making due returns of the whole of the elections had passed.

In 1867 the writs for the Dominion elections were made returnable on the 24th Sept., except those for Gaspé, and Chicoutimi and Saguenay, which were returnable on the 24th October. Parliament was summoned for 24th Sept., but prorogued, and finally met 'for the despatch of business on the 6th November. The date of the return of the member for Chicoutimi was the 16th, and for Gaspé the 24th Sept. The date of the receipt of the respective returns was 24th Sept. and 2nd October respectively.

In 1872 Manitoba and British Columbia had joined the Dominion. So the writs were made returnable, generally, on the 3rd Sept., except those for Gaspé, Chicoutimi and Saguenay, Manitoba and British Columbia, which were made returnable on the 12th October, on which day, also, Parliament was formally called together. It was, however, as usual, prorogued, and finally called 'for the despatch of business' 5th March, 1873. The excepted elections took place as follows:

was followed as in 1872, the writs generally being returnable on the 21st of February, and those for the excepted districts on the 12th of March, the day of the formal summons. But, as the writ for Algoma was, apparently from inadvertence, not classed with the excepted returns, a fresh proclamation was issued, making that writ also returnable on the 12th of March. Parliament was prorogued from the 12th to the 26th of March, and then met 'for the despatch of business.'

In Ontario, all the writs for the first Legislature after Confederation were made returnable on the 24th of September, 1867, and, by proclamation, the House was convened for that day. It was ultimately called 'for the despatch of business' on the 13th of December. All the elections had been held before the end of September, but no less than four—namely, Bothwell, Cardwell, North Middleser, and North York-were held on or after the 24th of September, the day named in the formal proclamation, while the receipt of no less than 21, or more than one-fourth of the whole number of writs, was delayed until subsequent to the 24th of September. Now, it will be recollected that, in 1867, the date of each separate election was fixed by the Government, and no one can suppose that so experienced a parlia mentarian as Mr. J. Sandfield Macdonald, then Premier, really intended to open his first session while twentyone returns were still incomplete and several members not even elected. That, surely, gives the finishing stroke to any argument founded on the wording of these formal proclamations.

In 1871 the writs were made returnable on the 7th of April, except the writ for Algoma, which was returnable on the 27th of May, and, for the first time, a day for all the elections (except Algoma) was named in the proclamation. The Legislature was called for the 7th of April, but, having been repeatedly prorogued, met for the

despatch of business' on the 7th of December. The nominations and pollings (except in Algoma) were respectively held on the 14th and 21st of March, 1871, and for Algoma the date of the return is given as the 5th of May, the return being received on the 15th of May, 1871. In 1875, as already observed, the writs were generally returnable on the 2nd of February, and for Algoma on the 14th of August. The House stood prorogued from time to time to the 24th of November, 1875. The practice which long obtained in Canada of naming as the day of meeting, the day on which the writs generally were returnable, was doubtless copied from that of Great Britain, where no exceptional conditions existed. It does not, however, follow by any means that the Parliament of Great Britain always meets on the day first appointed. May says on this point (p. 52): The interval 'between a dissolution and the assem'bling of the new Parliament varies 'according to the period of the year, 'the state of public business, and the 'political conditions under which an 'appeal to the people may have become 'necessary.

When the session has 'been concluded, and no question of 'ministerial confidence or responsi'bility is at issue, the recess is generally continued by prorogation until the usual time for the meeting of 'Parliament.'

THE ALLEGED INVASION OF THE PREROGATIVE.

It is alleged that, by virtually prohibiting or precluding the assembling of a new parliament, pending the election for Algoma, the prerogative is violated. In answer to this it may beobserved that, while the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of Parliament are undoubtedly attributes of the prerogative, they are nevertheless subject to the restraints and limitations of law. Every Act must have the assent of the Crown, and if the

Crown thus be a consenting party to an abridgement of the prerogative, no wrong is done to the rights of the Crown by such legislation. The forty days secured by the Barons in Magna Charta for the summoning of the 'Common Council of the Kingdom,' virtually suspended the prerogative for that space of time. So did the forty days statutory provision of William III. So did the fifty days of the Scotch Union Act. So did the fifty days of the Union Act of Canada. So did the ninety days allowed by the Ontario Act of 1868-9 for Algoma in the winter season. So has nearly every statutory limitation or security which has been considered by the Crown as advised by Parliament, essential to the privileges of the electorate.

