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S Canadians, we are proud of our nationality. Our amor patriæ is not on the surface, and possibly requires the positive stimulus of a Trent Difficulty,' or the negative influence of a Times article, before its latent depths are stirred. But the national feeling exists. We are justly proud of our position as the first colony of the Empire, and of our commercial rank among the nations of the world. It is our boast that we have a commercial marine only surpassed in numbers and tonnage by four of the leading nations of the earth. We have a territory richer in vegetable and mineral wealth, and larger in area, than any of the kingdoms of Europe. We have a hardy and intelligent population, and the freest institutions on the face of the globe. How should we maintain those rights, protect our liberties, and retain our possessions, were Great Britain's naval and military assistance withheld or withdrawn? We have no navy to protect our ships; we have developed no sufficient military organization to

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Now, is this a condition that should be acquiesced in by a free people, accustomed to the exercise of the fullest civil and religious liberty? The merchant who will not insure his life against accident, or his property against fire, is blameworthy, should he suffer loss by these means. The nation which declines or neglects to protect its liberties in not providing for their defence by all means within its power, is equally reprehensible.

Contrast our position with that of some of the smaller European Powers :

Sweden. Norway. Denmark. Greece.

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From these figures it appears that, with a population almost equal, and a revenue half as large as the Netherlands, we spend less than one-seventh as much for military and naval purposes, and train for such services less than one-fourth the number of men. We have no ships of war; she has sixty-seven, some of first-class power; and yet her mercantile marine only numbers 1,835 vessels, of 526,527 tonnage, while we have 6,952 vessels, of 1,205,565 tons burden! Denmark, with about half our population and revenue, trains annually double the number of men that we do, and has a small and well appointed navy.

For

Another striking comparison may be made in the amount paid for military purpose per head of population annually in different countries. example, in Great Britain the people are taxed $6.86 per head per annum, in France $4.50 per head, in Prussia $2.20 per head, and in the United States (exclusive of the cost of the State Militia) $1.39 per head, while in Canada we only burden ourselves with the trifling tax of 14 cents per head of our population for militia purposes. Certainly no Canadian would object to that tax being doubled or quadrupled.

It is not necessary to force these comparisons to an application. There are many circumstances which prevent a comparison with the states of Europe. It is merely to point the fact, that other nations having small populations and resources, do more to ensure their national rights and liberties than we do. And it is beyond the power of the most prophetic soul to say that our rights and liberties may not be invaded.

The question is, how are our means of defence to be developed at the least cost to a young and struggling people, both in the matter of money, and of time? There is only one way by which a defensive organization can be maintained, adequately and inexpensively, and that is by means of a militia. of our fellow-citizens are

But

many

accustomed to ask the question, 'Why expend money to support a militia that in peace is not required, and in war would be inadequate as a protection against invasion?' Let our history answer this question.

Barely twelve years after the struggle which terminated in the cession of Canada to the British, the arms of the rebellious American colonies were directed against Canada. At that time there were only about 500 British troops in the colony, but General Carleton embodied some 1,800 militia and garrisoned Quebec, defeating the attempt of the enemy to carry the fortress by storm on the 30th December, 1775, and holding it until the arrival of British reinforcements on the 6th May, 1776. All the country, west of Quebec, had been overrun by the Americans, and had not the militia proved loyal, in spite of the temptations offered them by the various proclamations of the American Generals, it is probable that, at the present time, Canada would have been one of the States of the Union. This time, therefore, the steady valour and loyalty of the Canadian militia, preserved Canada to the British Crown.

In 1812 the Americans attacked Canada with two corps, numbering 13,300 men. The British troops in the Province were but 4,500 strong, nearly 3,000 of whom were in garrison at Quebec and Montreal, only 1,500 being in Upper Canada. From the capture of Michilimacinac, the first blow of the campaign, down to its close, the militia took their share in every military operation. Of the force that captured Detroit with its garrison of 2,500 men, scarcely 300 were regular troops. Brock had but 1,200 men to oppose 6,300 Americans on the Niagara frontier, and more than half were militia; yet he confronted the enemy, and in the gallant action in which he lost his life, left an imperishable record of the steady valour with which Canadians can defend their country. At that time the population

arms,

of Upper Canada, capable of bearing did not exceed 10,000 men, yet the Province supplied 5,455 officers and men as its contingent for service during the war.

