though it is important to have a thorough conviction and appreciation of the worthlessness of narratives about remote and marvellous events when utterly unsupported by contemporary evidence, the investigation of them is best left entirely to scholars and antiquaries. The only possible arguments are, we would not say imponderablethey are of value in evoking the sympathies of those who study them, but they are such as cannot be weighed in the historical balance.

New tests of historical certa nty may soon be established in the case of the two ancient nations which have bequeathed us ample contemporary records in the shape of sculptures and inscriptions. We are all familiar, however, with two plain proofs that their value, and that of coins also, may be reduced to a minimum at any time by imperial or national vanity or prejudice.

Domitian celebrated a triumph over Britain when his army had merely picked up shells upon the opposite coast of Gaul. And our own London Monument, "like a tall bully, lifts its head and lies" (did so at least till 1810), asserting that the great fire of 1666 was a plot of the Papists.

Let us come down as far as to A.D. 1307. Some of us have title deeds and letters in our family chests of this and earlier dates. Yet it is impossible to be sure of anything about William Tell except that the story of the apple is untrue, and was borrowed from a Scandinavian legend, popular in many countries, about a hero named Toke, alias Eigil, alias &c., &c. The first history that contained his famous adventures was published 140 years after the current date of his death. Serious discrepancies exist between different versions of the story as told by the Swiss

chroniclers.

He was nowhere so

much as mentioned in contemporary records. No trace of his descendants or connections could be found at the end of the 16th century The list of bailiffs of Kussnacht during the 14th century does not show the name of Gessler. Had not early treatises discrediting the legend been burnt by the common hangman, and their authors been threatened with a similar fate, we might have known more-that is, less. As it is, the Antiquarian Society of Lausanne seems to doubt Tell's very existence. However,

from the early foundation of Tell's Chapel on the banks of Lake Lucerne in 1387-only forty years after his death-and from the institution in the previous year of a religious service to commemorate how he lost his life during a flood in the attempt to save a friend, we may venture infer what? "that an obscure peasant of this name did shoot an Austrian bailiff on the banks of Lake Lucerne, thereby causing a revolt; and that he was afterwards drowned, as stated above."

to

The case is most instructive, as showing how far down in European history the legendary elements have survived, and also how necessary it is to reject the dilemma, "take all or none," and to maintain that something happened, though we cannot know exactly what, only being assured that it is not always what is told in the story that is oldest, most famous, most interesting, most edifying.

So much for notoriety. Equally remarkable and discouraging are the phenomena to be met with in historical writings taken by themselves.

It is marvellous that the model historian Thucydides should have had for his contemporary (though senior) such an inveterate legendmonger as Herodotus, and that

Tacitus (born A.D. 61) should have been as immeasurably superior in discrimination to Livy (died A.D. 7).

Then we must be prepared for such startling omissions as that of the "rise of Methodism, from a history of the reign of George II., and of allusion to the Chinese wall from the travels of Marco Polo," and for such discrepancies as between Clarendon's statement that the Earl of Argyle was hung (in 1661) and Burnet's (another contemporary) that he was beheaded.

Again, the indirect and therefore (if genuine) invaluable evidence derivable from the autobiographies and correspondence of distinguished men can only be received subject to one caution: "To forge and counterfeit books, and father them upon great names,. has been a practice almost as old as literature.' Thus did Dr. Gauden publish "Eikon Basilikè as the composition of Charles I. Hence the least anachronism in personal or political or geographical allusions, or in the use of words or idioms, outweighs all notoriety in the matter of authorship; and every allegation of a radical difference in style between the disputed and the recognised compositions of the same author must be treated with respect.

Once more. Not only are medals coined, trophies set up, inscriptions engraved, and public buildings erected, in honour of events that never took place, but a religious ceremony is often the "circumstance to a 66 lie," e.g., the annual pilgrimage to Paray-le-Monial. And while the names of places are often "fossil history" -as when Camargue is traced to Caii Marii ager-they still more often give rise to legends which have actually no foundation in fact, as when Mons Pileatus, the cloud-capped peak of Lucerne, was transformed into the scene of the banishment and suicide of Pontius Pilatus.

To complete the discomfiture of the controversialist who appeals to history and insists on everybody taking his view, we have also to consider how little is to be learnt from the three witnesses who do always tell the truth; how seldom they speak, or else how enigmatically.

