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price of his commolity; an opinion inducement to be much of a restraint grounded either on the rise or fall in a period supposed to be one of rashadalready going on, or on his prospective venture, and upon persons so confident judgment respecting the supply and the of success as to involve themselves berate of consumption. When a dealer yond their certain means of extrication. extends his purchases beyond his im- And further, I apprehend that their conmediate means of payment, engaging fidence of being helped out in the event to pay at a specified time, he does so of ill-fortune, will mainly depend on in the expectation either that the trans- their opinion of their own individual action will have terminated favourably credit, with, perhaps, some considerabefore that time arrives, or that he tion, not of the quantity of the currency, shall then be in possession of sufficient but of the general state of the loan funds from the proceeds of his other market. They are aware that, in case transactions. The fulfilment of these of a commercial crisis, they shall have expectations depends upon prices, but difficulty in obtaining advances. But not specially upon the amount of bank if they thought it likely that a comnotes. He may, doubtless, also ask him-mercial crisis would occur before they self, in case he should be disappointed | had realized, they would not speculate. in these expectations, to what quarter he can look for a temporary advance, to enable him, at the worst, to keep his engagements. But in the first place, this prospective reflection on the somewhat more or less of difficulty which he may have in tiding over his embarrassments, seems too slender an

If no great contraction of general credit occurs, they will feel no doubt of obtaining any advances which they absolutely require, provided the state of their own affairs at the time affords in the estimation of lenders a sufficient prospect that those advances will be repaid.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF AN INCONVERTIBLE PAPER CURRENCY.

§ 1. AFTER experience had shown that pieces of paper, of no intrinsic value, by merely bearing upon them the written profession of being equivalent to a certain number of francs, dollars, or pounds, could be made to circulate as such, and to produce all the benefit to the issuers which could have been produced by the coins which they purported to represent; governments began to think that it would be a happy device if they could appropriate to themselves this benefit, free from the condition to which individuals issuing such paper substitutes for money were subject, of giving, when required, for the sign, the thing signified. They determined to try whether they could not emancipate themselves from this unpleasant obligation, and make a piece of paper issued by them pass for a pound, by merely calling it a pound,

and consenting to receive it in payment of the taxes. And such is the influence of almost all established governments, that they have generally succeeded in attaining this object: I believe I might say they have always succeeded for a time, and the power has only been lost to them after they had compromised it by the most flagrant abuse.

In the case supposed, the functions of money are performed by a thing which derives its power of performing them solely from convention; but convention is quite sufficient to confer the power; since nothing more is needful to make a person accept anything as money, and even at any arbitrary value, than the persuasion that it will be taken from him on the same terms by others. The only question is, what determines the value of such a currency; since it cannot be, as in the case of gold

and silver (or paper exchangeable for them at pleasure), the cost of production.

We have seen, however, that even in the case of a metallic currency, the immediate agency in determining its value is its quantity. If the quantity, instead of depending on the ordinary mercantile motives of profit and loss, could be arbitrarily fixed by authority, the value would depend on the fiat of that authority, not on cost of production. The quantity of a paper currency not convertible into the metals at the option of the holder, can be arbitrarily fixed; especially if the issuer is the sovereign power of the state. The value, therefore, of such a currency, is entirely arbitrary.

Suppose that, in a country of which the currency is wholly metallic, a paper currency is suddenly issued, to the amount of half the metallic circulation: not by a banking establishment, or in the form of loans, but by the government, in payment of salaries and purchase of commodities. The currency being suddenly increased by one-half, all prices will rise, and among the rest, the prices of all things made of gold and silver. An ounce of manufactured gold will become more valuable than an ounce of gold coin, by more than that customary difference which compensates for the value of the workmanship; and it will be profitable to melt the coin for the purpose of being manufactured, until as much has been taken from the currency by the subtraction of gold, as had been added to it by the issue of paper. Then prices will relapse to what they were at first, and there will be nothing changed except that a paper currency has been substituted for half of the metallic currency which existed before. Suppose, now, a second emission of paper; the same series of effects will be renewed; and so on, until the whole of the metallic money has disappeared: that is, if paper be issued of as low a denomination as the lowest coin; if not, as much will remain, as convenience requires for the smaller payments. The addition made to the quantity of gold and silver disposable for ornamental

purposes, will somewhat reduce, for a time, the value of the article; and as long as this is the case, even though paper has been issued to the original amount of the metallic circulation, as much coin will remain in circulation along with it, as will keep the value of the currency down to the reduced value of the metallic material; but the value having fallen below the cost of production, a stoppage or diminution of the supply from the mines will enable the surplus to be carried off by the ordinary agents of destruction, after which, the metals and the currency will recover their natural value. We are here supposing, as we have supposed throughout, that the country has mines of its own, and no commercial intercourse with other countries: for, in a country having foreign trade, the coin which is rendered superfluous by an issue of paper is carried off by a much prompter method.

