Such is the greatness, and such the uninterrupted prevalence of the law;* such is, in short, the continuity of omnipotence, of resistless superiority, it exhibits, that the extent. of its effects at length ceases to be a subject of observation to the public. Nor are great or wealthy men to seek for redress or satisfaction of any kind, by any other means than such as are open to all; even the sovereign has bound himself to resort to no other; and experience has shown that he may without danger trust the protection of his person, and of the places of his residence, to the slow and litigious assistance of the law.† Another very great advantage attending the remarkable stability of the English government, is, that the same is effected without the assistance of an armed standing force :‡ the constant expedient this of all other governments. On this occasion I shall introduce a passage of Doctor Adam Smith§, in a work published since the present chapter was first written, in which passage an opinion certainly erroneous is contained: the mistakes of persons of his very great abilities deserve attention. This gentleman, struck with the necessity of a sufficient power of reaction, of a sufficient strength, on the side of government, to resist the agitations attendant on liberty, has looked round, and judged that the English government derived the singular stability it manifests from the standing force it has at its disposal: the following are his expressions:-"To a sovereign who feels * Lex magna est, et prævalebit. + I remember, soon after my first coming to this country, I took notice of the boards set up from place to place behind the inclosure of Richmond Park-"Whoever trespasses upon this ground will be prosecuted." This is not exactly true. There is an armed force; and in the instance of the Bristol riots, the yeomanry were very properly called out; while, on a former occasion, most unfortunately, the yeomanry attacked and killed several persons at a reform meeting near Manchester, at which no riot was attempted. In Ireland we have a strong armed force, including the armed constabulary. In England and Scotland the unarmed civil police is amply sufficient to prevent any disorder; but the British people themselves, in their devoted obedience to the supremacy of the laws, are the best preservers of order and of selfgovernment.-Ed. § An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Book v. chap. i. himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well-regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances, can give but little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of his superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a wellregulated standing army."* The above positions are grounded on the notion, that an army places in the hands of the sovereign a united irresistible strength, a strength liable to no accidents, difficulties, or exceptions; a supposition this, which is not conformable to experience. If a sovereign was endued with a kind of extraordinary power attending on his person, at once to lay under water whole legions of insurgents, or to repulse and sweep them away by flashes and shocks of the electrical fluid, then indeed he might use the great forbearance above described though it is not perhaps very likely he would put up with the rude and groundless remonstrances of his subjects, and with their licentious freedom, yet he might, with safety, do or not do so, at his own choice. But an army is not that simple weapon which is here supposed. It is formed of officers and soldiers who feel the same passions with the rest of the people,—the same disposition to promote their own interest and importance, when they find out their strength, and proper opportunities offer. What will therefore be the resource of the sovereign, if into that army, on the assistance of which he relies, the same party spirit creeps, by which his other subjects are actuated ? Where will he take refuge, if the same political caprices, abetted by the serious ambition of a few leading men,-the same restlessness, and at last perhaps the same disaffection,-begin to pervade the smaller kingdom of the army, by which the main kingdom or nation is agitated? The prevention of dangers like those just mentioned constitutes the most essential part of the precautions and state * The author's design, in the whole passage, is to show that standing armies, under proper restrictions, cannot be hurtful to public liberty; and may in some cases be useful to it, by freeing the sovereign from any troublesome jealousy in regard to this liberty. craft of rulers, in those governments which are secured by standing armed forces. Mixing the troops formed of natives with foreign auxiliaries, dispersing them in numerous bodies over the country, and continually shifting their quarters, are among the methods that are used; which it does not belong to our subject to enumerate, any more than the extraordinary expedients employed by the Eastern monarchs for the same purposes. But one caution, very essential to be mentioned here, and which the governments we allude to never fail to take before every other, is to retrench from their unarmed subjects a freedom, which, transmitted to the soldiers, would be attended with such fatal consequences: hindering such bad examples from being communicated to those in whose hands their power and life are trusted, is what every notion of self-preservation suggests to them; every weapon is accordingly exerted to suppress the rising and spreading of so awful a contagion. In general, it may be laid down as a maxim, that, where the sovereign looks to his army for the security of his person and authority, the same military laws by which this army is kept together must be extended over the whole nation; not in regard to military duties and exercises, but certainly in regard to all that relates to the respect due to the sovereign and to his orders. The martial law, concerning these tender points, must be universal. The jealous