to exercise no severity except where it could be productive of some political advantage. It suited this disinterested course to accuse Augereau, in the face of the army, of having betrayed the city of Lyons to the enemy: but to have gone farther, and to have inflicted a vindictive chastisement, would have had no other result than that of exciting the regret of those who had for so many years shared the dangers of the field with the Marshal. In point of fact, indeed, Bonaparte was always convinced that Augereau was as guiltless of the loss of Lyons as Marmont of the loss of Paris, although Mr. H.'s perspicacity does not enable him to discover the innocence of either. He seems equally slow of comprehension when he relates (Vol. i. p. 394.) the affected familiarity of Bonaparte, for the purpose of ingratiating himself with the French soldiers. If, however, our countryman be altogether inflexible in his admiration, the Parisians soon shewed a very different disposition; and no sooner had Napoleon sent in his abdication (22d June) than they gave over all concern about him. It is a curious fact that, during the succeeding days, (Vol. ii. p. 12.) they never thought of inquiring whether he was at Malmaison or not; and that they eventually learned his surrender to a British ship of war with the greatest indifference. (Vol. ii. p. 203.)

On hearing that Bonaparte's letter to the Prince Regent had not been received, but had been sent unopened to Vienna, we are told that the author undertook the part of a political adviser, and recommended it to one of Bonaparte's aides-de-camp to make another application to his Royal Highness, "on the pretext of the entire pacification of the empire." This occurrence took place in the month of April; and in the succeeding July we find Mr. Hobhouse (Vol. ii. p. 154.) sitting down to enlighten Lord Castlereagh on the state of France, by an spistle proving that the great mass of the inhabitants were republicans, when a loud acclamation called him into the street, and presented him with another revolution of public sentiment in a display of white handkerchiefs:

A battalion of the national guards were passing with white flags, to the shouts of Vive le Roi. The streets were lined with the same troops, in white cockades; not a national colour was to be seen; the white flag was floating on the column of the grand army, and the windows glittered with women and white linen.'

If I may depend upon the assertion of one of the members of the intermediate government, what did actually happen was as follows: Lord Castlereagh, on his arrival at head-quarters, imparted to the commission his surprise, indeed his indignation, that Louis was not yet in Paris, and added that he must come in tomorrow, or the next day at furthest. The president of the government replied that he understood from the allied sovereigns that there

was

was no intention, on their part, to interfere with the inclinations of the French nation, in the election of its monarch; for answer to which remonstrance, his Lordship only introduced Mr. Pozzo di Borgo, and the ministers of the other two principal powers, each of whom drew a note from his pocket, stating their respective sovereigns' agreement with the English minister, and their resolution to replace Louis on the throne of France. This was decisive, but the government was still sitting in the Tuileries, when a squadron of cavalry, and two battalions of Westphalian infantry, and several pieces of cannon, marched into the Place du Carousel, and occupied the inner court of the palace; and an officer, entering the council chamber, told the commissioners that he was ordered to evacuate the apartments, and at the same time presented a paper, which contained a demand of a contribution of a hundred millions, signed by Marshal Blucher. The government remonstrated; they contrasted this demand and conduct with the articles of the convention, which secured the public and private property; and which left the service of the interior of the capital to the national guard; but in vain. The officer did not understand the nicety of the distinction, and the government had no other resource than to resolve upon communicating their forced dissolution to the chambers, and upon retiring each to his own home. As to the contribution, they deposited the paper upon the council table, where, said the Duke of Otranto, "we will leave it as a legacy for the king." The government did not dissolve itself. It was dissolved by Lord Castlereagh.'

In turning over the pages of this work, our attention was repeatedly attracted by a typographical irregularity altogether unusual in a book printed in the metropolis; we mean an inequality, in a variety of places, in the number of lines in a page. This is curiously exemplified in Vol. i. pp. 94, 95. 106, 107. 295. to 299. 332., &c. and we can account for it only by supposing that a number of alterations and retrenchments were found necessary after the MS. had actually been printed; so that, in addition to other discoveries, Mr. Hobhouse seems to have hit on the very economical one of amending his book by making it first pass through the hands of the compositor.