Up to this point, the effects of a paper currency are substantially the same, whether it is convertible into specie or not. It is when the metals have been completely superseded and driven from circulation, that the difference between convertible and inconvertible paper begins to be operative. When the gold or silver has all gone from circulation, and an equal quantity of paper has taken its place, suppose that a still further issue is superadded. The same series of phenomena recommences: prices rise, among the rest the prices of gold and silver articles, and it becomes an object as before to procure coin in order to convert it into bullion. There is no longer any coin in circulation; but if the paper currency is convertible, coin may still be obtained from the issuers, in exchange for notes. All additional notes, therefore, which are attempted to be forced into circulation after the metals have been completely superseded, will return upon the issuers in exchange for coin; and they will not be able to maintain in circulation such a quantity of convertible paper, as to sink its value below the metal which it represents. It is not so, however, with an inconvertible currency. To the increase of that (as

rermitted by law) there is no check. The issuers may add to it indefinitely, lowering its value and raising prices in proportion; they may, in other words, depreciate the currency without limit.

Such a power, in whomsoever vested, is an intolerable evil. All variations in the value of the circulating medium are mischievous: they disturb existing contracts and expectations, and the liability to such changes renders every pecuniary engagement of long date entirely precarious. The person who luys for himself, or gives to another, an annuity of 100l., does not know whether it will be equivalent to 2007. or to 50l. a few years hence. Great as this evil would be if it depended only on accident, it is still greater | when placed at the arbitrary disposal of an individual or a body of individuals; who may have any kind or degree of interest to be served by an artificial fluctuation in fortunes; and who have at any rate a strong interest in issuing as much as possible, each issue being in itself a source of profit. Not to add, that the issuers may have, and in the case of a government paper always have, a direct interest in lowering the value of the currency, because it is the medium in which their own debts are computed.

§ 2. In order that the value of the currency may be secure from being altered by design, and may be as little as possible liable to fluctuation from accident, the articles least liable of all known commodities to vary in their value, the precious metals, have been made in all civilized countries the standard of value for the circulating medium; and no paper currency ought to exist of which the value cannot be made to conform to theirs. Nor has this fundamental maxim ever been entirely lost sight of even by the governments which have most abused the power of creating inconvertible paper. If they have not (as they generally have) professed an intention of paying in specie at some indefinite future time, they have at least, by giving to their paper issues the names of their coins, made a virtual, though generally a

false, profession of intending to keep them at a value corresponding to that of the coins. This is not impracticable, even with an inconvertible paper. There is not indeed the self-acting check which convertibility brings with it. But there is a clear and unequivocal indication by which to judge whether the currency is depreciated, and to what extent. That indication is, the price of the precious metals. When holders of paper cannot demand coin to be converted into bullion, and when there is none left in circulation, bullion rises and falls in price like other things; and if it is above the Mint price, if an ounce of gold, which would be coined into the equivalent of 3l. 17s. 104d., is sold for 4l. or 5l. in paper, the value of the currency has sunk just that much below what the value of a metallic currency would be. If, therefore, the issue of inconvertible paper were subjected to strict rules, one rule being that whenever bullion rose above the Mint price, the issues should be contracted until the market price of bullion and the Mint price were again in accordance, such a currency would not be subject to any of the evils usually deemed inherent in an inconvertible paper.

But also such a system of currency would have no advantages sufficient to recommend it to adoption. An inconvertible currency, regulated by the price of bullion, would conform exactly, in all its variations, to a convertible one; and the only advantage gained, would be that of exemption from the necessity of keeping any reserve of the precious metals; which is not a very important consideration, especially as a government, so long as its good faith is not suspected, needs not keep so large a reserve as private issuers, being not so liable to great and sudden demands, since there never can be any real doubt of its solvency. Against this small advantage is to be set, in the first place, the possibility of fraudulent tampering with the price of bullion for the sake of acting on the currency ; in the manner of the fictitious sales of corn, to influence the averages, so much and so justly complained of while

There is, in truth, a great charm in the idea. To be able to pay off the national debt, defray the expenses of government without taxation, and in fine, to make the fortunes of the whole community, is a brilliant prospect, when once a man is capable of believing that printing a few characters on bits of paper will do it. The philosopher's stone could not be expected to do

more.

the corn laws were in force. But a | still stronger consideration is the importance of adhering to a simple principle, intelligible to the most untaught capacity. Everybody can understand convertibility; every one sees that what can be at any moment exchanged for five pounds, is worth five pounds. Regulation by the price of bullion is a more complex idea, and does not recon.mend itself through the same familiar associations. There would be As these projects, however often nothing like the same confidence, by slain, always resuscitate, it is not suthe public generally, in an inconver-perfluous to examine one or two of the tible currency so regulated, as in a convertible one: and the most instructed person might reasonably doubt whether such a rule would be as likely to be inflexibly adhered to. The grounds of the rule not being so well understood by the public, opinion would probably not enforce it with as much rigidity, and, in any circumstances of difficulty, would be likely to turn against it, while to the government itself a suspension of convertibility would appear a much stronger and more extreme measure, than a relaxation of what might possibly be considered a somewhat artificial rule. There is therefore a great preponderance of reasons in favour of a convertible, in preference to even the best regulated inconvertible currency. The temptation to overissue, in certain financial emergencies, is so strong, that nothing is admissible which can tend, in however slight a degree, to weaken the barriers that restrain it.

