suppose, that the partial success of a few vessels can have the least bearing on the great question of naval superiority. The capture of a sloop, a frigate, or even a ship of the line, determines nothing beyond its own fate : the preponderance of naval power must always depend on the equipment and appointment of feets of large ships. With the seamen of a ruined commercial marine thrown wholly out of employ, it would indeed have been surprising if five frigates could not be manned with picked men, many of whom were prime British seainen, and, not a few, deserters from the British navy, who either fought with that desperation which the halter round their necks inspired, or, as in the case of the frigate captured near Valparaiso, escaped from the expected justice of their country in the moment of defeat. But when England was carrying on the commerce of the world, which with her fisheries and the coasting trade created a demand for 200,000 seamen; when her naval store-ships and transports averaged the enormous amount of 250,000 tons, and required 15,000 seamen to pavigate them; when her regular navy demanded 145,000 men, it must and did necessarily follow, that the crews of the ships of war, more especially those last fitted out, were composed of all manner of men--foreigners, landsmen and boys. It is by no means improbable also that, from the nature of the long war in which we had been engaged, a relaxation of strict discipline in the exercise of the guns might have taken place. The decisive battle of Trafalgar had left no enemy on the sea to contend with; and this event, added to the subsequent blockading system, which put an
end to the French navy, was not calculated to improve the tactics of our own.
But there was yet another cause for that partial success which has turned the brain of every American. Their frigates were, in every instance, superior to those of their opponents in size, in weight of metal, and in the number of their crew. A frigate is but a vague term, and expresses no definite idea of a ship's actual force; that of some of the American frigates was nearly equal to our old seventy-fours. We are told in the North American Review,' that a Mr. Corny, one of the best painters of ships alive,' has made use of a stratagem to flatter his countryinen, in repre . senting the English frigate, which was commanded by Commodore Downie, of disproportionate size. There seems to have been little occasion for this. Let them not suppose however, that even with the twelve sail of the line, and twenty-four frigates, which America already enjoys 'in vision beatific,' she will succeed, as Mr. Bristed prognosticates, in wresting from England the empire of the sea :' nor entertain the erroneous notion that even such a squadron is to be manned with the same facility, or with seamen of the same quality, as five or six frigates; or that, even if so manned, it can chuse the objects of attack, and give or avoid battle as it may suit her purpose. Let them also recollect that one decisive victory puts an end to the dream of universal empire: above all, it may be of importance to them to remember that England never had so large a fleet, in such excellent condition, as at this time, ready for sea at a moment's warning, with the means of man- . ning and sending them forth; that, in addition to the 20,000 men employed on the peace establishment, she has (as appears by the Report of the Finance Committee) a band of 32,000 registered seamen, receiving pensions, the youngest of whom have seen more than fourteen years service; and of whom it is not unreasonable to calculate on eight or ten thousand coming forward on the first call. -But we must return to Mr. Bristed.
Unlike most of the British emigrants, he still retains a portion of veneration for the society, the talents, the institutions civil and religious, and even for the glory of the country, from which he has expatriated himself. He does not therefore predict the immediate loss of her liberties, though he contemplates, with some complacency (as we have seen) the period' when the great Republic of the United States is to rule the destinies of the globe.' In speaking of the American army, whose meditated reduction from ten to five thousand men he reprobates, he says,
' Britain has an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men stationed at home, in France, and in colonial garrisons; besides her militia amounting to two hundred thousand; and her Sepoy troops in India,
VOL. XXI. NO. XLI.
rated at a hundred and fifty thousand. And yet no man in his sober senses believes that the liberties of the British people are endangered by this standing army. The liberties of England are not about to expire under the pressure of her military, or the encroachments of her government; if they are to perish, they will perish under the daggers of her democracy: if she is to be blotted out from the list of independent and powerful nations, she will be erased from that high scroll by the parricidal hand of her own rabble, led on to their own and their country's perdition by anarchical reformers, who are alike bankrupt in fortune, reputation, character and principle. But we have no occasion to entertain such fears at present; for while the sovereign governs under the benignant influence of the laws; while the people are free; while religion, morals, intelligence, learning, science, industry, enterprize, and valour continue to make England their favoured abode, the sun of her national glory can never set, but will burn with brighter and still brighter light, until all the ages of time shall be lost in the profound of eternity.'