By the Act of 36th Edward III. it was enacted that Parliament shall be holden every year.' The Triennial Act, 6 & 7 William & Mary, c. 2, enacted that 'from henceforth Parliament shall be holden once in three

years, at the least.' By the Septennial Act, 1 Geo. I, c. 38, the duration of Parliament was limited to seven years, so that the Sovereign might not be able by the aid of a servile or corrupt Parliament to abuse the prerogative. The Canadian Acts providing for the annual convening or duration of the Parliament or Legislatures, are but reflections of the British Statutes. The most potent influence over the acts of the Crown and an all-powerful check on the abuse of the prerogative is, however, the voting of supplies. The granting of these for one year only compels the summoning of Parliament annually quite as effectually as any law. The fact is that, interpreted by modern practice, usage and ideas, the prerogative is simply a power held in trust by the Crown for the people, a power, consequently, that may be enlarged or contracted by the joint action of the Crown and the people, and which has been subject to both in many ways. Hence it is not to be argued that if, by the joint ac

tion of the Crown and the people, it has been decided that there shall be no session of a new parliament during certain months in the year or for a given period of time, this would be an unlawful or improper infringement upon the prerogative, especially by a body that has a right to alter or amend the constitution.

case

But does the Algoma proviso really prejudice the prerogative? We have seen that it has not done so in the past, nor is likely to do so. The c is supposed of a political crisis, say in the Fall, necessitating a dissolution. The Legislature might, it is suggested, refuse to vote supplies, and no appeal to a new House could be had until the July following at the earliest. Is the Crown to be thus deprived of the means for carrying on the government for some seven or eight months! The answer is that, while the Crown would have the right to dissolve, harmony between the Crown and the Legislature could be secured by a change of Ministers. The prerogative is not an arbitrary instrument, but one always to be used judiciously and solely in the public interest. A Governor may have to decide between a change of Ministers and a stoppage of the Queen's business. In that case he must act on his best judgment. Supposing, however, by forcing him to accept, as the result of an appeal to the country, the will of a partially constituted House only, and Ministers in whom a majority of the country, if represented by a complete House, would have no confidence, what would then become of the rights of the Crown? It might get supplies, it is true, but at the price of the prerogative.

THE ARGUMENT OF CONVENIENCE.

In the foregoing remarks the question of convenience has been incidentally referred to. It is argued that the inconvenience of the arrangement which limits elections in Algoma to certain months in the year, is to have

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great weight in considering the intentions of the Legislature, when framing the Statute. Mr. Scott, M. P.P., in his argument, quoted from Maxwell's Interpretation of the Statutes,' in support of this view. Maxwell, in his ‘Interpretation of the Statutes, page 166, says 'An argument drawn from an inconvenience, it has been said, is for'cible in law, and no less force is due 'to any drawn from an absurdity or 'injustice.' But 'inconvenience' alone is not sufficient to invalidate a Statute that is clear and unmistakable in its terms. The law books are full of decisions, some of which are to be found in 'Maxwell' (p. 5), distinctly insisting on adherence to the express letter of the Statute, no matter what the consequences, or, in other words, the 'inconvenience' may be. In 'Maxwell' p. 4, occurs the following passage: 'If the words go beyond what was the in'tention, effect must nevertheless be 'given to them. They cannot be con'strued contrary to their meaning 'merely because no good reason ap

pears why they should be excluded or embraced. However unjust, ar'bitrary or inconvenient the intention 'may be, it must receive its full effect. 'When once the intention is plain, it 'is not the province of a court to scan 'its wisdom or its policy.' The plea of inconvenience in the present instance has no practical weight. A possible difficulty can only arise at a General Election. The practice of Ontario is against the presumption that such an inconvenience will arise. It was for the Legislature in framing the Election Law to balance inconveniences. They decided, it must be assumed, that it would be less inconvenient, perhaps once in a great many years, for public business to have to await the election of a complete As sembly than to recognise as a valid and effectual meeting of Parliament one from which a portion of the representation was, per force, excluded However to guard against a most improbable eventuality it has now been

provided that should such a contingency as that suggested arise the old member shall retain his seat until a new one is elected for Algoma.

