No one

be set upon the land, than upon the air or the light. would think of charging Rent, any more than of levying tolls for the right to cross the broad ocean. And it is conceivable, that this state of things should exist over the whole earth, and should continue for many centuries to come. Islands of limited extent, like the British Isles, might indeed be filled up, or completely occupied, the people having become so numerous that no more land could be had for the new families. In such case, the new families would have to emigrate, as they are now actually obliged to do; but they would find abundance of unoccupied land in America, Australia, and elsewhere.

But if the population of one country, or of the whole globe, were thus distributed with perfect evenness, each family residing upon the spot that furnished it with food, though there would be no Rent, it is obvious that there would be little or no Division of Labor, and, consequently, no progress in civilization and the arts, and no advancement in opulence. Mankind would begin to retrograde to a condition as low as that in which any portion of them have yet been found. The labor of far the larger portion of each family would have to be devoted to agriculture, in order to obtain the necessary sustenance from the ground; and as the labor of the remaining part would not suffice to renew and keep in repair the stock of tools, domestic utensils, and household comforts, these would soon be expended or worn out. As tools become imperfect and deficient, more labor must be given to tillage. The processes of agriculture would thus rapidly degenerate, till, at last, the incessant toil of the whole family would produce only a scanty supply of the coarsest sustenance, and, from the want of leisure, knowledge and civilization would die out.

But experience even of the commencement of these evils would teach mankind their appropriate and easy remedy. Several families would unite, in order to obtain the benefits of a Division of Labor. Some would devote themselves exclusively to the manufacture of agricultural implements and household articles, while the labor of the others would supply them with food. As manufacturing operatives must work near each other, the ground originally allotted to a single family would come to be tenanted by many, and would form the nucleus of a town. But a town is necessarily a market for the sale of agricultural produce and the purchase of

manufactured commodities. From the advantages which the town would thus afford, the land in its immediate vicinity, being limited in quantity, would assume a value, or, in other words, would begin to yield a Rent. Only a small number of farms of the original size, from six to twenty acres, can have the advantage of immediate proximity to the newly formed manufacturing village; the occupants of these farms would be better furnished with tools, and more able to exchange their products for manufactured goods. The occupants of farms at a distance would be willing to purchase these advantages of them, - to offer two or three acres remote from market in exchange for one acre adjoining a town. Thus Rent would begin, not at all as a consequence of the absolute increase of the population, for the total population might be stationary or even retrograding while these changes were going on, but as a consequence of the altered distribution of the people over the face of the country.

The highest Rents of all are obtained from land that is not used for any purposes of agriculture, but only for habitation or manufacturing purposes, within the limits of the cities themselves,

a phenomenon of which the theory of Ricardo furnishes no explanation whatever. His theory is applicable only to what may be called agricultural Rents; civic Rents, the ground-rents of houses and shops in crowded cities, afford the best of all instances of Rent property so called, as they are free from the effects of the great disturbing cause, agricultural improvements. These ground-rents do not depend upon the magnitude of the population of the city, or upon its rate of increase; they rise and fall in different streets, under the varying demand produced by the changes of business and the mutations of fashion. In London, they have risen enormously high in Belgravia, and fallen proportionally in what was the fashionable part of the metropolis a century ago; in the most crowded portions of the city proper, they are probably no higher than they were in the time of George III., and do not certainly equal some in Washington Street, Boston, the population of which city is not one twelfth part as great as that of London. In the English metropolis, the population, as it increases in number, necessarily spreads itself over more space; and therefore it may be doubted whether the aggregate ground-rent of those portions of the city which were densely inhabited at the beginning of

this century is any greater now than it was in 1800, though the population of all England meanwhile has doubled.

In the United States, the want of local attachments and the restless and migratory character of the population have drawn attention to the fact, that Rents begin, or the land acquires value, as fast as the vicinity is peopled. The favorite form of speculation here, the easiest and most common mode of money-getting, is the acquisition of a tract of land in some neighborhood where the circumstances indicate that a new town or city must soon spring up. A fortune is thus easily acquired, as the land acquires value before any labor is expended upon it, and long before the necessities of an increasing population would require it to be inhabited, or even cultivated. In England, the more stationary habits of the population have concealed this fact; and as the land slowly rose in value with the advancement of opulence and the gradual increase in the number of the whole people, Ricardo's theory of Rent seemed plausible enough. Yet even in England there has been a regular movement of the population, a steady drain from the agricultural counties, and a filling up of the manufacturing districts.