In 1813, Canada was menaced by three separate armies, numbering over 30,000 men. The British force consisted of 13,000 regulars, and 15,000 militia, scattered over a frontier a thousand miles long. The Americans overran Upper Canada for a while, but by the end of the campaign had been driven across the border. At Chateauguay, Col. de Salaberry showed of what stuff our militia was made. The American force consisted of 7,000 infantry, 10 guns, and 250 cavalry. The Canadian force, under de Salaberry, was about 1,000 strong-nearly half of whom took no part in the battle- and yet he totally defeated and drove back a force eight times his strength. Of this action, General Sir James Carmichael Smyth says: The affair upon the Chateauguay River is remarkable as having been fought, on the British side, almost entirely by Canadians. The Republicans were repulsed by a very inferior number of Canadian militia, and of troops raised in Canada, thus affording a practical proof of the good disposition of the Canadians, and the possibility, to say nothing of the policy, of improving the Canadian militia, so as to be fully equal in discipline and instruction to any American troops that may be brought against them at any future opportunity.' He also says, 'Not a single Canadian militiaman was known to desert to the enemy, during the three years the war continued.' At the end of the war, the Americans had gained no foothold upon Canadian territory, and were forced to postpone that conquest of Canada, originally undertaken as a military promenade.' Yet at that time the entire population of Canada did not exceed 300,000, while that of the United States was over 8,000,000,-an odds of 27 to 1 against us.

For the second time,

therefore, the efforts of the Canadian militia largely contributed to the preservation of Canada to the Crown.

During 1837, in Upper Canada alone, with a population of 450,000, there were 40,000 militia enrolled, in the expectation of a war being provoked by the action of the too active sympathisers with the Rebels. Of this number there were 16 battalions and 35 companies of cavalry, artillery, and riflemen, placed on active service, several of whom did military duty for some years afterward.

In 1862, when the 'Trent difficulty' rendered a war with the United States a matter of extreme probability, the alacrity with which the Canadian militia sprung to arms, resolving to abide by all consequences rather than that their dearly loved flag should be insulted with impunity, no doubt had its influence in securing the submission and apology that was made by the American Government.

In 1865, it became necessary, in order to restrain the Southerners resident in Canada from making our territory a basis for warlike operations, to place corps of observation at certain points on the frontier. These battalions were formed from the elite of our militia and they became, after a few months' duty, equal to any soldiery in the world. How could we at that time have sustained our International obligations, had we no militia?

From 1866 to 1870 came the Fenian raids. How serious would these small matters have become had we not had our militia ready to repel such attacks! Those who now cavil at the expense, and argue against the necessity of the Force, were in those days the first to recognize their usefulness, and to seek to place the militia between themselves and the enemy. In twenty-four hours from the call for active service, 33,754 militiamen had come forward, upwards of 8,000 in excess of the quota allowed by the Militia Act, and 13,000 more than had been on the

strength of companies in the preced

ing year.

In 1869, our militia took a part in the expedition to Red River, and, by their soldierlike qualities and cheerful endurance, won such high consideration from their gallant commander that in the wilds of Ashanti he wished for those two corps of Canadian militiamen, when the picked regiments of Imperial troops were at his disposal.

Since 1870, have not the Guibord riots and the 12th of July outrages in Montreal; the Grand Trunk riot at Belleville and elsewhere on the line; the pilgrimage riots in Toronto, and half a dozen other occasions in which military aid has been invoked to enforce the civil power, proved sufficiently the imperative necessity for the maintenance in our midst of a body of armed and disciplined militia, who regard their duty as soldiers first, and their prejudices and feelings last?

Suppose that we take it for granted that a militia is a necessary adjunct to Government, even in a country where the people have an hereditary respect for the majesty of the law. Upon what principle, and what detail, shall we render that constitutional force at once inexpensive and efficient? There are three ways afforded us by precedent. First, the old feudal system, making the land, through its owners, responsible for the forthcoming of a certain force. This was the system in Canada prior to the conquest, and which, singularly enough, was engrafted upon British law by the Quebec Act. Second-the ballot, which is the law of this country, though suspended in its operation by the present system of voluntury enlistment.