Even when Mr. Bristed is in an error, he still discovers symptoms of regard to the country he has left, and appreciates, very justly, the character and aims of the discontented. He supposes, indeed, that the government of this country draws to the public use but a small portion of the great inass of its talent and activity; and we forgive him the error for the sake of the apology which he makes.
* It is urged as a common topic of reproach, both in England and in these United States, that the English government does not employ a sufficient portion of talent in its service. This complaint is natural in the mouths of the opposition in Britain, and means nothing more than that if their party were in power, the government would be very wisely administered; a circumstance which must be left to the votes of the people of England, when they elect their knights and burgesses to represent them in the House of Commons. This charge, also, is quite natural in the English reformers, who clamour incessantly about the dulness and ignorance, as well as the corruption and profligacy of the administration; all of which is a mere effusion of disappointed malignity and rage, because the talent, skill, and strength of ihe government render all their efforts to destroy the country vain and ineffectual.
• It is admitted, I believe, on all hands, that there exists a sufficient quantity of talent of every various gradation in Britain; but the objection is, that it is not employed in the service of government, the objection rests on the assumption, that all the great talents of a country ought to be employed in the guidance of its government. But if this were ever to take place in any nation, it would, of itself, ensure a perpetuity of resistless despotism. A well-established government, like that of England, does not require all the highest talents of the country to be crowded into the administration. Having grown up in the habits, affections, and feelings of the people, its business can be regulated and energetically carried on, by the superintending genius of a few great men to guide its primary movements, and by men of decent, respectable talents, to execute its subordinate functions. The residue of its greatesť and most commanding talents would be employed to the best advantage, in diffusing the lights of science, art and literature over the whole community.
Under a free répresentative government, whose national institutions and departments of public service, both civil and military; aré extensive and magnificent, the restrictions upon the rise of real merit are much fewer, and less pernicious, that under a single despotisin; or an unbalanced democracy; and the road to legitimate preferinent is extended to a much wider circle. Whence, in those countries, much less consequence may be attached to the existence or loss of any particular great man; because the appearance of those illustrious characters, irr whose hands the national destinies are placed, is not regulated by accident; but is provided for in regular succession, from age to age, by the internal organization and ordinary administration of government. Thus Chatham was reproduced in Pitt, and Pitt reappears in Castlereagh and Canning.'—p. 484.
We have been rather liberal in our quotations, because we wish to convey to the minds of our readers the feelings of that party in America, which has been the most averse from the irreligious and levelling principles of the Jacobins, and which contains the most respectable portion of the American people. They were never deeply smitten with the charms of the French řevolution; they wished to avoid the war with England; they were eager for the return of peace, and desirous that such improvements might be made in their system of government, as should strengthen the executive power, remunerate more liberally the officers of government, render the judges less dependent, and have a president sometimes chosen from the other states as well as from Virginia, which, withi one exception, has hitherto vominated that chief. Such is the party of which Mr. Bristed is the organ; they call themselves the Federalists, and are opposed to the Democrats, who, by means of a majority composed of the lower classes, including the Irish and English recruits, and the paupers existing on charity, have chosen the president, the greater part of the senate, and the house of representatives.
We have been accused of injustice towards the United States, because we asserted that the Sesostrises of ancient or the Timours of later times, were not more essentially conquerors ir their disposition, than the American government acting upon the politics of Jefferson and Madison. We have, however, in Mr. Bristed---not a proof of the conquering propensities of the democratical portion of the United States, which, indeed, was sufficiently clear before; but--the most decisive evidence, that even the solid, moral, and religious part of America, the aristocrats, the enemies of democracy, are as madly bent on conquest and plunder, and extension of terri