The rise of Rents, as thus explained, is no hardship for those who are not landholders, and does not tend to depress the laboring part of the population. Those who pay these higher Rents, or the higher prices of corn which produce them, are compensated by the advantages they obtain through their vicinity to a market. In fact, the enhancement of price for the burghers or citizens is merely nominal; they obtain more, and have a readier sale, for the manufactured goods which they produce, and pay more for the corn which they consume, the one result counterbalancing the other. What matters it to the laborer if he pays more Rent for his dwelling, and a higher price for his corn and potatoes, provided that the additional wages which he receives are more than enough to meet these additional expenses? The positive gain to the community consists in the saving of transportation both ways. If the population were not concentrated, it would be necessary to transport the agricultural produce a long distance to the town where it is consumed, and to carry the manufactured goods an equal distance to the farmers who need them. Even the English Economists admit that a great saving is effected in this respect through

canals, railways, and other contrivances which lessen the cost of transportation. Is it not still a greater saving to do away with the necessity of these improved means of transport, and with the cost of constructing them, by bringing the agriculturists and the manufacturers nearer to each other?

It is as much for the interest, then, of the farmers of the Mississippi Valley, as of the manufacturers themselves, that the American system of protection should be continued. At present, the value of the lands at the West is kept down by the distance of their produce from a market. The cost of transporting a barrel of flour from Cincinnati to New York amounts, at ordinary prices, to at least thirty per cent of its value at the former place; the cost of its further transportation to Liverpool, including insurance and other necessary expenses, raises this proportion to about forty per cent. Create a manufacturing population in Ohio like that which exists in English Lancashire, and the price of flour at Cincinnati would be made equal to its price at Liverpool. Free trade between England and Ohio, then, means simply that Ohio produce should be admitted into the English ports under what we may call a "transportation duty" of forty per cent; while, owing to the great value in a small bulk, of the finer manufactures, English produce is to be admitted into Cincinnati at a duty of only fifteen per cent. In other words, the opponents of protection would persuade the Ohio farmer that it is better for him to buy English broadcloth at $1.70 a yard, and sell his flour at $5.00, than to buy American broadcloth of the same quality at $2.00, and sell his flour at $7.00. The depression in the value of Ohio produce, which took place between 1847 and 1852, is clearly attributable to the fact, that the crowds of laborers discharged from our unprosperous manufacturing establishments, and the 300,000 immigrants annually landed on our shores, had been driven into agriculture, and had so increased the annual product of Michigan, Iowa, and Wisconsin, as to undersell the Ohio farmer at his own door. The protection of our manufactures would enlarge the home market for him, through the very means which are now swelling the number of his competitors.

CHAPTER X.

THE CAUSES WHICH AFFECT THE RATE OF WAGES: WHY WAGES ARE NOT EQUAL IN DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS.

THE doctrine of the English Economists respecting Wages may be easily inferrred from their two theories, already considered, respecting Population and Rent. Putting aside the consideration of Wages reckoned in money, as these are subject to merely nominal variations, according as the value of money rises or falls, they say that Wages rated in commodities, or the quantity of produce apportioned to each laborer, is determined by the ratio which the capital of the country bears to its laboring population, or to the number of those who work for hire. By capital, however, they here mean only Circulating capital, and not even the whole of that, but only the part of it which is expended directly in the purchase of labor. To this, however, must be added all funds which, without forming a part of capital, are paid in exchange for labor; such as the wages of soldiers, domestic servants, and all other unproductive laborers." The aggregate of capital or wealth devoted to this purpose, to the payment of productive or unproductive labor, may be termed the Wages-fund of a country; and the share of it which each laborer receives will evidently be determined by its amount, divided by the whole number of persons seeking employment.

Thus explained, the doctrine is a mere truism. We obtain no insight into the causes which regulate the rate of Wages, when we are merely told that this rate depends upon the whole sum annually expended for Wages, divided by the number of persons who share this sum among them. But as it is intended to be understood, the doctrine is merely a covert statement of the theory of Malthus. Assuming it to be impossible, by any measure of legislation or government policy, to increase the aggregate funds employed in hiring laborers, it is affirmed that a "diminution in the number of competitors for hire" is the sole means of raising Wages, and that the power and responsibility are thus placed in the hands of the laborers themselves. If they will refrain from overstocking the labor-market, their condition as a class may be