ENACTMENTS RELATING TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

First, in order, we have the British North America Act, sec. 41, continuing, in the case of the Dominion, the Election Laws of the several Provinces until otherwise provided. (2) In section 65, powers are given to the Local Legislatures to abolish or alter' 'powers, authorities and functions' exercised by the Lieut.-Governors. (3) The 70th section declares that the Legislative Assembly of Ontario shall be composed of eighty-two members to represent the eighty-two electoral districts set forth in the first schedule to the Act (Algoma being one). Section 84 contains a provision for the temporary continuance of the existing electoral laws of Canada in respect of the two Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. (5) Section 85 provides, that the Legislative Assembly shall last four years and no longer (subject to earlier prorogation). (6) The 86th section enacts that there shall be a session once at least in every year. (7) The 92nd section gives power to the Provinces to amend their constitutions except as regards the office of Lieut.Governor.

(4)

We have now exhausted the list of the several provisions in the British North America Act bearing upon the subject under consideration. Reading them together as we are bound to do, we must come to the conclusion: (1) That in every sense (save in the one exception relating to the office of the LieutenantGovernor) the Local Legislatures were to have full power to alter or amend their constitutions, including those constitutional provisions above mentioned and expressly enacted under the 3rd, 5th, and 6th heads. (2) That the 70th section fixing the number of

members at 82, could have no less force than the 85th and 86th relating to the duration and holding of parliament. If it be held that parliament would lapse, and its Acts be void if the Statute were infringed by the session lasting one day over the four years, surely it must be equally void if constituted of only 81 members instead of 82.

We come next to the Ontario Acts. The Act of 1868-9 (32 Vic. c. 21, s. 18, sub-sec. 4) extends the period for making the Algoma writ returnable, to ninety days in the winter season. Then, in the Representation Act of 1874 (38 Vic. c. 2, sec. 1), the number of members is increased to eightyeight, and by the 38 Vic. c. 3, sec. 21, the period for holding an election in Algoma is limited to the months of June, July, August, September and October. This is slightly enlarged and more precisely stated in 39 Vic. c. 10, s. 13, which provides, that the nomination or polling shall be held in any year at some time from the 20th day of May to the end of November, and between those days only.

Now, how, in a legal sense, does this last enactment contravene any we have quoted preceding it in order of time? Not certainly the first (sec. 41, B. N. A.), for it does not relate to the Do minion Law; not the second (sec. 65, B. N. A), for it is of the very essence of that clause that the Legislature should abolish or alter any of those prerogative rights, which, without express direction to the contrary, the Crown would exercise independently of such a check or regulation; not the third (sec. 70, B. N. A.), because it gives aid to the effectual constitution of the Assembly by naming a time suitable for the election of the full complement of members; not the fourth (sec. 84, B. N. A.), because that is a mere continuance of former Acts, pending such provisions as the later Act comprises; not the fifth (sec. 85, B. N. A.), for the four years' date will run as easily from the return of the

Algoma writ as from any other; not the seventh, for that gives express powers to pass just such a law as the one in question. We have omitted to consider the effect of the enactment on the section quoted under the sixth head (86 sec., B. N. A.), as the several sections have been passed in review, and for this reason: it is the only one that might, by a remote contingency, be negatived or voided by the Algoma clause. The case is put thus: If the LieutenantGovernor were advised to dissolve the Legislature at a date, say in October, too late to allow an election in Algoma to be legally held that year, while the Legislature had been prorogued in March or April, no election could take place in Algoma until June or July of the following year, or, contrary to the Statute, fifteen or sixteen months instead of a year from the last sitting of the Legislature at its previous session.

The guarantee against such an event from caprice or without absolute neces

sity, is the need the Executive has of obtaining supplies, of which it would have none without a Legislature at or immediately after New Year's Day. But, if an emergency of the kind arose then it is submitted that, as no penalty nor disability would attach to the holding of the Legislature after the expiration of the year dating from the last sitting of the previous Legislature, so, if in providing for the general convenience, and ensuring the due constitution of the Legislature (a fundamental principle in the constitution), the Algoma clause came into collision under wholly exceptional conditions with the annual-meeting clause, then the last enacted Statute must prevail over the earlier one, and in so far as may be necessary to the carrying out of the latest expressed intention of the Legislature be held to have repealed it. But the Act which has just become law removes even this possible if improbable source of dif ficulty.