Some critics, we are told, have chosen to consider Mr. H. as writing ironically, and have quoted the more outré passages of his volumes in support of that view of his doctrines: but we prefer the plain course of stating them as we really believe them to be meant, and have only to regret that so much good disposition should be so materially perverted. If any persons regard us as carrying our strictures too far, and under-rating the value of the work, we have merely to request them to turn to particular passages, such as Vol. i. pp. 4. et seqq. 293. 383. 448.; and, for a specimen of the author's credulity, they may

refer

refer to the rumours which (Vol. i. p. 466.) he retails respecting the numbers of the French army in May 1815. If he could not bring himself to suspect Bonaparte of exaggeration when he spoke of having 375,000 regulars under arms, the result of the battle of Waterloo certainly shewed that no second army was at the disposal of the executive government. What shall we say, also, of the judgment of the writer who terms Caulaincourt (Vol. i. p. 246. Vol. ii. p. 43.) the ornament of the court,' and a man of strict principle;' or who can gravely assert, (Vol. ii. p. 75.) that a fondness for children is one of Bonaparte's peculiarities?' Has Mr. H. not had occasion to observe that a finished hypocrite can assume the semblance of humanity on little as on great occasions? and is it possible that he can seriously believe that Bonaparte refrained from suicide because (Vol. ii. p. 77.) he thought it wrong to make any change in his destiny? An extreme carelessness and generosity in pecuniary matters,' says Mr. Hobhouse, is one of the characteristics of Napoleon.' How was this exemplified by his stipulating in April 1814 for an income of 100,000l. a-year; and by his securing, through the medium of a mercantile house in Paris, a very comfortable sum for his private use, on the very day after he reached the capital from the field of Waterloo. This transaction was lately the subject of a judicial process at Paris, which ended in the merchants making good their claim for the validity of the public securities lodged with them by their disinterested ruler.

Yet, after all these animadversions on Mr. H. and his neverending panegyrics, we do not say that his book is devoid of merit. On the contrary, it affords, in more instances than one, a proof that the author, whatever may be the extent of his misapprehensions, does not pervert facts nor wilfully misrepresent the state of things. Respecting the successful entrance of Bonaparte into Paris on the 20th of March 1815, we have

these observations:

I must now declare a truth, which my respect for the cause with which he is at present identified makes me unwilling to own. Napoleon is not popular, except with the actual army, and with the inhabitants of certain departments; and, perhaps, even with them, his popularity is only relative. At no place is there so great a portion of the population decidedly averse to him as at Paris. The nobles of St. Germain are his declared foes - they have seceded: the shopkeepers, whose interest is connected with peace, wish him no good, as long as they see in him a promise of perpetual war. Hence, Paris, on the entry of Napoleon, presented but a mournful spectacle. The crowd, which went out to meet the Emperor, remained in the outskirts of the city; the shops were shut no one appeared at the windows-the boulevards were lined

with a multitude collected about the many mountebanks, tumblers, &c., which for the two last days had been placed there in greater numbers than usual by the police, in order to divert the populace, There was no noise nor any acclamations; a few low murmurs and whispers were alone heard, when the spectators of these open shows turned round to look at the string of six or eight carriages, which preceded the imperial troops. The regiments then passed along, and cried out Vive l'Empereur!—not a word from any one. They tried the more popular and ancient exclamation, Vive Bonaparte! all still silent. The patience of the dragoons was exhausted; some brandished their swords, others drew their pistols, and rode into the alleys amidst the people, exclaiming, " Crie, donc, Vive l'Empereur!" but the crowd only gave way, and retreated without uttering a word. Lady was present,-I have the account from her. You may wish me to reconcile this with my former statements: but I beg you to recollect, that it is my purpose only to tell you what I know and believe to be true.'

