to be destitute of all foundation, either in Scripture or antiquity, rests in the principle here laid down, by infallibility itself, that the Privilege of Peter follows the faith and the works of Peter. In the words of Tertullian, "ex fide probamus personas" (even though it be the pope), "non ex personis fidem," which is the rule of Archbishop Manning.

CONCLUSION.

We have now examined the alleged "Privilege of Peter" in the light of Scripture, of the earlier and later Councils, and of the confessions of the popes themselves, in almost every age, and we may fairly ask the reader whether consequences so vast were ever suspended on so slender a thread of probability, not to say of mere conjecture—whether so vast a superstructure of autocratic and irresponsible power was ever raised upon so shifting and inconstant a foundation? Can we doubt that God, if He had intended us to hold our faith on such a tenure as the continuousness and legitimacy of a succession to a visible monarchy like that of the Roman pontiffs, would have given us the clearest possible proofs and directions in a matter of such supreme importance? Can we doubt that He would have protected every link of the long chain of succes

sion as carefully as he has guarded from injury or error the canon and even the very text of Scripture? To use the words of Milton on the corrupted text of St. Ignatius, "Had God intended that we should derive our instruction from such a succession, doubtless He would not have so illprovided for our knowledge as to send it into our hands in this broken and disjointed plight." For it may be truly and emphatically affirmed that no dynasty in the world, whether sacred or profane, presents such insuperable historical difficulties as that of the Roman pontificate. Extremely obscure in its origin, it becomes in the middle ages subject to the wildest tumults and confusions. For seventy years it is exiled; after this, divided first into two, then into three distinct and hostile lines. Its authentic and undisputed history only begins a century before the Reformation, with Pope Martin V., and his title rests only upon the act of a Council whose authority all his successors repudiate. 1418 is the date of this new title-deed, and 1518 that of the recovery of the ancient title-deed of every Christian to the true "Petrine Privilege"the possession and interpretation of the Word of

God. For this latter year witnessed the meeting of Luther and Cajetan at Augsburg, and the utter discomfiture of the papal decrees before the irresistible appeal to the Word of God.

But even if we were to admit the "Petrine Privilege," and all its results, where should we find ourselves, and what would remain to us of our privilege and of our rights as Christians after this surrender of ourselves in soul and body.

Let that pious and learned member of the Roman Church, to whom we have so often appealed before,* depict to us "the frightful consequences which would flow from these portentous principles." "If the pope," he writes, "is the true and only real judge in the church; if the Councils only meet to hear and to promulgate his decrees; if his decisions are infallible oracles which it is sacrilege to doubt; if one dare not meet his commands but with a blind submission and obedience ; if, finally, he is not bound to give a reason for any of his laws or judgments, our surprise must ceasewe can no longer regard with horror the following propositions:

* The Bishop of Chiusi and Pienza,

"I. That the pope is a kind of indefinite being between God and man. (Gloss. in Praef. Clem.)

"II. That he may dispense against natural and apostolic law. (Gloss. Gratiani Caus. 15, quaest. 6, c. Auctoritatem.')

"III. That he can do all that God can do, and be judged by none. (Felin. in c. Ergo n. de Jurejurando.)

“IV. That he is a kind of Deity. (Card. Paris. Consil. 63, n. 162, tom. iv.)

«V. That he is the first cause, and cause of all causes. (Baldo in Cap. 'Eccles. ut lite pendente.') “VI. That he is all, and above all. (Id. in L. Barbar. de offic. Praet.)

VII. That he is above law, against law, and bẹyond law. (Id. in c. cum super de causâ propriet. et possess.)

« VIII. That he can change unrighteousness into righteousness, and vice into virtue. (Gomes in reg. Cancell. Bellarmini, de Rom. Pontif., l. iv. c. v.)

"All these and other wild chimæras," concludes the bishop, "of which the writings of the canonists are full, are the foundations of many of the decrees of the Roman court."* And we might add that

* Atti dell' Assemblea, tom. iv. p. 822.