It is not by means of their military force that they prevent the several kinds of civil magistracies in the kingdom from invading and lessening their prerogative; for this military force is not to act till called for by these latter, and under their direction. It is not by means of their army that they lead the two branches of the legislature into that respect to their regal authority which we have before described; since each of these two branches, severally, is possessed of an annual power of disbanding this army.*

There is another circumstance, which, abstractedly from all others, makes it evident that the executive authority of the crown is not supported by the army; I mean the very singular subjection in which the military is kept in regard to the civil power in this country.

In a country where the governing authority in the state is supported by the army, the military profession, who, in regard to the other professions, have on their side the advantage of present force, being now moreover countenanced by the law, immediately acquire, or rather assume, a general ascendancy, and the sovereign, far from wishing to discourage their claims, feels an inward happiness in seeing that instrument on which he rests his authority additionally strengthened by the respect of the people, and receiving a kind of legal sanction from the general outward consent.

And not only the military profession at large, but the individuals belonging to it, also claim personally a preeminence chief commanders, officers, soldiers or janissaries, all claim, in their own spheres, some sort of exclusive privilege and these privileges, whether of an honorary or of a substantial kind, are violently asserted, and rendered grievous to the rest of the community, in proportion as the assistance of the military force is more evidently necessary to, and more frequently employed by, the government. These things cannot be otherwise.

The generality of the people have from early times been so little accustomed to see any display of force used to influence the debates of the parliament, that the attempt made by Charles the First to seize the five members, attended by a retinue of about two hundred servants, was the actual spark that set in a blaze the heap of combustibles which the preceding contests had accumulated. The parliament, from that fact, took a pretence to make military preparations in their turn; and then the civil war began.

Now, if we look into the facts that take place in England, we shall find that quite a different order prevails from what is above described. All courts of a military kind are under a constant subordination to the ordinary courts of law. Officers who have abused their private power, though only in regard to their own soldiers, may be called to account before a court of common law, and compelled to make proper satisfaction. Even any flagrant abuse of authority committed by members of courts-martial, when sitting to judge their own people, and determine upon cases entirely of a military kind, makes them liable to the animadversion of the civil judge.*

* A great number of instances might be adduced to prove the abovementioned subjection of the military to the civil power. I shall introduce one which is particularly remarkable: I met with it in the periodical publications of the year 1746.

A lieutenant of marines, whose name was Frye, had been charged, while in the West Indies, with contempt of orders, for having refused, when ordered by the captain, to assist another lieutenant in carrying another officer prisoner on board the ship: the two lieutenants wished to have the order given in writing. For this, Lieutenant Frye was tried at Jamaica by a court-martial, and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, besides being declared incapable of serving the king. He was brought home; and his case (after being laid before the Privy Council) appearing in a justifiable light, he was released. Some time after, he brought an action against Sir Chaloner Ogle, who had been president of the above court-martial, and had a verdict in his favour for one thousand pounds damages, as it was also proved that he had been kept fourteen months in the most severe confinement before he was brought to his trial. The judge, moreover, informed him that he was at liberty to bring his action against any of the members of the said court-martial he could meet with. The following part of the affair is still more remarkable:

Upon application made by Lieutenant Frye, Sir John Willes, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, issued his writ against Admiral Mayne and Captain Rentone, two of the persons who had composed the above court-martial, who happened to be at that time in England, and were members of the court-martial that was then sitting at Deptford, to determine on the affair between Admirals Matthews and Lestock, of which Admiral Mayne was also president; and they were arrested immediately after the breaking-up of the court. The other members resented highly what they thought an insult; they met twice on the subject, and came to certain resolutions which the judge-advocate was directed to deliver to the Board of Admiralty, in order to their being laid before the king. In these resolutions they demanded “satisfac

To the above facts concerning the pre-eminence of the civil over the military at large, it is needless to add that all offences committed by persons of the military profession in regard to individuals belonging to the other classes of the people, are to be determined upon by the civil judge. Any use they may make of their force, unless expressly authorised and directed by the civil magistrate, let the occasion be what it may, makes them liable to be convicted of murder for any life that may have been lost. To allege the duties or customs of their profession, in extenuation of any offence, is a plea which the judge will not so much as understand. Whenever claimed by the civil power, they must be delivered up immediately. Nor can it, in general, be said, that the countenance shown to the military profession by the ruling power in the state has constantly been such as to inspire the bulk of the people with a disposition tamely to bear their acts of oppression, or to raise in magistrates and juries any degree of prepossession sufficient to lead them always to determine with partiality in their favour.*

tion for the high insult on their president, from all persons, how high soever in office, who have set on foot this arrest, or in any degree advised or promoted it :"-moreover complaining, that, by the said arrest, "the order, discipline, and government of his Majesty's armies by sea were dissolved, and the statute 13 Car. II. made null and void."

