The general advantages of the institution of property are so obvious, that it may be said to exist by general consent. Without it, mankind would relapse into barbarism, — nay, into the condition of the wild beasts; for even a tribe of savages cannot live together without exclusive ownership of their rude tools, arms, clothing, and habitations. No one would submit to the labor of tilling the ground, because others would have an equal right with him to reap the harvest. No man would even erect a hut, if his neighbors could claim possession of it as soon as it was completed. Prudence and frugality would be impossible virtues; no provision for the future would be made, if those who wasted and spoiled were allowed to enjoy that provision as well as those who saved it. No society could be organized; for the only bond of association is the possession of certain property and rights, from the enjoyment of which those who are not members of the society are excluded. Universal want would lead to universal war, and that condition of mankind which Hobbes imagined as the inevitable result of the evil principles of human nature, when not checked by despotism, would become a fearful reality.

To guard against these tremendous evils, the sacredness of property is recognized, government is instituted for its protection, and laws are made to facilitate its increase, to regulate its use, and to provide for the distribution of it, when the death of its producer or former owner leaves it to the disposal of his survivors. The rule almost universally adopted in the last case is, to distribute it among those who are nearest of kin to the deceased, though in very different proportions, according to the different policy of the law in different countries. A man's nearest relations are commonly said to be his natural heirs, not because they have any natural or indefeasible right to his estates, but because they are nearest to his affections, and, if his will were to be consulted, they would generally succeed to the ownership. The strongest natural claim to property thus left vacant is surely that of the community at large, to whom, if it be land, it originally belonged, and under whose protection and by whose aid, whether it be real or personal, it was accumulated. Their claim, in fact, is universally admitted, as they assume the power of giving the property away by designating the persons who shall inherit it, and the proportions which they

shall respectively hold. And there is no doubt that society acts wisely in consulting the wishes of the original proprietor, by limiting the succession to his own family or his nearest connections. Industry and economy are thus promoted, as every one is encouraged to labor and to save up to the close of his life, since those who are dearest to him are to have the sole benefit of his accumulations. If he had only a life interest in his estate, if society at large, or individuals who were entire strangers to him, were to be his heirs, his exertions would be limited to the attainment of a fortune barely sufficient to supply his own wants. He would spend both income and principal, and be reckless of the future, so that he had enough left for the necessities of his own declining years. Family ties, also, would be weakened or destroyed by a law giving the inheritance to strangers; children would have less motive to reverence their parents, who could not labor to promote the welfare of their offspring, except for the brief remaining period of their own existence; and as the admirable constitution of our moral nature is such, that we always love those most upon whom we have conferred the greatest benefits, parental affection under these circumstances would be very sensibly diminished. Besides, such a law could be executed only very imperfectly. Invention, stimulated by affection, would be constantly on the rack to evade it, by fraudulent transfers and sales effected during the lifetime of the first owners; and the attempt to prevent such practices would lead to intolerable inquisition into private and domestic concerns, and to endless litigation.

It is from the wisest reasons, therefore, from the most judicious regard to the general welfare, that the law gives the property of a person deceased intestate to the nearest of kin. Still, there is room for a wide discretion in determining the principles on which the estate shall be divided among those who stand in the same degree of relationship to the first proprietor. Shall any regard be paid to the wishes of the deceased in this respect? Shall all share alike? Or what preference shall be shown to the sons over the daughters, or to the first-born over his brothers and sisters? These are grave questions, and on the answers to them, more, we had almost said, than on all other causes united, the form of government and

the welfare of the people, the whole political and social framework of society, in every country, must ultimately depend. Notwithstanding their immense importance, these questions have not, till of late years, been much discussed either by legislators or political economists. "I am surprised," says M. De Tocqueville, "that ancient and modern jurists have not attributed a greater importance to the laws of inheritance. It is true, they belong to civil affairs; but they ought, nevertheless, to be placed at the head of all political institutions; for, while political laws are only the symbols of a nation's condition, those which determine the descent of property exercise an extraordinary influence over its social state. They operate in a uniform and certain manner. Man acquires through their means a kind of preternatural power over the destiny of unborn generations. When the legislator has established the laws of succession, he may rest from his labors. The machine is a self-acting one, and when once put in motion, it will advance steadily, as of its own accord, towards the previously appointed end. Adjusted in one manner, it brings together, concentrates, and heaps up property first, and power afterwards, in the hands of a few; it causes an aristocracy, so to speak, to spring out of the grouud. Adjusted on different principles, and turned another way, its action is still more rapid; it now breaks up, pulverizes, and disseminates wealth and power. It crushes or shatters every obstacle that is found in its path; it rises and falls upon the ground with repeated blows, till there is no longer anything to be seen but an impalpable and moving dust on which democracy is seated."