A people's institutions, as distinguished from a code of laws invented for them by a native genius, or imposed upon them by a foreign conqueror, are the fruits of their past history, and the tree may be known by its fruits.

Thus, supposing the authentic period of Roman history to commence at a time when there was already in force a law that one of the consuls must be a plebeian, it is an almost inevitable inference that at a previous period both were patricians.

Our English law that we may not be taxed without our own consent proves that taxation in old times was both arbitrary and oppressive.

But a student as far removed from ourselves as we are from the Romans of B.C. 366 would never be able to guess from such a sketch of our institutions as we possess of theirs, "how different ́ was the exercise of nearly the same nominal legislative functions by Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth." (Sir G. Cornwall Lewis).

The language of many mixed nations at many periods has told as clear a tale as Wamba read in the words calf and veal, swine and pork. But philologists are not always unanimous, and history written solely by their aid is very sketchy, and seldom invites or settles any important dispute.

Alleged events, unsupported otherwise, may be strongly confirmed when subsequent undisputed events can be represented as effects which, according to established

physical and moral possibilities, and setting aside gratuitous suppositions, could have had no other cause. This is merely the circumstantial evidence of law courts on a large scale, sharing all its strength-as when the murder of Bishop Patteson by certain Polynesians proved their previous illtreatment by white men-and all its weakness, as when the murder of Mungo Park merely indicated the brutal cupidity or ferocity of other barbarians.

Enough has now been said on the destructive side.

The reader will now accept as possibly applicable to the historical problem which he himself may most desire to solve the following dictum of Fitzjames Stephen: "Unless by some unforeseen accident new materials should come to light, any doubts about this subject-whether they arise from inherent improbabilities in the story itself, from differences of detail in the different narratives, or from general considerations as

to

the untrustworthiness of historians writing on hearsay, and at a considerable distance from the events which they relate are, and must remain for ever, unsolved and insoluble."

How many names in the long sweep of time,

That so foreshortens greatness, may but hang

On the choice mention of some fool that

once

Brake bread with us, perhaps.

TENNYSON, Queen Mary, act iii., sc. 1.

It is a relief to turn to the bright side of the picture. A writer in the Journal de Genève thus recalls it to our view : "Relevons encore un merite, assez rare aujourd'hui, chez l'historien de Voltaire: il raconte les faits; les historiens récents n'écrivent guère plus que les contester; s'ils vont longtemps-encore de ce train,

Ce

nous arriverons à cette triste conclusion, qu'il ne s'est rien passé depuis la création du monde. n'est pas que je méprise la critique; au contraire, et je la préfere de beaucoup à l'éloquence chez ceux qui me racontent le passé, mais encore faut-il qu'ils me racontent. Je demande à l'histoire de rentrer dans le genre narratif."

What then can we do towards constructing the wished-for canons of historical credibility?

We begin, of course, with careful definitions.

Historical events, as distinguished from personal details, are such as concern a whole nation, and (except secret treaties and the like) are notorious throughout the country, country, and usually also in neighbouring countries.

Credible means probable, i.e., resting on evidence which in the majority of similar cases has been verified, or at least is accepted as

true.

It must be noted that, as in matters of "probability," so here also, antecedent likelihood must be allowed to strengthen or weaken the chances made out by evidence; and moreover, when our conviction that a certain alleged event is true would drive us into a change of conduct or of sentiment, we require the odds in its favour to be very great. The foundations must correspond to the superstructure.

Next to definitions come axioms; only, in this inexact science, we must use the less forcible Latinderived equivalent, assumptions. In historical as in legal investigations we assume.

To resume, men tell the truth if they know it, and take the trouble, and have no interest the other way. Events admitted to have happened must have been caused by previous events; and if history (not mythology) mentions a vera causa, i.e., previous events such as might very

well have happened, any other hypothesis is gratuitous.

The undesigned consensus of independent authorities is convincing and conclusive as far as it goes (of this proviso more hereafter), whether the authorities (i.e., persons who knew) are authors of books, inscriptions, coins, &c., in which case facts may be established "out of the mouth of two or three witnesses," or are merely "folks," in which case they must be very numerous, for only so is the " VOX populi vox Dei"- only so may constat be translated "it is well known."