The altercations on that account lasted some months. At length the court-martial thought it necessary to submit ; and they sent to Lord Chief Justice Willes a letter signed by the seventeen officers, admirals and commanders, who composed it, in which they acknowledged that "the resolutions of the 16th and 21st of May were unjust and unwarrantable, and to ask pardon of his Lordship, and the whole Court of Common Pleas, for the indignity offered to him and the court."

This letter Judge Willes read in the open court, and directed the same to be registered in the Remembrance Office, "as a memorial to the present and future ages, that whoever set themselves above the law, will, in the end, find themselves mistaken." The letter from the courtmartial, and Judge Willes's acceptation, were inserted in the next Gazette, 15th November, 1746.

The reader may see, in the publications of the year 1770, the clamour that was raised on account of a general in the army (General Gansell) having availed himself of the vicinity of his soldiers to prevent certain sheriff's officers from executing an arrest upon his person at Whitehall. It, however, appeared that the general had done nothing more than put forth a few of his men, in order to perplex and astonish the sheriff's officers; and in the meantime he took an opportunity for

The subjection of the military to the civil power, carried to that extent it is in England, is another characteristic and distinctive circumstance in the English government.

It is sufficiently evident that a king does not look to his army for his support, who takes so little pains to bribe and unite it to his interest.

In general, if we consider all the different circumstances in the English government, we shall find that the army cannot procure to the sovereign any permanent strengthany strength upon which he can rely, and from it expect the success of any future and distant measures.

The public notoriety of the debates in parliament induces all individuals, soldiers as well as others, to pay some attention to political subjects; and the liberty of speaking, printing, and intriguing, being extended to every order of the nation by whom they are surrounded, makes them liable to imbibe every notion that may be directly contrary to the views of that power which maintains them.

The case would be still worse if the sovereign should engage in a contest with a very numerous part of the nation. The general concern would increase in proportion to the vehemence of the parliamentary debates: individuals, in all the different classes of the public, would try their eloquence on the same subjects; and this eloquence would be in great measure exerted, during such interesting times, in making converts of the soldiery: these evils the sovereign could not obviate, nor even now, till it should be in every respect too late. A prince, engaged in the contest we suppose, would scarcely have completed his first preparations, his project would scarcely be half ripe for execution,-before his army would be taken from him. And the more powerful this army might be, the more adequate, seemingly, from its numbers, to the task it is intended for, the more open it would be to the danger we mention.

Of this, James the Second made a very remarkable experiment. He had augmented his army to the number of thirty thousand. But when the day came in which their support was to have been useful to him, some deserted to himself to slip out of the way. The violent clamour we mention was no doubt owing to the party spirit of the time; but it nevertheless shows what the notions of the bulk of the people were on the subject.

the enemy; others threw down their arms: and those who continued to stand together, showed more inclination to be spectators of, than agents in, the contest. In short, he gave all over for lost, without making any trial of their assistance.*

From all the facts before mentioned, it is evident that the power of the crown, in England, rests upon foundations quite peculiar to itself, and that its security and strength are obtained by means totally different from those by which

*The army made loud rejoicings on the day of the acquittal of the bishops, even in the presence of the king, who had purposely repaired to Hounslow Heath on that day. He had not been able to bring a single regiment to declare an approbation of his measures in regard to the test and penal statutes. The celebrated ballad, "Lero, lero, lillibulero," which is reported to have had such an influence on the minds of the people at that time, and of which Bishop Burnet says, "Never, perhaps, so slight a thing had so great an effect," originated in the army: "the whole army, and at last people both in city and country, were perpetually singing it."

To a king of England, engaged in a project against public liberty, a numerous army, ready formed beforehand, must, in the present situation of things, prove a very great impediment; he cannot give his attention to the proper management of it: the less so, as his measures for that purpose must often be contradictory to those he is to pursue with the rest of the people.

If a king of England, wishing to set aside the present constitution, and to assimilate his power to that of the other sovereigns of Europe, should do me the honour to consult me as to the means of obtaining success, I would recommend to him, as his first preparatory step, and before his real project is even suspected, to disband his army, keeping only a strong guard, not exceeding twelve hundred men. This done,

he might, by means of the weight and advantages of his place, set himself about undermining such constitutional laws as he dislikes; using as much temper as he can, that he may have the more time to proceed. And when at length things should be brought to a crisis, then I would advise him to form another army, out of those friends or class of the people whom the turn and incidents of the preceding contests will have linked and riveted to his interest: with this army he might now take his chance the rest would depend on his generalship, and even in a great measure on his bare reputation in that respect.

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In offering my advice to the king of England, I would, however, conclude with observing to him, that his situation is as advantageous to the full as that of any king upon earth, and, upon the whole, that all the advantages which can arise from the success of his plan cannot make it worth his while to undertake it.