of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like CONNEXION betwixt them. Here then many philoso phers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and original cause of all things, but the immediate and sole cause of every event that appears in nature. They pretend, that those objects which are commonly denominated causes, are in reality nothing but occasions; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being." Hume's Philos. Essays. Ess. vii. Upon this doctrine, a late eminent philosopher has observed: "Mr. Hume had the merit of shewing clearly to philosophers, that our common language, with respect to cause and effect, is merely analogical; and that if there be any links among physical events, they must for ever remain invisible to us. If this part of his system be admitted; and if, at the same time, we admit the authority of that principle of the mind, which leads us to refer every change to an efficient cause; Mr. Hume's doctrine seems to be more favourable to theism, than even the common notions upon this subject as it keeps the Deity always in view, not only as the first, but as the constantly operating efficient cause in nature, and as the great connecting principle among all the various phenomena which we observe. This, accordingly, was the conclusion which Malebranche deduced from premises very nearly the same with Mr. Hume's." Mr.Dugald Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, vol. i. p. 549. 8vo ed. In truth, the evidence of this fact lies in every man's own consciousness. He has only to fix his reflection attentively upon it, to perceive that it is certain and unquestionable. But it is not implied, as perhaps Mr. Hume would have been willing that his readers should infer, that events are fortuitous and insulated, that no connecting power exists, pro ducing and maintaining a physical and a moral order. The proper inference is, that the phenomena of the universe are a collection of constituted series, the result of divine wisdom, the object of divine power, the production of HIM "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will:" that the great moral constitutions of LEGISLATIVE RECTITUDE and REDEEMING MERCY,-are parts of the one, all-wise, harmonious, and perfect system of the universe; and that the union of all is the immediate effect of Jehovah's infinite power, acting from the highest reason, namely, holiness, conjoined with benevolence. Note XIV.-page 35. ON THE TERM, GUILT. "Jesus Christ In the first edition this was expressed, voluntarily sustained the guilt and punishment of sin." As the term guilt is liable to misconstruction, I have declined retaining it; though it was used in a sense quite, I trust, unobjectionable. We commonly employ this term both in the sense of LEGAL ANSWERABLENESS (reatus), and of BLAMEWORTHINESS (culpa). It was only in the former sense, and by no means in the latter, that the word was here introduced. In divinity, as well as in other sciences, it is necessary to attach to some terms a technical definiteness of signification, much more restrained than the ordinary acceptation of the same words. It were to be wished that, in all such cases, we had words appropriated only to the particular objects: but the usage of language (quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi), forbids such a wish. If scepticism, or rashness should raise a cavil, we can only reply, that the cavil is unreasonable. No man ridicules mathematical terms, because, in many instances, they are the words of common life, employed in a very restricted signification. "In regard to the phrase guilt of Adam's first sin [in the Westminster Assembly's Catechism], it is well known that many great divines have considered GUILT as intending simply exposure or liability to punishment; and this, either for one's own sin or that of another." Letters to Prof. Stuart, by Daniel Dana, D. D. Boston, New Engl. 1839: p. 22. Note XV.-page 38. ON THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST FOR US. It is a common method of eluding the force of these scriptural passages, to maintain their simple meaning to be that Christ gave himself, suffered, and died for us, that is, for our benefit; in other words, we derive from his death important advantages, such as evidence of his sincerity, confirmation of our faith in his mission, and a valuable example of suffering virtue. But, according to this reasoning, our benefit from the death of Christ is only one article of the general sum of blessing derived from him, and to which his exemplary life, his doctrine, his miracles, and above all, his resurrection, contributed as much, or more, than his death. We should, therefore, have expected to find the forgiveness of our sins, and deliverance from condemnation, ascribed equally to any or to all of these. But how different is the fact! Christ lived, and taught, and proved his divine commission, for us; and we have thus a most important benefit from him in those respects but it is to his sufferings and death alone that the New Testament attributes the putting away of sin, remission, propitiation, reconciliation, redemption, and peace with God. This very marked difference deserves most serious consideration from those who deny, or doubt, the doctrine of the atonement. Another circumstance places this argument in a still stronger light. To the piety and constancy, the sufferings and martyrdom, of Christ's immediate disciples, we are immensely indebted; as in those facts, combined with their peculiar circumstances, we find the evidence of the divine origin of Christianity and the most edifying lessons of every virtue. Neither were they insensible to the benefit which would hence accrue to the cause of religion; and the contemplation of it was to their disinterested spirits a source of the purest delight. "Yea, if even I be poured out as the libation upon my sacrifice and ministerial service [for the establishment] of your faith, I myself rejoice, and I congratulate you all." Phil. ii. 17. "I now rejoice in my sufferings for you; and I go on to endure in my flesh what yet remain of these afflictions [for the cause] of Christ, for [the good of] his body, which is the church." Col. i. 24. Thus strongly does the apostle recognise the fact, of the great advantages to be derived from his own sufferings to his fellow-christians. But how does he shrink back from putting those advantages in the same relation to the salvation of mankind, which belonged to the sufferings of his Lord! "Was Paul crucified for you?" 1 Cor. i. 13. Another objection is, that the obedience and devotions of Christians are called sacrifices, (Rom. xii. 1. 1 Pet. ii. 5. Heb. xiii. 15,) because they are acts of consecration and submission to God; and that, therefore, nothing higher may be intended in the language of the New Testament concerning the sufferings of Christ. To which we reply: 1. That the use of such terms with relation to Christ is not slight and incidental, but is amply illustrated by a copious variety of additional expressions, which place their sense out of all reasonable doubt. 2. That, in the secondary senses of words, the primary idea is often dropped, and only the accessory one remains. Obedience and prayer were the accessories of the primary notion of sacrifice and agreeably to the usage of all language, the term itself would come to be applied, in a limited acceptation, to any act expressing devotedness to God. 3. That in the instances adverted to, there is an allusion to the kinds of sacrifice among the Hebrews called thankofferings, peace-offerings, and free-will-offerings. Note XVI.-page 45. This term has been too often misconceived, and upon such misconception gross prejudices are founded against our doctrine. I beg permission, therefore, to state the sense in which it is here used, following the authority of the most accurate divines, Stapfer, Stein, Wyttenbach, Canzius, &c. By Satisfaction, in a theological sense, we mean, such act or acts as shall accomplish all the moral purposes which to the infinite wisdom of God appear fit and necessary under a system of rectoral holiness, and which must otherwise have been accomplished by the exercise of retributive justice upon transgressors in their own persons, Sin produces a disturbance in the moral order which supreme wisdom has constituted in the universe. Such disturbance is an endeavour to cast disapprobation and contempt upon that supreme wisdom, and upon all the moral and legislative attributes of the Deity; holiness, justice, veracity, authority, and power. Were the divine government to connive at such disturbance of moral order, it would acquiesce in its own dishonour. It cannot connive at such disturbance in any instance, or in any degree, however small in the partial estimation of mortals; for great and small are relative ideas, and of the whole sum of moral relations the Infinite Mind alone is competent to judge: and, were a single instance connived at, the moral principle would be violated, and the series of consequences would extend illimitably to the subversion of the whole system of moral order in the universe.-Such is the outline of an admirable train of reasoning, solely on the principles of natural ethics, by the acute and excellent Stapfer, in his Inst. Theol, vol. i. p. 249-258. If, then, the work of Christ have that excellency and merit, which the unerring justice of heaven has seen to be an actual doing of that which was requisite to compensate for the injury perpetrated, and to restore the moral harmony which had been violated, it may, with the utmost propriety, be called a Satisfaction. The theological use of the word |