sufficient to convince the most skeptical that nothing but ruin can attend such a system. Objectionable as this feature would be, even under the supposition that the Treasury had a large capital to loan out in this manner, it becomes infinitely worse when connected with the fact that that Treasury is now bankrupt. The proposed issue of paper money is a borrowing operation cloaked under the pretext of supplying a uniform currency. Under that clause $15,000,000 of paper money are to be issued simply upon the credit of the government, and trusting to casual balances arising from the customs for their redemption. This money to be paid out in the discharge of debts, and in the discount of bills, and of course to come in conflict with the Bank issues. From these measures incalculable evils must arise if adopted. Independent of the great risks of government failure, and a consequent depreciation of the notes, a fate which has uniformly overtaken all paper that has ever yet been issued by any government, its effect upon the commerce of the country must be directly opposite from that which is intended. We have seen, in the fore part of this article, that notwithstanding the most rigid curtailment on the part of the Banks here, a suspension during the last fall was very narrowly escaped. An issue of gov ernment paper will, in the same degree, increase the volume of the currency, and place it beyond the control of the Banks at this point, where the settlements take place for the imports of the country. The result must be, that the credits of the Banks will be entirely supplanted by that of the government, or a suspension be produced. If the circulation should thus fall entirely into the hands of the government, the door would be thrown wide open to inflation and failure. In short, the issue of paper money on the credit of the government is a matter much too dangerous to be ventured upon. Yet it is argued that a universal paper medium of circulation is of the highest necessity in facilitating commercial intercourse between one section of the country and another. To meet this want a proposition has been made, which will seemingly embrace all the advantages of paper money without risk of loss. It is to authorize the issue from the Treasury of paper money dollar for dollar, at the option of the government creditor, that is, if an individual has a claim upon the department for say $1,000, and the specie is there to meet it, the individual has the option of taking the coin or the same amount in Treasury notes, if he chooses paper. By this means, the facility of remittance, transfer, and use of the coin is sought to be obtained without its encumbrance. At the same time it does not increase the volume of the currency, because, if the bills are taken, the coin remains in the Treasury, and if the coin is taken, the bills are not issued. In this form only is it safe to issuc government money. Such emissions would not add to the fluctuations in the currency, nor enable those who are without capital to obtain its semblance in order to specu late in the produce of the country at the risk of its government, nor would the notes come in competition with those uttered by the Banks, but, on the contrary, would become a basis for their emission. This would leave the control of the currency in the hands of the Banks, who would be obliged still to govern it with an eye to the preservation of their ability always to pay specie, and consequently to preserve the currency as steady as possible.

The basis of all credits in this country must, from the nature of its trade, exist in the condition of the national credit abroad; inasmuch as the ability to purchase from foreign countries depends upon the extent of the exports. If, through the medium of paper credits, prices are inflated so as to induce large imports, the excess over the value realized for sales abroad must be paid in coin, which necessarily involves failure on the part of the Banks, or sufficient credit must exist abroad to have the payment postponed to some future period. Such a credit has heretofore existed in various shapes, particularly in the few years previous to 1836, when they reached a dangerous height, and depended entirely upon the will of the Bank of England. It was a strong conviction of the fearful power of that institution, through the medium of existing credits, that drew from Mr. Van Buren the remark, that "the Bank of England had the power to alter the condition of every man in every village in the United States." Subsequent events justified the truth of that remark in its fullest extent. In the year 1838, State stocks supplied the credits necessary to sustain a Bank inflation here; and for the year ending in September, 1839, the imports were immense.

In the year 1840, no such credits existed, and the exports showed an apparent excess over the imports of nearly $26,000,000. During the past year the excess of imports is apparently about $3,000,000. The following is a table of the imports and exports for a series of years ending October 1, 1841:

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A SERIES OF YEARS, DISTINGUISHING THE

We have before seen that the Banks had great difficulty in sustaining themselves during the past fall, in consequence of the demand for specie for shipment, and the absence of all credits abroad to supply a temporary deficiency. Notwithstanding that, the excess of imports is not so much as a healthy state of trade would warrant. This arises from the deceptive action of the paper currency upon the method of valuing the exports. The real value of the products of the country, particularly the principal articles of export, cotton and tobacco, is that for which they sell abroad, which for several years has been much less than the nominal value at home. During the past year, the losses on cotton have been large, probably $15,000,000, and on other produce perhaps $5,000,000, making a deduction of $20,000,000 to be made from the amount of exports. These losses grow out of the fact that the shipments are not made to order on foreign account at stipulated prices, as is the case with goods imported here from England; but they are shipped on speculation by operators here, who obtain their facilities from suspended Banks. Those people compete in the markets for the produce, raise the prices upon each other, and ship it without regard to the price abroad, and in almost all cases give more for it here than the price in Liverpool at the time of purchase. The price paid here is nominal in irredeemable money, the depreciation of which increases according to the quantity paid out. The prices so paid enter into the official valuation of the exports, and consequently are always higher than the amount realized abroad. The practical result of this system is seen in the constant suspension of the Banks that are the agents in the transaction, their constantly increasing suspended debts, the reclamations upon speculators who have no capital to meet them, and who consequently clamor for a Bankrupt law to relieve them from the burden.

The same general system which causes the over-valuation of exports, causes goods to flow into the country for sale, when they are converted into specie as speedily as possible for transmission abroad. It counteracts in an eminent degree all the benefit which manufactures at home might derive from a tariff; yet it is a singular fact, that the advocates of the latter are at the same time in favor of a fluctuating paper currency, and have been strenuous supporters of the policy of ingrafting upon the fiscal agent the means of borrowing and expansion. In the present and prospective state of the market abroad for American credit, it is impossible to support a currency in this country of a value materially less than that of the commercial countries with which we have intercourse. The moment that the currency is in any degree depreciated in comparison, either by government issues, the operations of a National Bank, or the State institutions generally, exports are checked, and imports increase the drain of specie to pay the excess of the latter, which will again deplete the currency, and raise its value, if the principle of specie payments is rigorously maintained under the loose system necessarily attending government issues. This would, however, be impossible; and the state of American credit abroad is by no means such as to justify the hope that it will be speedily revived so as to support any new scheme of inflation that may be devised on this side. A long course of steady business upon a cash basis must ensue before even an approximation can be made to the unbounded confidence that formerly existed.