their property against the attempts of the Crown; while they overlook the nobler and more extensive efficiency of that privilege.

The right to grant subsidies to the Crown, possessed by the people of England, is the safeguard of all their other liberties, religious and civil; it is a regular mean, conferred on them by the constitution, of influencing the motion of the executive power; and it forms the tie by which the latter is bound to them. In short, this privilege is a sure pledge in their hands, that their sovereign, who can dismiss their representatives at his pleasure, will never entertain thoughts of ruling without the assistance of these.

If, through unforeseen events, the Crown could attain to be independent on the people in regard to its supplies, such is the extent of its prerogative, that, from that moment, all the means the people possess to vindicate their liberty would be annihilated. They would have no resource left,-except indeed that uncertain and calamitous one, of an appeal to the sword; which is no more, after all, than what the most enslaved nations enjoy.

Let us suppose, for instance, that abuses of power should be committed, which, either by their immediate operation, or by the precedents they might establish, should undermine the liberty of the subject. The people, it will be said, would then have their remedy in the legislative power possessed by their representatives. The latter would, at the first oppor tunity, interfere, and frame such bills as would prevent the like abuses for the future. But here we must observe, that the assent of the sovereign is necessary to make those bills become laws and if, as we have just now supposed, he had no need of the support of the Commons, how could they obtain his assent to laws thus purposely framed to abridge his authority?

Again, let us suppose that, instead of contenting itself with making slow advances to despotism, the executive power, or its minister, should at once openly invade the liberty of the subject. Obnoxious men, printers for instance, or political writers, might be persecuted by military violence, or, to do things with more security, with the forms of law.

Then, it will be said, the representatives of the people would impeach the persons concerned in those measures. Though unable to reach a king who personally can do no wrong, they at least would attack those men who were the immediate instruments of his tyrannical proceedings, and endeavour, by bringing them to condign punishment, to deter future judges or ministers from imitating their conduct. All this I grant; and I will even add, that, circumstanced as the representatives of the people now are, and having to do with a sovereign who can enjoy no dignity without their assistance, it is most likely that their endeavours in the pursuit of such laudable objects would prove successful. But if, on the contrary, the king, as we have supposed, stood in no need of their assistance, and moreover knew that he should never want it, it is impossible to think that he would then suffer himself to remain a tame spectator of their proceedings. The impeachments thus brought by them would immediately prove the signal of their dismission: and the king would make haste, by dissolving them, both to revenge what would then be called the insolence of the Commons, and to secure his ministers.

But even those are vain suppositions; the evil would reach much farther; and we may be assured that, if ever the Crown should be in a condition to govern without the assistance of the representatives of the people, it would dismiss them for ever, and thus rid itself of an assembly which, continuing to be a clog on its power, would no longer be of any service to it. This Charles the First attempted to do when he found his parliaments refractory, and the kings of France really have done, with respect to the general estates of their kingdom.

Indeed, if we consider the extent of the prerogative of the King of England, and especially the circumstance of his completely uniting in himself all the executive and active powers of the state, we shall find that it is no exaggeration to say that he has power sufficient to be as arbitrary as the kings of France, were it not for the right of taxation, which, in England, is possessed by the people: and the only constitutional difference between the French and English nations is, that the former can neither confer benefits on

their sovereign, nor obstruct his measures; while the latter, how extensive soever the prerogative of their king may be, can deny him the means of exerting it.

But here a most important observation is to be made; and I intreat the reader's attention to the subject. This right of granting subsidies to the Crown can only be effectual when it is exercised by one assembly alone. When several distinct assemblies have it equally in their power to supply the wants of the prince, the case becomes totally altered. The competition which so easily takes place between those different bodies, and even the bare consciousness which each entertains of its inability to obstruct the measures of the sovereign, render it impossible for them to make any effectual constitutional use of their privilege. "Those different parliaments or estates (to repeat the observation introduced in the former part of this work) having no means of recommending themselves to their sovereign, but their superior readiness in complying with his demands, vie with each other in granting what it would not only be fruitless but even dangerous to refuse. And the king, in the meantime, soon comes to demand, as.a tribute, a gift which he is confident to obtain." In short, it may be laid down as a maxim, that when a sovereign is made to depend, in regard to his supplies, on more assemblies than one, he in fact depends upon none. And indeed the King of France is not independent of his people for his necessary supplies, any otherwise than by drawing the same from several different assemblies of their representatives: the latter have in appearance a right to refuse all his demands and as the English call the grants they make to their kings, aids or subsidies, the estates of the French provinces call theirs dons gratuits, or free gifts.