Another point of a different nature, and in which we apprehend that Mr. H. is too correct, relates to the inefficiency of several of our ambassadors at foreign courts:

Those who are acquainted with the composition of our diplomatic body cannot be surprised at the Cimmerian darkness of our reigning English politicians. It cannot be denied that any English cabinet must be exceedingly embarrassed in the selection of their foreign agents, and that, from the necessity of silencing the importunity, and satisfying the demands of those possessed of parliamentary influence, they may run an even chance of excluding whatsoever things are honest, just, true, and of good report from many of our embassies, missions, and correspondencies. Restricted to a choice not amongst the most serviceable, but the best allied of their fellow-countrymen; they ought not to be surprised at occasionally discovering, when too late, that some of their peregre missi have dropped the mode of lying, (allow me the literal translation of Sir Henry Wotton's Latin,) comprehended the old definition, and have deceived only their employers.'

Among these better parts of the work, we class the observations (Vol. i. p. 48. Vol. ii. p. 248.) on the non-existence of a conspiracy in Paris to favour the return of Bonaparte from Elba:

Having taken considerable pains to ascertain the fact, I am come into that persuasion which prevails most generally amongst those who have the reputation of being the best informed; which is, that there was no corresponding scheme laid at Paris for this restoration, and that the whole project and execution are to be attributed solely to the daring determination of Napoleon himself to recover his crown, most happily coinciding with the actual condition and general feeling of France. What was that condition and that general feeling it is likely that the exile at Elba well knew.

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knew. He might be informed of this even by the public papers, had he not been possessed of correspondents at Paris and agents at Naples. But what I mean to assert is, that there was no conspiracy in France corresponding with the disembarkation at Cannes. The Grand Marshal Bertrand, the preux chevalier of Europe, gavė his word and honour to an English gentleman only yesterday, that no such conspiracy existed; and that three weeks before their quitting Elba not the least idea was entertained of the design. The Emperor himself, whose assurance you may receive with suspicion, told Mr. S as much, in a conversation he had with him in the garden of the Elysée, and, on being complimented on the performance of this, the greatest of all his actions, he said, "No, it was easier than you think; my only merit was making a good guess as to the actual situation of France."—

The treason of Marshal Ney was not in consequence of any preconcerted scheme. The Marshal, when he left Louis, had not any intention of betraying him; nor did he adopt the line of con duct so justly condemned, until he found the troops at Lons le Saulnier had determined upon joining the Emperor. He was weak enough not to do the only thing left for an honourable man: instead of returning to Paris with the news, he marched with the revolted army, and has branded his name with an infamy that even the success of his cause has failed to obliterate. He has no ostensible employ at the Emperor's court, excepting a military command; and although he is known to be a very brave man, and has the character of a very weak one, is regarded by all parties as a disreputable acquaintance. In London language "he is cut," and his name and crime have furnished a pun for the Parisian wits, who say of his treachery, "il faut être né pour ça." Colonel Henry Labedoyere went over with his regiment to Napoleon from the impulse of the moment, and, as I know from the officer of Napoleon's suite who received the first intelligence of his coming, without the least previous intimation being conveyed to the Emperor.-The refusal of the garrison of Antibes to join him is a sufficient proof that the defection of the other troops, afterwards, was not preconcerted, but merely the effect of a spontaneous preference of their ancient chief to their new master.'

In a subsequent part of this publication, (Vol. i. p. 345.) Mr. H. reasons with considerable moderation on the impropriety of interfering in the domestic concerns of another country. Had France been actually in the hands of the better part of the liberalistes, (or, as they are improperly termed, revolutionists,) the interference of foreigners might have been unnecessary, and have been called unfair or oppressive: but what prospect could be seen either of freedom at home or quiet abroad under a military despot? It is to be feared that Bonaparte would have acted a pacific part only as long as it was necessary to enable him to combine measures for a second conquest of the Netherlands; and, had he succeeded in this REV. OCT. 1816.

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object,