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would so have fallen off, that multitudes would have been thrown out of employment, and whole establishments would have been ruined. Suppose that, by a duty, we exclude the foreign cloth, and make it ourselves, but at double the price. There will be a less quantity made than before. But the imported cloth was not to be had for nothing. Some of our own population were obliged to raise the products which we sent in exchange for it. As we do not take their cloth, they cannot take our produce. Of course, all those who labored in the products which were exchanged for cloth, are out of employment. There was a demand for a sufficient amount of their labor to purchase one thousand bales of cloth; suppose, now, there is a demand for labor sufficient to make only five hundred bales of cloth. By all the difference, therefore, between the labor necessary to procure one thousand bales by exchange, and that necessary to manufacture, or procure by exchange, five hundred bales, is the demand for industry diminished, and, of course, the stimulus to industry weakened.

We see, then, what is the tendency of a system of this kind. First, so far as the manufacturer is concerned, it cannot increase his profit beyond the average profits of every other employment; for, if competition be allowed, capital and labor will flow into it, whatever may be its advantages, until its profits fall to the general level. Secondly, the demand for other labor is diminished, by the reduced con sumption created by a rise of price, and also, as this rise of price increases the expenses of living, it makes even these reduced wages of less value than they were before. Hence the tendency is, to reduce the profit of capital and of labor in the whole community lower than they were before such duty was imposed. To this reduced average, manufacturers must themselves conform; and hence, by this very operation, they themselves must suffer. Hence we see the reason why, when once a duty is imposed for the protection of a

particular branch of manufactures, it is not long before a larger protective duty is demanded; and also why a protective duty, which at first is followed by great manufacturing enterprise and success, is so commonly afterwards followed by so universal a depression of manufacturing industry.

This is the result, so far as the effect upon our own country is concerned. But this is not all. A rise of prices must, of necessity, follow a protecting duty; for this is its very object. Its object is, to raise the price of some particular product, so that it may be created where it could not be created before. If it produce no rise of prices it is useless. Now, a rise of prices raises the cost of production, and, by its whole effect, must raise the price of every product which we create. By this whole effect, therefore, is our foreign market injured. If we can raise cotton at ten cents a pound, and bring it into market as cheap as other nations, we have as good an opportunity as they for selling it. If we can raise it at nine cents, we can undersell them, and supply the whole market; or, if we sell it at the same price as before, we gain one cent more on the pound. If, by increase of the expenses of living, we cannot raise it for less than eleven cents a pound, they will undersell us, and we shall be obliged to give up the raising of cotton, either partially or altogether; and the industry engaged in raising and transporting the cotton, and what we receive in exchange for it, must be either partially or wholly thrown out of employment. Every one must see, that the manufactures of England could be afforded much lower: that is, would be able much better to compete with those of other nations, if, by abolishing her duties on corn, her manufactures could be supplied with the necessaries of life at half the present cost. At the same profit to the laborer and capitalist, her products could be afforded at a price less than at present, by the whole amount of the difference in the expenses of living. By this differ

ence, she would both undersell other nations and increase the demand for her manufactures, thus reaping at once a double advantage.

But once more: It is seen that, by such a system, the course of industry and of capital in a nation, must be greatly changed. Thus, when an article is imported, one class of producers must labor to create the article which we exchange for it; another class must build ships to transport it; and another class must carry on the transportation. By a discriminating duty, all these classes must, either in whole or in part, be thrown out of employment, and this capital be either reduced in value, or rendered wholly useless. Now this is an injury, both to the capitalist and the laborer. The property of the one and the skill of the other are rendered useless, and by so much is it a total loss to the country. It may be said, let them seek other employments. True; they must do this; but this renders it not the less true, that there has been so much loss. If a man's house be burned down, it is easy to say to him, move into another house; but this does not alter the fact, that his house has been burned down, and that he has suffered loss to precisely this amount.

But, suppose he turn to the other employment. It has been shown that the average of profit, in this employment, cannot be higher than the average of profit was, in the employment which he left. He is then no better off than he was before, and, in the meantime, he has lost the skill and capital which he spent many years to acquire; and he has lost them, not as in the case mentioned, by the progress of civilization, and with the prospect of bettering his condition, but by an act of arbitrary legislation. By all this amount of depreciation, therefore, is he, and of course the whole country, poorer by the exchange.

Of Bounties. The principle of bounties is the same as that of discriminating duties. The manner in which they are bestowed, is the following: If a manufacturer cannot

produce cloth for less than ten dollars a yard, and the imported cloth can be produced at five dollars, a bounty of five dollars a yard is given him, for every yard he manufac tures, or for every yard he exports. The cloth, then, is sold, either at home or abroad, at five dollars, and he also receives five dollars as a gratuity.

The principal reasons urged above, apply to bounties. They are, however, less objectionable for several reasons:

1. The price of the article is not visibly raised, and the consumption, therefore, on this account is not so much diminished.

2. The encouragement given, in this manner, is cheaper; that is, we pay only for what is made, while by discriminating duties we pay the same whether any thing be made or not. We pay a very heavy duty on cutlery in this country, while not a thousandth part of the cutlery used is made here. It would be vastly cheaper to pay a bounty sufficient to raise all the cutlery made in this country to its present prices, and it would be, for aught I see, just as good for the cutler. The whole effect of this mode of encouragement is, to pay one man as much more as the bounty amounts to, for producing an article, than we should pay another man; that is, one man will do it for five dollars, and we engage another to do it for five dollars, and give him five dollars besides, for the sake of economy.

CHAPTER VIII.

FAILURE OF REVENUE TARIFF AND OTHER

SUBJECTS.

BY HENRY C. CAREY.

A letter addressed to President Grant.

DEA

EAR SIR:-An eminent foreigner, speaking of our countrymen, characterized them as "the people who soonest forget yesterday," and that nothing could be more accurate is shown by the facts which I propose now to give, as follows:

The revenue tariff period which followed the close, in 1815, of the great European war, was one of great distress both private and public. Severe financial crises bankrupted banks, merchants, and manufacturers; greatly contracted the market for labor and all its products; so far diminished the money value of property, as to place the debtor everywhere in the power of his creditor; caused the transfer of a very large portion of it under the sheriff's hammer; and so far impaired the power of the people to contribute to the revenue that, trivial as were the public expenditures of that period, loans were required for enabling the Treasury to meet the demands upon it. Under the protective tariff of 1828 all was changed, and with a rapidity so great that but few years of its action were required for bringing the country up to a state of prosperity the like of which had never before been known, here or elsewhere; for annihilating the public debt; and for causing our people wholly to forget

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