Hume's Treatise of Morals: And Selections from the Treatise of the PassionsGinn, 1894 - 275 стор. |
Інші видання - Показати все
Hume's Treatise of Morals: And Selections from the Treatise of the Passions David Hume Повний перегляд - 1893 |
Hume's Treatise of Morals: And Selections from the Treatise of the Passions David Hume Повний перегляд - 1893 |
Hume's Treatise of Morals: And Selections from the Treatise of the Passions David Hume Повний перегляд - 1893 |
Загальні терміни та фрази
action advantage agreeable approbation argument arise artificial assert Atheism attended beauty betwixt cause character chuse circumstances conception concerning conduct connexion consequence consider consider'd considerable contrary cou'd David Hume degree Deism deriv'd doctrine duty effect empiricism encrease entirely establish'd esteem esteem'd ethics execution of justice external fact farther feel force give hatred Hence human nature Hume Hume's humility ideas imagination immediately influence injustice interest judgment justice kind liberty mankind manner matter ment merely merit mind moral distinctions necessary necessity notions objects observ'd observe origin ourselves particular passions perform person philosophic sceptic philosophy pleasure and pain possess'd present pride principles produce promises qualities ratiocinative reason reductio ad absurdum regard relation relations of ideas render rules scepticism sense of morality sensible sentiments shew shou'd society suppos'd suppose sympathy tendency theory thing tion tis evident tis impossible twill uneasiness utilitarianism vice and virtue vicious volition
Популярні уривки
Сторінка 114 - Here is a matter of fact ; but ' tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.
Сторінка 102 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Сторінка 115 - I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Сторінка 89 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Сторінка 116 - ... to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. A very play or romance may afford us instances of this pleasure, which virtue conveys to us; and pain, which arises from vice. Now since the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures...
Сторінка 89 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Сторінка 116 - To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character.
Сторінка 182 - ... of whatever is near and contiguous. This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known interest ; and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counterbalance any immediate advantage that may be reaped from it.
Сторінка 119 - They must necessarily be plac'd either in ourselves or others, and excite either pleasure or uneasiness ; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions ; which clearly distinguishes them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects, that often bear no relation to us : And this is, perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind.
Сторінка 99 - Accordingly we find, in common life, that men are principally concerned about those objects which are not much removed either in space or time, enjoying the present, and leaving what is afar off to the care of chance and fortune. Talk to a man of his condition thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is to happen to-morrow, and he will lend you attention. The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house when abroad, and some hundred leagues...