Earnshaw v. Newman (43 Wash. Law Rep. 198, Sup. Ct. D. of C.)-limiting labor to 10 hours, six days a week.

Hotchkiss v. D. of C. (41 Wash. Law Rep. 706, Ct. of App., D. of C.)-law held to include dressmakers, against defendant's claim that he was not conducting a manufacturing establishment.

Commonwealth v. J. T. Connor Co. (110 N. E. 301, Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass.), Massachusetts law fixing eight hour day for women "employed in labor" held to apply to a cashier in a grocery store.

People v. Chas. Schweinler Press (108 N. E. 639, Ct. of App., N. Y.)-law forbidding night work for women held constitutional.

State v. Dominion Hotel (151 Pac. 958, Sup. Ct. Arizona) -law prescribing eight hour day for women, and making certain apportionments of time, held constitutional.

(c) RAILROADS-Many decisions were made during the year regarding the Federal statute fixing the hours of service of railroad employees. They dealt chiefly with those circumstances which may be said to constitute valid excuses for employing workers overtime; with the question as to what class of employees were unaffected by the law; with the problem as to when a railroad office might be said to be open continuously, and whether overtime work should always be reported.

(d) SUNDAY LABOR-The constitutionality of statutes of Oregon and New York restricting Sunday labor was proclaimed by the courts of last appeal in these states, in State v. Nicholls (151 Pac. 473), and People v. C. Klinck Packing Co. (108 N. E. 278). An Indiana Court (Stellborn v. Board of Commissioners, 110 N. E. 89), held that the work of an assessor in checking up lists could not be said to be a labor of necessity, and that no payment could be collected for services.

III. Wages.

The decisions under this head were not of great importance. On the whole they were liberal. A law insisting on cash payments to workers and one directing weighing of coal before screening-passed in the interest of employees -were upheld, while the one law declared unconstitutional was condemned on the ground that it might lead to imprisonment for debt.

(a) MODE AND TIME OF PAYMENT-On the ground that the enforcement of the law might lead to imprisonment for debt, a law of California fixing periods of

wage payments was declared unconstitutional during the year (Ex Parte Crane, 145 Pac. 733).

The West Virginia law was upheld which required redemption in cash at full value of scrip or money orders, the orders in this case being payable in merchandise (Atkins v. Grey Eagle Co., 84 S. E. 906).

The Supreme Court of New York, construed the New York Statute requiring weekly payments of wages, declaring what classes of employees were outside of the statute (People v. Interbor. Rapid Transit Co., 154 N. Y. Supp. 627).

In Trammell v. Victor Manfg. Co. (86 S. E. 1057), the Supreme Court of No. Carolina held that the law which penalizes a company that fails to give wages to discharged workmen on regular weekly and monthly pay days applies equally to a company the pay days of which are semi-monthly.

(b) BASIS-An Ohio statute prohibiting screening of coal before weighing, in cases where wages are paid according to the weight of the coal mined was declared constitutional by the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple (35 Sup. Ct. 359).

(c) PREFERENCE-Under this heading several statutes were construed as to when wage debts would be given a preference over other forms. The citations are:

Central Trust Co. v. George Lueders & Co., 221 Fed. 829 U. S. Ct. of App., 6th Dist.; Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 Fed. 35, U. S. Circ. Ct. of App., 9th Circ.; Farnum v. Harrison, 152 N. Y. Supp. 835, N. Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div.; Lyons v. Jarnberg, 150 N. W. 1083, Sup. Ct., Minn.; Bofferding v. Mengelkoch, 152 N. W. 135. Sup. Ct. Minn.

IV. Factory Regulations.

The necessity of providing accessible fire escapes, guards for dangerous machinery and other equipment required by law was emphasized in a number of the court decisions of the year in regard to factory regulations.

(a) FIRE ESCAPE-That the employer's negligence in failing to provide fire escapes for his tannery constituted liability per se, where an employee had been burned to death in the building, was the decision of the court in Amberg v. Kinley, (108 N. E. 830, Ct. of App., N. Y.). In Goetz v. Duffy (109 N. E. 113, Ct. of App., N. Y.), the court determined the liability of owner of the building, lessee and sublessee for failure to maintain suitable fire escapes. It declared that the case of the owner should go to the jury, as the testimony seemed to indicate that the access to the fire escape had been so obstructed as to render it of no avail in an emergency.

(b) GUARDS-The practicability of guarding dangerous machinery was affirmed by the Minnesota court in Puls v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. (150 N. W. 175) and by the New York court in Ponca v. Wendall & Evans Co. (151 N. Y. Supp. 257).

(c) INSPECTION-That it was proper to admit testimony that the mill had been inspected by a State factory inspector, for the purpose of relieving the company from a charge of negligence in the matter of equipment, was the opinion of Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Burk v. Hobart & Mill and Elevator Co. (150 Pac. 458). The failure of an employer to furnish a punch for punching holes in barrel hoops was considered as a basis for liability in the case of Wiley v. Solway Process Co. (109 N. E. 606, Ct. of App., N. Y.).

V. Contract of Employment.

The right of silence was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Texas in a unique decision declaring unconstitutional a Texas law which required that an employer give a discharged worker a true statement of the reason for the discharge. The statute, according to the court, was "violative of the general private right of silence enjoyed in this State by all persons, natural or artificial, from time immemorial."

