plied if the men knew that they could refer questions to an umpire, because his award might reasonably be expected to be of the nature of a compromise, and they would accordingly feel confident of gaining some advantage by every contest. The same objections would apply to the appointment of an independent chairman to settle with the joint committee."

In some cases the adoption of a sliding-scale appears to have been arrived at without a great deal of difficulty; in other cases the negotiations for this end have been fruitless. In West Lancashire, efforts were made at different times during the last ten years or so to arrange a sliding-scale in the coal industry, but no satisfactory basis could be arrived at, and the scale was never introduced.

In nearly every instance where a sliding-scale has been introduced in the mining industry, and abandoned, it has been given up at the instance of the workmen. In West Yorkshire, a sliding-scale was in force for two years preceding 1881, but it was terminated in March of that year owing to the men being dissatisfied with it. In the Durham coal trade there have been four different scales under which wages were fixed according to the ascertained average selling price of coal. Only one of these, however, lasted for more than two and a half years. The first, which came to an end in December 1878, only lasted for a year and seven months. The second, which was concluded in December 1881, only lasted for two years and two months. The third, which came to an end in December 1883, lasted for a year and eight months. And the fourth and last, which was given up in July 1889, lasted for about five years, and was also terminated at the instance of the workmen. This does not prove, however, that the workmen had lost all faith in the system. It only proves that the particular application or basis adopted did not suit them.

CHAPTER XVII.

PENDING PROPOSALS AND LEGISLATION.

DURING the last two years the exceptional frequency and unprecedented magnitude of some of the strikes that have occurred, in the coal and other industries, have suggested and enforced the absolute necessity of attempting some means of avoiding cases of the kind in the time to come.

This necessity has found expression in the introduction of three different Bills, that are intended to secure the end in view, by making more or less binding the adoption of conciliation or arbitration.

In our own country, the Act known as Lord St Leonard's was adopted by Parliament some twenty-five years ago, for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of arbitration, but the Act has practically remained a dead letter. Not that employers and employed have failed to make use of arbitration for the purposes that the Act was designed to promote, but in nearly all the arrangements made for this end the Act itself has been disregarded. The recent serious strikes in the Durham and Midland coalfields, and elsewhere, have forced upon the Legislature the necessity of making some additional legislative provision for meeting cases of the kind, and we are consequently likely to have quite a crop of arbitration Bills, including probably a Government measure, in the ensuing session of ParliaTwo such Bills are already under consideration. One of them, described as Sir John Lubbock's Bill, which is backed by Mr Mather, Mr Howell, and others, proposes to give power to a Board of Conciliation or Arbitration to examine on oath, to issue subpoenas, and to call for the production of docu

ment.

ments; and it provides that where the parties have agreed in writing to submit a difference to arbitration, the award made thereon shall be final, and shall be enforceable "in the same manner as a judgment or order of the High Court to the same effect." Sir F. Dixon Hartland's Bill is constructed on different lines. It withdraws the constitution of the arbitration board from the hands of the parties to the difference, and vests it in the County Council, who are to be saddled with the expenses involved; and while it takes authority, like Sir John Lubbock's Bill, to summon witnesses, compel attendance, and administer oaths, it does not provide for giving the same legal sanction to any awards that may be arrived at. This second Bill, in point of fact, appears to be based upon the theory that if a sufficiently full and impartial inquiry is held into the subject-matter of a dispute, and a decision given and published as to the proper mode of settlement, public opinion and its pressure may be trusted to take care that the decision is carried out.

These two Bills open up the whole question of the constitution, procedure, and powers of boards of arbitration, and at the present moment are, therefore, of great public interest. The most important problem involved in any attempted legislation on the question, is that of whether the awards made under a reference to arbitration shall be enforceable by legal process. A hardly less important question is whether the parties to a dispute shall be bound to submit the difference to arbitration. The second of these points is in one sense much more important than the first, because obviously, if it is competent for either party to a dispute to refuse to submit the question at issue,—as was actually the case in the Durham strike of 1892 and the Midland coal strike of 1893,-the giving of legal sanction to the award becomes a matter of secondary importance. In other words, when once arbitration has been resolved upon, the rest becomes comparatively smooth sailing, inasmuch as there have been comparatively few cases where an award has been deliberately set aside by either side. Two aspects of compulsion have therefore to be provided for: the first, compulsion to

resort to arbitration; and the second, compulsion to observe the terms of an award-if compulsion is to be adopted at all.

Practically, however, all experience and precedents up to the present time are dead against compulsion in any form. You cannot very well compel a man to agree to submit to reference whether he shall be required to work for a certain employer for a certain wage at a certain time. This must be left entirely to the man's own choice. Nor can you deal differently with a body of men, however numerous, so long as they have broken no laws and rendered themselves amenable to no penalties. Workmen must be continued in the enjoyment of the right to dispose of their labour at whatsoever price they like, and this being so, they cannot be compelled to arbitrate as to what the price of that labour shall be, or as to any other general conditions affecting its value and duration. All that can be done is to endeavour to persuade both employers and employed to agree to submit matters in dispute to arbitration, and failing acceptance of the award made under such reference to impose some sort of penalty. This would be more than any country or any locality has attempted to do up to the present time. The judgment of those who have been most intimately associated with labour movements is, on the whole, adverse to compulsion. The laws adopted with a view to the encouragement and sanction of arbitration abroad are almost wholly permissive. It has not been entirely so in England. The Act 5 George IV., chap. 96 (1824), gives considerable powers of compulsory arbitration on application by either party to a justice of the peace, but the scope of the Act is limited to subsisting contracts; and the formation of permanent boards or councils, or the fixing of future wages and prices, was not contemplated. Lord St Leonard's Act—30 & 31 Vict., chap. 105 (1867)—gives power to the Home Secretary to license permanent councils of arbitration; but their operation was limited to the existing contracts enumerated in Section 2 of the Act 5 George IV., chap. 96. Finally, Mr Mundella's Act of 1872 gives all the powers that can be given for the establishment of permanent boards of arbitration, consistent

with freedom of contract. Power is given to fix future wages or prices, and to enforce awards by legal process, as breaches of contract.

Mr Mundella's pending Conciliation (Trades Disputes) Bill (the full text of which is published in the Appendix) places in the hands of the Board of Trade the power-(a) To inquire into the causes of a difference or dispute, and make a report thereon; and (b) To invite the parties to meet together, by themselves or their representatives, under the presidency of a chairman mutually agreed upon or nominated by the Board of Trade, or by some other person or body, with a view to the amicable settlement of the difference. The Board of Trade is also authorised to take steps to establish boards of conciliation and arbitration in cases where they do not already exist, and is required to make an annual report to Parliament under the Act.

It would be difficult to find fault with many of the provisions of Mr Mundella's latest Bill. He does not go so far as some others have done in the direction of enforcing obedience to awards. The whole spirit and tenour of the proposed measure is permissive and voluntary, and this is probably essential in any attempt to legislate on the subject. At the same time, the powers vested in the Board of Trade would enable them to take such a course, in reference to any important dispute, as would cover with odium any party to it that refused to recognise and accept the recommendations of so manifestly impartial an authority. The annual report to be made to Parliament should, moreover, enter into the merits of each dispute, and assign credit or blame where they were deserved, thereby securing sympathy and approval for the one side at the expense of the other.

While the whole subject is still pending, the recommendations of the Royal Labour Commission relative to the settlement of trade disputes have opportunely been published.* The Commissioners find that institutions for the settlement of dis

* The Times, 20th April.