§ 3. Although no doctrine in political economy rests on more obvious grounds than the mischief of a paper currency not maintained at the same value with a metallic, either by convertibility, or by some principle of limitation equivalent to it; and although, accordingly, this doctrine has, though not till after the discussions of many years, been tolerably effectually drummed into the public mind; yet dissentients are still numerous, and projectors every now and then start up, with plans for curing all the economical evils of society by means of an unlimited issue of inconvertible paper.

fallacies by which the schemers impose upon themselves. One of the commonest is, that a paper currency cannot be issued in excess so long as every note issued represents property, or has a foundation of actual property to rest on. These phrases, of representing and resting, seldom convey any distinct or well-defined idea: when they do, their meaning is no more than this-that the issuers of the paper must have property, either of their own or entrusted to them, to the value of all the notes they issue; though for what purpose does not very clearly appear; for if the property cannot be claimed in exchange for the notes, it is difficult to divine in what manner its mere existence can serve to uphold their value. I presume, however, it is intended as a guarantee that the holders would be finally reimbursed, in case any untoward event should cause the whole concern to be wound up. On this theory there have been many schemes for "coining the whole land of the country into money" and the like.

In so far as this notion has any connexion at all with reason, it seems to originate in confounding two entirely distinct evils, to which a paper currency is liable. One is, the insolvency of the issuers; which, if the paper is grounded on their credit-if it makes any promise of payment in cash, either on demand or at any future time-of course deprives the paper of any value which it derives from the promise. To this evil paper credit is equally liable, however moderately used; and against it, a proviso that all issues should be "founded on property," as for instance

tion of all the confiscated property at its metallic value, and to have issued assignats up to, but not beyond, that

demand any piece of land, at its re gistered valuation, in exchange for assignats to the same amount. There can be no question about the superiority of this plan over the one actually adopted. Had this course been followed, the assignats could never have been depreciated to the inordinate de

that notes should only be issued on the security of some valuable thing expressly pledged for their redemption, would really be efficacious as a pre-limit; giving to the holders a right to caution. But the theory takes no account of another evil, which is incident to the notes of the most solvent firm, company, or government: that of being depreciated in value from being issued in excessive quantity. The assignats, during the French Revolution, were an example of a currency grounded on tl ese principles. The assignats "re-gree they were; for-as they would have presented an immense amount of retained all their purchasing power in highly valuable property, namely the relation to land, however much they lands of the crown, the church, the might have fallen in respect to other monasteries, and the emigrants; things-before they had lost very much amounting possibly to half the terri- of their market value, they would protory of France. They were, in fact, bably have been brought in to be exorders or assignments on this mass of changed for land. It must be rememland. The revolutionary government bered, however, that their not being had the idea of "coining" these lands depreciated would presuppose that no into money; but, to do them justice, greater number of them continued in they did not originally contemplate the circulation than would have circulated immense multiplication of issues to if they had been convertible into cash. which they were eventually driven by However convenient, therefore, in a the failure of all other financial re- time of revolution, this currency consources. They imagined that the as- vertible into land on demand might signats would come rapidly back to the have been, as a contrivance for selling issuers in exchange for land, and that rapidly a great quantity of land with they should be able to reissue them the least possible sacrifice; it is difficontinually until the lands were all cult to see what advantage it would disposed of, without having at any have, as the permanent system of a time more than a very moderate quan- country, over a currency convertible tity in circulation. Their hope was into coin: while it is not at all difficult frustrated the land did not sell so to see what would be its disadvantages; quickly as they expected; buyers were since land is far more variable in value not inclined to invest their money in than gold and silver; and besides, land, possessions which were likely to be re- to most persons, being rather an insumed without compensation if the cumbrance than a desirable possession, Revolution succumbed the bits of except to be converted into money, paper which represented land, becom- people would submit to a much greater ing prodigiously multiplied, could no depreciation before demanding land, more keep up their value than the than they will before demanding gold land itself would have done if it had or silver. * all been brought to market at once: and the result was that it at last required an assignat of six hundred francs to pay for a pound of butter.

§ 4. Another of the fallacies from which the advocates of an inconvertible

Among the schemes of currency to which, strange to say, intelligent writers have been found to give their sanction, one is as follows: that the state should receive in pledge or mortgage, any kind or amount of property,

The example of the assignats has been said not to be conclusive, because an assignat only represented land in general, but not a definite quantity of land. To have prevented their depreto the owners inconvertible paper money to ciation, the proper course, it is affirmed, the estimated value. Such a currency would would have been to have made a valuat even have the recommendations of the

such as land, stock, &c., and should advance

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