Of special interest also under this head is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring an Alabama statute unconstitutional on the ground that it might lead to peonage.

The status of armed guards paid by private companies, the remedies for discharges, etc., are also discussed in numer

ous cases.

(a) ENFORCEMENT-Under this division the Supreme Court of the United States declared unconstitutional a statute of Alabama authorizing the payment of fines of misdemeanants by one who subsequently accepted the service of the convicted person, under contract to work out fines and costs. The statute was held to be in conflict with the Federal statutes abolishing' peonage (U. S. v. Reynolds, 35 Sup. Ct. 86).

Two other cases under this heading dealt with workmen convicted of fraudulent contracts, procuring advances and failing to carry out the terms of the contract. They are: Thomas v. State, 69 So. 908, Ct. of App., Alabama; Paschal v. State. 85 So. 358, Ct. of App., Georgia.

(b) BREACH-Several cases of breach of contract were passed on during the year. In Koch v. Siff (154 N. Y. Supp.

223), the N. Y. Supreme Ct. decided that the plaintiff could not recover unearned wages, when he left service with the consent of the employer, on account of his fear of injury from strikers. The court also disallowed the employer's contention that he be privileged to retain the employee's deposit for faithful performance. In Silbert v. Katz (151 N. Y. Supp. 510) the employee was held not to be entitled to a return of his deposit, on the showing that he had refused to render the services contracted for, to the employer's injury.

The general principles on which recovery may be had for discharge and the remedies available were announced in Continental Aid Asso. v. Lee (85 S. E. 790, Ct. of App. of Georgia). The remedies which he might elect were: (1) He may bring an immediate action for any special injury received from the discharge; (2) he may wait until the expiration of the term for which he was employed, and sue for the entire amount due him under the contract; (3) he may treat the contract as rescinded and seek to recover upon quantum meruit the value of the services actually performed.

In Akron Milling Co. v. Leiter (107 N. E. 99, App. Ct. of Indiana), it was held that where there is an implied renewal of contract after the expiration of a fixed term, discharge may not be justified upon grounds known to the employer at the time of the implied renewal. Where hiring was for an indefinite period, and the workmen refused to continue labor after having worked continuously for a day and part of the night and were discharged, it was held (The J. P. Schuh, 223 Fed. 455, U. S. District Ct.), that the men were entitled to all of the wages earned. In Halpern v. Langrock Bros. (153 N. Y. Supp. 985) and Gabriel v. Opoznauer (153 N. Y. Supp. 990) employers were held guilty of breach of contract. In Swanson v. Union Pac. Railroad Co. (152 N. W. 744), a contract for life employment was involved.

(c) RESTRICTION ON DISCHARGE-RIGHT OF SILENCE-As violating "the right of silence," a correlative of the liberty of speech, a Texas statute was declared unconstitutional, which required that the employer furnish the` worker with a statement of the cause of discharge, in the case of St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Griffin (171 S. W. 703, Sup. Ct. of Tex.). Where a certificate of discharge has been given which is injurious and defamatory, proof must be complete as to damages resulting from the unlawful act which interferes with employment. A libel suit, however, may be maintained. This was held in Dick v. No. Pac. Ry. Co. (150 Pac. 8, Sup. Ct. of Wash.). The Massachusetts Court was asked by the legislature whether legislation would be con

sidered constitutional which permitted an employee to demand a hearing, when threatened with discharge the report being indirectly received. The court replied in the negative.

(d) EMPLOYMENT STATUS - MINE GUARDS — That the company was responsible for the acts of armed guards hired by it, the superintendent of the company having instigated the assaults by the guards employed, was the decision arrived at in the case of Pennsylvania Mining Company v. Jarnigan (222 Fed. 889, U. S. Circ. Ct. of App., 8th Dist.) In Ruffner v. Jamison Coal and Coke Co. (Atl. 1075) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dealt with a similar case. Here there were no public funds available for the wages of the guards and these were paid by the company. The guards, were held, however, to be acting in a public capacity, and the company was held not to be liable for injurious acts done beyond the proper scope of their authority.

The status of a man boarding a train used exclusively to carry workmen was considered in the case of Schifalaqua v. Atlantic City Railroad Co. (95 Atl. 260). In the case at hand the plaintiff was not an employee, but one seeking employment. The court held that he could not recover damages for injuries incurred in the act, as he was neither an employee nor a passenger.

(e) INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENTBLACKLISTS-In a Massachusetts case, a striker who had committed unlawful acts was held not to possess "clean hands," which would enable him to secure redress in a court of equity, where employment had been lost because of his being placed on the blacklist (Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manfg. Assoc. 109 N. E. 643). No proof seemed to be adduced in the trial that the plaintiff had actually participated in the unlawful acts alleged to have been committed by the strikers, but, as he was a member of the union, the court held that he could not avoid responsibility for some of these acts. For any damage caused by the blacklist, the court held that he must seek redress at a court of law, rather than a court of equity.

The courts of New York and Massachusetts sustained judgment in favor of employees whose discharge was procured by false or unauthorized statements as to assignment of wages by them, in the cases of Scott v. Prudential Outfitting Co. (155 N. Y. Supp. 497) and Kennedy v. Hub Manfg. Co. (108 N. E. 932) respectively.

In Lambert v. State (69 So. 261), the Alabama court set forth the conditions under which the Alabama statute applies which penalizes interference with employment by