It is interesting to note how our definitions bear upon our assumptions. The public importance of historical events leads us to expect that many contemporaries did know the truth about them, so that what was uncontradicted at the time ought not to be lightly discredited, while what was omitted at the time ought not to be easily accepted.

The magnitude of historical events forbids us to put aside alleged causes of admitted effects on the plea (which is, however, a sceptical man's only safeguard in the face of well- substantiated ghost stories and the like) that we "cannot be expected to account for everything."

The great number of circumstances, important or unimportant, surrounding a historical event, offer additional scope for undesigned coincidences, while it is also impossible to suppose as may happen in the subjects of lawsuits and trials-that a false account is due to a conspiracy either of historians or of multitudinous

rumour-mongers.

Next, to examine more closely some expressions that have just been employed.

What kind of persons "know the truth" about historical events?

Experience must furnish the answer. Sometimes it is experience of the particular authority we are valuing. If we have found him evidently as well-informed as he professes to be on all points which we can test by other authorities, we shall esteem him as well-informed as he professes to be on other similar points.

Thus, Herodotus's statement that Xerxes made a canal on the isthmus behind Mount Athos having been verified by the discovery of its channel, we have a reasonable presumption that he has correctly described the whole route of the Persian fleet and army.

But, unfortunately, it too often happens that we have only one authority for certain events, and that it relates no other events, or at least no other similar events, which we can test, and so estimate its trustworthiness.

Thus it is only in Herodotus that we can find a record of, or even an allusion to, the remarkable conversations which he tells us Xerxes held with Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta. In such cases our resource is to consider what proportion of such conversations are usually reported so eagerly and faithfully as to reach a foreigner fifty years afterwards; and, when other writers give similar conversations which can be verified, what proportion of them are found to be substantially correct.

In like manner we calculate the probability that a writer has "taken the trouble" to ascertain the truth, and that the evidence before us is not biassed by personal prejudice or national vanity.

It is needless to point out how great is the credibility of, say, a democratical writer who records democratical excesses and failures, and of national chronicles or monuments which publish national crimes or disasters.

So far we have been speaking of writers (including authors of inscriptions, monuments, and superscriptions on coins) who could have known the truth, the only question being whether they have the requisite discrimination and research, and were free from bias

a question decided partly by comparison with other authoauthorities, partly by the writer's own statements about the means he employed to ascertain the truth, partly by the internal evidence of style and sentiments.

By the expression "the question is decided" is meant that, after examination, we can reckon our authority among those which are always, or usually, or as often as not, or sometimes, or very seldom, or never, to be trusted for such and such a kind of event. We can take the evidence as worth, say, 18, 18, 18, 20, 20, or 20, the simple fact being (suppose) that fifteen out of twenty contemporary inscriptions record historical events as they really happened.

19

15

10

3

As to persons who could not have known the truth there is a great controversy. Is contemporary evidence indispensable? i.e., evidence derived from what was reported or recorded in some way by persons who had arrived at years of discretion when the event took place?

We must beware of taking as an axiom either this favourite assumption (so dear to Sir G. Cornwall Lewis), or another antagonistic to it, namely, "There must be some foundation in fact for the current account, even though quite mythological, when any other account is confessedly mere guesswork." For, on the one hand, the accurate preservation of historical events by tradition is not only quite conceivable, but has been proved in some instances by the unexpected discovery of confirmatory records.

Thus the traditional site of a battle has been verified by excavations.

On the other hand, though the existence of any current account must have had a definite cause, that cause may easily be conceived to be for ever undiscoverable; nor can we recount any instance in which a history has been successfully built up out of the ruins of a "pure and simple" mythology.

It is easy enough to omit or explain away the miraculous or superhuman details when they do not interfere with the sequence of events. Thus the credibility of Livy's history after the war with Pyrrhus is not at all impaired by a paragraph here and there about a rain of drops of blood, or an ox speaking with human voice. Thus, too, we may quite believe Xenophon's assertion that he won such and such a battle after waiting several hours for favourable omens, without agreeing with him as to the prophetic value of the entrails inspected by his priests. But when discarding the "marvellous element" obliges us to reconstruct the whole narrative, as we must do when we seek the foundation in fact for a genuine myth, then the result has no claims to be accepted. So it is with the Trojan war, and with what happened when good King Arthur ruled this land."