The nearest approach to our system as defined by law, is that in force in Denmark, which is based upon the liability of all able-bodied men to serve, but adopts the ballot as a practice. Let us glance at its working and results.

Every male subject, at the age of 22, has to assemble in his military district for the purpose of conscription. They are then sorted for the various arms-the smallest or weakest never being called upon for duty in time of peace, and the physically incapable being rejected altogether. About 40 per company are selected for active service, and are, to all intents and purposes, regular soldiers for sixteen months, and after that time are incorporated with those men of their year, not called upon for service, as a reserve, to be called upon in case of need. These reserves are formed into battalions, of which it will be seen forty per cent are drilled men. When a man has been in the reserve for ten years, he goes into the second reserve, and is not called upon for duty, unless the first reserve is drained by war. Officers obtain commissions only upon examination, and are promoted by seniority, promotions in the Artillery and Engineers being based upon the number of marks gained by those who are entitled to compete, and appointments being made to the Staff from those who pass the best examinations. In some cases, however, these promotions are made by merit. Non-commissioned officers above the rank of corporals enlist for eight years, after which time they are entirely exempt from military service. Corporals are selected from the recruits of the year, and are kept on duty for two years, by which time the new non-commissioned officers are fairly able for duty.

among

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entire male population takes it in turn to serve, as in Switzerland, a country which has for centuries presented the edifying spectacle of a nation determined to be independent, but never to interfere with its neighbours-an example it would be well for us to follow.

With exception of the clergy and certain civil functionaries, every Swiss is a soldier. From the age of 19 to that of 44 he may be at any time called upon for military service. But practically a man passes into the reserve or Landwehr, at about 28 to 30, serving his time in the élite or first line, before that age.

As soon as a

youth attains the age of 19 he is attached to a battalion in his canton and there undergoes 28 days' drill for the first year, and eight days' drill in the succeeding years. If he is suitable he is placed in the engineers or artillery, and then undergoes 42 days' training for the first and 14 days in the succeeding years. Riflemen are trained for 35 days the first, and 14 the following years.

Staff officers are obliged to pass through the military school at Thun, as are also the officers of engineers and artillery. Regimental staff officers also pass examinations on promotion. The military college at Thun is selfsustaining.

The élite or first line, numbers 84,369 of all ranks, the reserve or second line 50,069, of all ranks, and the Landwehr or third line, 65,981 of all ranks; the first two (in round numbers 140,000 men) being armed and equipped.

Thus we see what can be accomplished in the way of defensive organization, by smaller nations, with lesser revenues than our own. What are we to do towards the same end? No hurried extension of our present system is necessary or would be prudent. Armies are not made in a day, nor can a military system be perfected in a year. But the framework must be built in time of peace, upon such solid foundations that

.

it will neither shrinknor give way under the pressure of war. Therefore we ap

peal to our legislators, and to our countrymen at large, to give the matter serious and instant consideration. To have an efficient militia, sufficient funds must be provided to carry on the work regularly. It will not do to spend two millions in one year, and half a million in the next. The vote should be a standing sum, and not subject to legislative caprice, or cheeseparing administration. Let the country decide, once for all, what it can afford to spend annually for defensive purposes, and then hold those persons responsible for its proper expenditure, who are also responsible for the efficiency of the Force.

It is difficult to understand on what grounds the successive Governments have been so parsimonious in reference to militia expenditure. There is no item in the Public Accounts less grudged by the masses of the people than that devoted to the support of the militia; there is no outlay that is distributed so evenly over the countryand there is little doubt but that any Government would be liberally supported in a generous policy towards the force.

Members of Parliament have said that the country would not submit to an increased expenditure for militia purposes. This is either founded on ignorance of the real feelings of the Canadian people, or is but a shallow pretence. Have we not seen year after year Municipal Councils all over the country voting large sums to their local volunteer corps to supplement the Government Grants? Do not the Municipalities meet the Government half way and build handsome drill sheds, of which they pay a large portion of the cost? The municipal bodies are not bound to expend these sums, it is no part of their duty any more than that they should give grants to the customs and the post office, or for the erection of light-houses. This liberality is the most conclusive proof that

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