What is it, therefore, that constitutes the difference between the political situation of the French and English nations, since their rights thus seem outwardly to be the same? The difference lies in this, that there has never been in England more than one assembly that could supply the wants of the sovereign. This has always kept him in a state, not of a seeming, but of a real dependence on the representatives of the people for his necessary supplies; and how low soever the liberty of the subject may, at particular

times, have sunk, they have always found themselves possessed of the most effectual means of restoring it, whenever they thought proper so to do. Under Henry the Eighth, for instance, we find the despotism of the Crown to have been carried to an astonishing height: it was even enacted that the proclamations of the king should have the force of law a thing which, even in France, never was so expressly declared: yet no sooner did the nation recover from its long state of supineness, than the exorbitant power of the Crown was reduced within its constitutional bounds.

To no other cause than the disadvantage of their situation, are we to ascribe the low condition in which the deputies of the people in the assembly, called the general estates of France, were always forced to remain.

Surrounded as they were by the particular estates of those provinces into which the kingdom had been formerly divided, they never were able to stipulate conditions with their sovereign; and instead of making their right of granting subsidies to the Crown serve to gain them in the end a share in the legislation, they ever remained confined to the unassuming privilege of "humble supplication and remonstrance." ***

* An idea of the manner in which the business of granting supplies to the Crown was conducted by the states of the province of Bretagne in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, may be formed from several lively strokes to be met with in the Letters of Madame de Sevigné, whose estate lay in that province, and who had often assisted at the holding of those states. The granting of supplies was not, it seems, looked upon as any serious kind of business. The whole time the states were sitting was a continued scene of festivity and entertainment. The canvassing of the demands of the Crown was chiefly carried on at the table of the nobleman who had been deputed from court to hold the states; and the different points were usually decided by a kind of acclamation. In a certain assembly of those states, the Duke of Chaulnes, the Lord Deputy, had a present of fifty thousand crowns made to him, as well as a considerable one for his duchess, besides obtaining the demand of the court; and the lady we quote here, commenting somewhat jocularly on these grants, says, "Ce n'est pas que nous soyons riches; mais nous sommes honnêtes, nous avons du courage, et entre midi et une heure nous ne savons rien refuser à nos amis." "It is not that we are rich; but we are civil, we are full of courage, and between twelve and one o'clock we are unable to deny any thing to our friends."

The different provinces of France, it may be observed, are liable to

Those estates, however, as all the great lords in France were admitted into them, began at length to appear dangerous; and as the king could in the meantime do without their assistance, they were set aside. But several of the particular states of the provinces are preserved to this day :* some, which for temporary reasons had been abolished, have been restored: nay, so manageable have popular assemblies been found by the Crown, when it has to do with many, that the kind of government we mention is that which it has been found most convenient to assign to Corsica and Corsica has been made un pays d'états.†

That the Crown in England should, on a sudden, render itself independent on the Commons for its supplies,—that is, should on a sudden successfully assume to itself a right to lay taxes on the subject, by its own authority,—is not certainly an event likely to take place, nor indeed is it one that should, at the present time, raise any kind of political apprehension. But it is not equally impracticable that the right of the representatives of the people might become invalidated, by being divided in the manner that has been just described.

Such a division of the right of the people might be effected in various ways. National calamities, for instance, unfortunate foreign wars attended with loss of public credit, might suggest methods for raising the necessary supplies, different from those which have hitherto been used. Dividing the kingdom into a certain number of parts, which should

pay several taxes besides those imposed on them by their own states. Dean Tucker, in one of his tracts, in which he has thought proper to quote this work, has added to the above instance of the French provinces that of the states of the Austrian Netherlands, which is very conclusive. And examples to the same purpose might be supplied by all those kingdoms of Europe in which provincial states are holden. *The year 1784.

In the year 1794, the English obtained possession of Corsica, and gratified the people by granting a constitution and a parliament similar to those of England. But such institutions were not practical with so ignorant, superstitious, and, in many respects, barbarous a people, who preferred their own customs and traditions. The island was evacuated in 1796, and repossessed by the French; it has ever since formed a department of France.-Ed.