regulations concerning mutiny and contempt of orders cannot be severely enforced on that part of the nation which secures the subjection of the rest, and enforced too through the whole scale of military subordination, from the soldier to the officer, up to the very head of the military system,-while the more numerous and inferior part of the people are left to enjoy an unrestrained freedom. That secret disposition which prompts mankind to resist and counteract their superiors cannot be surrounded by such formidable checks on one side, and be left to be indulged to a degree of licentiousness and wantonness on the other. In a country where an army is kept, capable of commanding the obedience of the nation, this army will both imitate the licentiousness above mentioned, and check it in the people. Every officer and soldier, in such a country, claims a superiority in regard to other individuals; and, in propor ; tion as their assistance is relied upon by the government, expect a greater or less degree of submission from the rest of the people.* The same author concludes his above quoted-observations concerning the security of the power of an armed sovereign, by immediately adding: "It is in such countries only that it is unnecessary that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power for suppressing even the wantonness of this licentious liberty." The idea here expressed coinciding with those already discussed, I shall say nothing farther on the subject. My reason for introducing the above expressions, has been, that they lead me to take notice of a remarkable circumstance in the English government. From * In the beginning of the passage which is here examined, the author says, "Where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country are the chief officers of the army,where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have the greatest share of that authority,-a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may in some cases be favourable to liberty," &c. In a country so circumstanced, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty; no, not the liberty of those principal nobility and gentry, especially if they have wit enough to form combinations among themselves against the sovereign. Such a union as is here mentioned, of the civil and military powers, in the aristocratical body of the nation, leaves both the sovereign and the people without resource. If the former kings of Scotland had adopted the expedient of a standing army, and had trusted this army, thus defrayed by them, to those noblemen and gentlemen who had rendered themselves hereditary admirals, hereditary high-stewards, hereditary highconstables, hereditary great-chamberlains, hereditary justices-general, hereditary sheriffs of counties, &c. they would have ill repaired the disorders under which the government of their country laboured; they would only have supplied these nobles with fresh weapons against each other, against the sovereign, and against the people. If those members of the British parliament, who sometimes make the whole nation resound with the clamour of their dissensions, had an army under their command which they might engage in the support of their pretensions, the rest of the people would not be the better for it. Happily the swords are secured, and force is removed from their debates. The author whom we are quoting has deemed a government to be a more simple machine, and an army a more simple instrument, than they in reality are. Like many other persons of great abilities, while struck with a certain peculiar consideration, he has overlooked others no less important. the expression, it is unnecessary that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power, the author appears to think that a sovereign at the head of an army, and whose power is secured by this army, usually waits to set himself in motion till he has received leave for that purpose; that is, till he has been trusted with a power for so doing. This notion in the author we quote is borrowed from the steady and thoroughly legal government of this country; but the like law-doctrine or principle obtains under no other government. In all monarchies (and it is the same in republics), the executive power in the state is supposed to possess, originally and by itself, all manner of lawful authority every one of its exertions is deemed to be legal; and they do not cease to be so, till they are stopped by some express and positive regulation. The sovereign and also the civil magistrate, till so stopped by some positive law, may come upon the subject when they choose: they may question any of his actions; they may construe them into unlawful acts, and inflict a penalty, as they please: in these respects they may be thought to abuse, but not to exceed, their power. The authority of the government, in short, is supposed to be unlimited so far as there are no visible boundaries set up against it; within which boundaries lies whatever degree of liberty the subject may possess. In England the very reverse obtains. It is not the authority of the government, it is the liberty of the subject which is supposed to be unbounded. All the actions of an individual are supposed to be lawful, till that law is pointed out which makes them to be otherwise. The onus probandi is here transferred from the subject to the prince. The subject is not at any time to show the grounds of his conduct. When the sovereign or magistrate think proper to exert themselves, it is their business to find out and produce the law in their own favour, and the prohibition against the subject*. I shall take the liberty to mention another fact respecting myself, as it may serve to elucidate the above observations, or at least my manner of expressing them. I remember, when I was beginning to pay attention to the operations of the English government, I was under a prepossession of quite a contrary nature to that of a gentleman whose opinions have been discussed: I used to take it for granted that every U |