When we read in hiftory or romance, the account of actions either of generofity or of bafenefs, the adiniration which we conceive for the one, and the contempt which we feel for the other, neither of them arife from reflecting that there are certain general rules which declare all actions of the one kind admirable, and all actions of the other contemptible. Thofe general rules, on the contrary, are all formed from the experience we have had of the effects which actions of all different kinds naturally produce upon us.

An amiable action, a respectable action, a horrid action, are all of them actions which naturally excite for the perfon who performs them, the love, the respect, or the horror of the fpectator. The general rules which determine what actions are, and what are not, the objects of each of thofe fentiments, can be formed no other way than by obferving what actions actually and in fact excite them.

When these general rules, indeed, have been formed, when they are univerfally acknowledged and established, by the concurring fentiments of mankind, we frequently appeal to them as to the ftandards of judgment, in debating concerning the degree of praife or blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature. They are upon thefe occafions commonly cited. as the ultimate foundations of what is juft and unjuft in human conduct; and this circumftance feems to have milled feveral very eminent authors to draw up their fyftems in fuch a manner, as if they had fuppofed that the original judgments

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of mankind with regard to right and wrong, were formed like the decifions of a court of judicatory, by confidering firft the general rule, and then, secondly, whether the particular action under confideration fell properly within its comprehenfion.

Thofe general rules of conduct, when they have been fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting the misreprefentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular fituation. The man of furious resentment, if he was to liften to the dictates of that paffion, would perhaps regard the death of his enemy, as but a fmall compenfation for the wrong, he imagines, he has received; which, however, may be no more than a very flight provocation. But his obfervations upon the conduct of others, have taught him how horrible all fuch fanguinary revenges appear. Unless his education has been, very fingular, he has laid it down to himself as an inviolable rule, to abstain from them upon all occafions. This rule preferves its authority with him, and renders him incapable of being guilty of fuch a violence. Yet the fury of his own temper may be fuch, that had this been the first time in which he confidered fuch an action, he would undoubtedly have determined it to be quite juft and proper, and what every impartial fpectator would approve of. But that reverence for the rule which paft experience has imprefled upon him, checks the impetuofity of his paflion, and helps him to correct the too partial views which felf-love might otherwise

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fuggeft, of what was proper to be done in his fituation. If he fhould allow himself to be fo far transported by paffion as to violate this rule, yet, even in this cafe, he cannot throw off altogether the awe and refpect with which he has been accustomed to regard it. At the very time of acting, at the moment in which passion mounts the highest, he hesitates and trembles at the thought of what he is about to do: he is fecretly conscious to himself that he is breaking through those measures of conduct which, in all his cool hours, he had resolved never to infringe, which he had never seen infringed by others without the highest disapprobation, and of which the infringement, his own mind forebodes, muft foon render him the object of the fame disagreeable sentiments. Before he can take the laft fatal resolution, he is tormented with all the agonies of doubt and uncertainty; he is terrified at the thought of violating fo facred a rule, and at the fame time is urged and goaded on by the fury of his defires to violate it. He changes his purpose every moment; fometimes he refolves to adhere to his principle, and not indulge a paffion which may corrupt the remaining part of his life with the horrors of fhame and repentance; and a momentary calm takes poffeffion of his breast, from the prospect of that security and tranquillity which he will enjoy when he thus determines not to expose himself to the hazard of a contrary conduct. But immediately the paffion roufes anew, and with fresh fury drives him on to commit what he had the inftant before refolved to

abstain from. Wearied and distracted with those irresolutions, he at length, from a fort of despair, makes the last fatal and irrecoverable ftep; but with that terror and amazement with which one

flying from an enemy, throws himself over a precipice, where he is fure of meeting with more certain deftruction than from any thing that pursues him from behind. Such are his fentiments even at the time of acting; though he is then, no doubt, lefs fenfible of the impropriety of his own conduct than afterwards, when his paffion being gratified and palled, he begins to view what he has done in the light in which others are apt to view it; and actually feels, what he had only foreseen very imperfectly before, the ftings of remorfe and repentance begin to agitate and torment him.

CHAP. V.

Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity.

THE regard to thofe general rules of conduct,

is what is properly called a fenfe of duty, a principle of the greatest confequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions. Many men behave very decently, and through the whole of their lives avoid any confiderable degree of blame, who yet, perhaps, never felt the fentiment upon the propriety of which

we found our approbation of their conduct, but acted merely from a regard to what they faw were the established rules of behaviour. The man who has received great benefits from another person, may, by the natural coldness of his temper, feel but a very fmall degree of the sentiment of gratitude. If he has been virtuously educated, however, he will often have been made to obferve how odious thofe actions appear which denote a want of this fentiment, and how amiable the contrary. Though his heart therefore, is not warmed with any grateful affection, he will ftrive to act as if it was, and will endeavour to pay all thofe regards and attentions to his patron which the liveliest gratitude could fuggeft. He will visit him regularly; he will behave to him refpectfully; he will never talk of him but with expreffions of the highest efleem, and of the many obligations which he owes to him. And what is more, he will carefully embrace every opportunity of making a proper return for paft fervices. He may do all this too without any hypocrify or blamable diffimulation, without any selfish intention of obtaining new favors, and without any defign of impofing either upon his benefactor or the public. The motive of his actions may be no other than a reverence for the established rule of duty, a ferious and earnest defire of acting, in every respect, according to the law of gratitude. A wife, in the fame manner, may fometimes not feel that tender regard for her hufband which is fuitable to the relation that fubfifts between them. If the has heen virtuously educated, however fhe will