Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the StateMIT Press, 12 жовт. 1999 р. - 282 стор. In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion. |
Зміст
II | 3 |
III | 11 |
V | 29 |
VI | 51 |
VII | 61 |
VIII | 63 |
IX | 83 |
X | 91 |
XV | 139 |
XVI | 153 |
XVII | 155 |
XVIII | 177 |
XIX | 185 |
XX | 203 |
XXI | 205 |
XXII | 225 |
Інші видання - Показати все
Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State James M. Buchanan,Richard A. Musgrave Обмежений попередній перегляд - 1999 |
Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State James M. Buchanan Попередній перегляд недоступний - 1999 |
Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State James M. Buchanan,Richard Abel Musgrave Попередній перегляд недоступний - 2000 |
Загальні терміни та фрази
Adam Smith alternative argument basic behavior benefits budget Calculus of Consent called capital categorical equity central century collective action concern constitutional constraints context costs defined democratic demogrant discrimination discussion distribution economic economists effects efficient equal Europe European expenditure federal fiscal competition fiscal federalism flat tax grants impose income tax individuals institutions interaction interest issues James Buchanan jurisdictions lecture libertarian socialist limits majoritarian majority rule ment moral anarchy moral community moral order Musgrave's nation-state normative optimal outcomes particular percent persons perspective political authority position preferences problem Professor Buchanan programs provision of public public choice public finance public sector question R. A. Musgrave redistribution rent seeking Richard Musgrave role rule utilitarian seems sense share Sinn social welfare function society structure tax base tax competition taxation tion transfers United voting Wicksell Wicksellian William Niskanen
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