And long before De Tocqueville, in an address delivered at Plymouth in 1820, Mr. Webster said: "A republican form of government rests, not more on political constitutions, than on those laws which regulate the descent and transmission of property. Governments like ours could not have been maintained where property was holden according to the principles of the feudal system; nor, on the other hand, could the feudal constitution possibly exist with us. Our New England ancestors brought hither no great capitals from Europe; they were themselves, either from their original condition, or from the necessity of their common interest, nearly on a general level in respect to property. Their situation demanded a parcelling out

and division of the lands; and it may be fairly said, that this necessary act fixed the future frame and form of their government. The character of their political institutions was determined by the fundamental laws respecting property. The laws rendered estates divisible among sons and daughters. The right of primogeniture, at first limited and curtailed, was afterwards abolished. The property was all freehold. The entailment of estates, long trusts, and the other processes for fettering and tying up inheritances, were not applicable to the condition of society, and seldom made use of. On the contrary, alienation of the land was every way facilitated, even to the subjecting of it to every species of debt. The establishment of public registries, and the simplicity of our forms of conveyance, have greatly facilitated the change of real estate from one proprietor to another. The consequence of all these causes has been, a great subdivision of the soil, and a great equality of condition; the true basis, most certainly, of a popular government.

"A most interesting experiment of the effect of a subdivision of property on government is now making in France. The law regulating the transmission of property in that country now divides it, real and personal, among all the children equally, both sons and daughters; and there is, also, a very great restraint on the power of making dispositions of property by will. It has been supposed, that the effect of this might probably be, in time, to break up the soil into such small subdivisions, that the proprietors would be too poor to resist the encroachments of executive power. I think far otherwise. What is lost in individual wealth will be more than gained in numbers, in intelligence, and in a sympathy of sentiment. I would, presumptuously perhaps, hazard a conjecture, that if the government do not change the law, the law, in half a century, will change the government; and this change will not be in favor of the power of the crown, as some European writers have supposed, but against it.” *

In just ten years, this remarkable prediction was fulfilled by the revolution of 1830; and in less than twenty years more, by the still more democratic revolution of 1848.

* Webster's Works, Vol. I. pp. 35-37. I have condensed the extract.

That the extremes of opulence and destitution should exist side by side, a few revelling in the enjoyment of immense fortunes, while millions around them are suffering from the want of all the comforts, and even of the necessaries, of life, is the great reproach of modern civilization. Men have acquiesced in the evil only because they believed it to be irreparable. Any attempt to remove the inequality of property was supposed to threaten the security of the institution itself, and thus to lead immediately to the dissolution of society and government, and to the destruction of all the higher interests of the human family. The subject would not bear to be tampered with; the sensibility of the community upon this point is feverish in the extreme. To excite their fears, to shake their confidence in the permanency of the institution as it exists, is enough to break the springs of industry and enterprise at once, and to cause nearly as much mischief as a complete social revolution. Changes in the laws affecting the distribution of wealth, therefore, are seldom proposed, except in the course of some great political convulsion, when the foundations of society are broken up, and the whole fabric is to be placed on a new basis, and erected anew.

Sudden changes, then, are out of the question; they would only enhance, or render universal, the evils which we seek to remedy. The only inquiry is, whether causes may not be set to work which will tend slowly but irresistibly to the equalization of wealth, without exciting alarm, or affecting the present enjoyment of property, or injuring any vested rights, or lessening to any appreciable extent the motives for accumulation. If the diffusion of capital, the division of estates, and the consequent approach to equality of condition, when thus gradually effected, should act with resistless force upon the institutions of the state, and change the nature of the government, we need not deplore the result. In these modern days, political influence gravitates towards property, as in former ages it was always united with military strength. Riches are but another name for power, either in a republic, a monarchy, or a despotism; and as the possession of them, when fairly earned, not inherited, is usually coupled with sobriety, prudence, industry, and good sense, and, above all, with a distrust of innovation and a love of order, it is well that they should have the