fome damage to another, he is often by the law obliged to compenfate it. Thus, by the Aquilian law, the man, who not being able to manage a horse that had accidentally taken fright, fhould happen to ride down his neighbour's flave, is obliged to compenfate the damage. When an accident of this kind happens, we are apt to think that he ought not to have rode fuch a horfe, and to regard his attempting it as an unpardonable levity; though without this accident we should not only have made no fuch reflection, but should have regarded his refusing it as the effect of timid weakness, and of an anxiety about merely possible events, which it is to no purpose to be aware of. The person himself, who by an accident even of this kind has involuntarily hurt another, seems to have some sense of his own ill defert, with regard to him. He naturally runs up to the fufferer to express his concern for what has happened, and to make every acknowledgment in his power. If he has any fenfibility, he neceffarily defires to compensate the damage, and to do every thing he can to appease that animal refentment, which he is fenfible will be apt to arise in the breast of the sufferer. To make no apology, to offer no atonement, is regarded as the highest brutality. Yet why should he make an apology more than any other person? Why fhould he fince he was equally innocent with any other bystander, be thus fingled out from among all mankind to make up for the bad fortune of another? This task would furely never be imposed

upon him, did not even the impartial fpectator feel fome indulgence for what may be regarded as the unjust refentment of that other.

CHAP. III.

Of the final caufe of the Irregularity of Sentiments.

SUCH is the effect of the good or bad confequence of actions upon the fentiments both of the person who performs them, and of others; and thus, Fortune, which governs the world, has some influence where we fhould be leaft willing to allow her any, and directs in fome measure the fentiments of mankind, with regard to the character and conduct both of themselves and others. That the world judges by the event, and not by the defign, has been in all ages the complaint, and is the great difcouragement of virtue. Every body agrees to the general maxim, that as the event does not depend on the agent, it ought to have no influence upon our fentiments, with regard to the merit or propriety of his conduct. But when we come to particulars, we find that our sentiments are scarce in any one instance exactly conformable to what this equitable maxim would direct. The happy or unprofperous event of any action, is not only apt to give us a good or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was conducted, but almost always too animates our gratitude or refentment, our sense of the merit or demerit of the design.

1

Nature, however, when she implanted the feeds of this irregularity in the human breast, seems, as upon all other occafions, to have intended the happiness and perfection of the species. If the hurtfulness of the design, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the caules which excited our refentment, we should feel all the furies of that paffion against any person in whose breast we suspected or believed fuch defigns or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any actions. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind run as high against them as against actions; if the bafeness of the thought which had given birth to no action, feemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the baseness of the action, every court of judicature would become a real inquifition. There would be no fafety for the most innocent and circumfpect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views, had designs, might ftill be suspected; and while these excited the fame indignation with bad conduct, while bad intentions were as much refented as bad actions, they would equally expose the perfon to punishment and refentment. Actions, therefore, which either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it, and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it, are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and approved objects of human punishment and resentment. Sentiments, designs, affections, though it is from these that according to cool reafon human actions derive

their

their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurifdiction, and are reserved for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal. That neceflary rule of juftice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their defigns and intentions, is founded upon this falutary and useful irregularity in human fentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at firft fight appears fo abfurd and unaccountable. But every part of nature, when attentively surveyed, equally demonftrates the providential care of its Author, and we may admire the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weaknefs and folly of men.

Nor is that irregularity of fentiments altogether without its utility, by which the merit of an unfuccessful attempt to ferve, and much more. that of mere good inclinations and kind wishes, appears to be imperfect. Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of his faculties fuch changes in the external circumftances both of himself and others, as may feem most favorable to the happiness of all. He muft not be satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his heart he wishes well to the profperity of the world. That he may call forth the whole vigor of his foul, and strain every nerve, in order to produce those ends which it is the purpose of his being to advance, Nature has taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully fatisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full VOL. I.

N

น

measure of applaufe, unless he has actually produced them. He is made to know, that praise of good intentions, without the merit of good offices, will be but of little avail to excite either the loudest acclamations of the world, or even the highest degree of felf-applause. The man who has performed no fingle action of importance, but whofe whole converfation and deportment express the jufteft, the nobleft, and moft generous fentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward, even though his inutility fhould be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity to ferve. We can fill refuse it him without blame. We can ftill ask him, What have you done? What actual fervice can you produce, to entitle you to so great a recompence? We efteem you, and love you; but we owe you nothing. To reward indeed that latent virtue which has been useless only for want of an opportunity to serve, to bestow upon it those honors and preferments, which, though in some measure it may be said to deserve them, it could not with propriety have infifted upon, is the effect of the moft divine benevolence. To punish, on the contrary, for the affections of the heart only, where no crime has been committed, is the most infolent and barbarous tyranny. The benevolent affections feem to deferve most praife, when they do not wait till it becomes almost a crime for them not to exert themselves. The malevolent, on the contrary, can scarce be too tardy, too flow, or deliberate.