tion of what has been remarked in a preceding chapter, concerning the manner in which public disturbances have been terminated in England. Here we find a series of parliaments to have been tenaciously and perseveringly jealous of those kinds of popular universal provisions, which great men in other states ever disdained seriously to think of, or give a place to, in those treaties by which internal peace was restored to the nation; and at the same time these parliaments cordially and sincerely gave up those high and splendid branches of governing authority, which the senates, or assemblies of great men who surrounded the monarchs in other limited monarchies, never ceased anxiously to strive to assume to themselves, - and which the monarchs, after having lost them, never were able to recover but by military violence, aided by surprise, or through national commotions. All these are political singularities, certainly remarkable enough. It is a circumstance in no small degree conducive to the solidity of the executive authority of the English crown (which is the subject of this chapter), that those persons who seem to have it in their power to wrest the same from it, are even prevented from entertaining thoughts of doing so.

* I shall mention another instance of this real disinterestedness of the Parliament in regard to the power of the Crown;-nay, of the strong bent that prevails in that assembly to make the Crown the general depository of the executive authority of the nation; I mean to speak of the manner in which they are accustomed to provide for the execu tion of such resolutions of an active kind as they may at times adopt: it is always by addressing the Crown for that purpose, and desiring it to interfere with its own executive authority. Even in regard to the printing of their Journals, the Crown is applied to by the Commons, with a promise of making good to it the necessary expenses. Certainly, if there existed in that body any latent anxiety, any real ambition (I speak here of the general tenor of their conduct) to invest themselves with the executive authority in the state, they would not give up the providing by their own authority, at least for the object just mentioned; it might give them a pretence for having a set of officers belonging to them, as well as a treasury of their own, and, in short, for establishing in their favour some sort of beginning or precedent; at the same time that a wish on their part, to be the publishers of their own journals, could not be decently opposed by the Crown, nor would be likely to be disapproved by the public. To some readers the fact we are speaking of may appear trifling; to me it does not seem so: I confess I never see a paragraph in the newspapers, mentioning an address to the Crown

As another proof of the peculiar solidity of the power of the Crown in England, may be mentioned the facility and safety to itself and to the state with which it has at all times been able to deprive any particular subjects of their different offices, however overgrown and even dangerous their private power might seem to be. A very remarkable instance of this kind occurred when the great Duke of Marlborough was suddenly removed from all his employments: the following is the account given by Dean Swift in his "History of the Four last Years of the Reign of Queen Anne."

"As the Queen found herself under a necessity, either, on the one side, to sacrifice those friends, who had ventured their lives in rescuing her out of the power of some, whose former treatment she had little reason to be fond of,—to put an end to the progress she had made towards a peace, and dissolve her Parliament; or, on the other side, by removing one person from so great a trust, to get clear of all her difficulties at once; her Majesty determined upon the latter expedient as the shorter and safer course; and, during the recess at Christmas, sent the Duke a letter to tell him she had no farther occasion for his service.

"There has not, perhaps, in the present age been a clearer instance to show the instability of greatness which is not founded on virtue; and it may be an instruction to princes who are well in the hearts of their people, that the overgrown power of any particular person, although supported by exorbitant wealth, can, by a little resolution, be reduced in a moment, without any dangerous consequences. This lord, who was, beyond all comparison, the greatest subject in Christendom, found his power, credit, and influence crumble away on a sudden; and, except a few friends and

for borrowing its executive prerogative in regard to the inconsiderable object here alluded to, without pausing on the article. Certainly there must exist causes of a very peculiar nature, which produce in an assembly possessed of so much weight that remarkable freedom from any serious ambition to push their advantages farther, which inspire it with the great political forbearance we have mentioned, with so sincere an indifference in general, in regard to arrogating to themselves any branch of the executive authority of the Crown: they really seem as if they did not know what to do with it after having acquirel it, or of what kind of service it may be to them.

followers, the rest dropped off in course," &c. (B. I., near the end.)

The ease with which such a man as the Duke was suddenly removed, Dean Swift has explained by the necessary advantages of princes who possess the affection of their people, and the natural weakness of power which is not founded on virtue. However, these are very unsatisfactory explanations. The history of Europe, in former times, presents a continual series of examples to the contrary. We see in it numberless instances of princes incessantly engaged in resisting in the field the competition of the subjects invested with the eminent dignities of the realm, who were not by any means superior to them in point of virtue,—or, at other times, living in a continual state of vassalage under some powerful man whom they durst not resist, and whose power, credit, and influence, they would have found it far from possible to reduce in a moment, or crumble on a sudden, by the sending of a single letter, even though assisted by a little resolution, to use Dean Swift's expression, and without any dangerous consequences.

Nay, certain kings, such as Henry the Third of France, in regard to the Duke of Guise, and James the Second of Scotland, in regard to the two Earls of Douglas successively, had at last recourse to plot and assassination; and expedients of a similar sudden violent kind are the settled methods adopted by the eastern monarchs; nor is it very sure that they can always easily do otherwise.*

Even in the present monarchies of Europe, notwithstanding the awful force by which they are outwardly supported, a discarded minister is the cause of more or less anxiety to the governing authority; especially if, through the length of

*We might also mention here the case of the Emperor Ferdinand II. and the Duke of Walstein, which seems to have at the time made a great noise in the world.-The Earls of Douglas were sometimes attended by a retinue of two thousand horse. See Dr. Robertson's History of Scotland.-The Duke of Guise was warned, some hours before his death, of the danger of trusting his person in the King's presence or house : he answered On n'oseroit, They durst not.

If Mary, Queen of Scots, had possessed a power analogous to that exerted by Queen Anne, she might perhaps have avoided being driven into those instances of ill-conduct which were followed by such tragical consequences.

time he has been in office, he happens to have acquired a considerable degree of influence. He is generally sent and confined to one of his estates in the country, which the crown names to him: he is not allowed to appear at court, nor even in the metropolis; much less is he suffered to appeal to the people in loud complaints, to make public speeches to the great men in the state, and intrigue among them, and, in short, to vent his resentment by those bitter and sometimes desperate methods, which, in the constitution of this country, prove in a great measure harmless.

But a dissolution of the parliament, that is, the dismission of the whole body of the great men in the nation, assembled in a legislative capacity, is a circumstance in the English government, in a much higher degree remarkable and deserving our notice than the depriving any single individual, however powerful, of his public employments, When we consider in what an easy and complete manner such a dissolution is effected in England, we must become convinced that the power of the crown bears upon foundations of very uncommon, though perhaps hidden, strength; especially, if we attend to the several facts that take place in other countries.

In France, for example,* we find the crown, notwithstanding the immense outward force by which it is sur rounded, to use the utmost caution in its proceedings towards the parliament of Paris; an assembly only of a judiciary nature, without any legislative authority or avowed claim, and which, in short, is very far from having the same weight in the kingdom of France as the English parliament has in England. The king never repairs to that assembly, to signify his intentions, or hold a lit de justice, without the most overawing circumstances of military apparatus and preparation, choosing to make his appearance among them rather as a general than a king.

And when the late king,† having taken a serious alarm at the proceedings of this parliament, at length resolved upon their dismission, he fenced himself, as it were, with his army; and military messengers were sent with every circumstance

*We must be observant of the date at which the author last revised his work, namely, the year 1784.-Ed.

+ Louis the Fifteenth.

of secrecy and dispatch, who, at an early part of the day, and at the same hour, surprised each member in his own house, causing them severally to retire to distant parts of the country, which were described to them, without allowing them time to consider, much less to meet, and hold any consultation.

But the person who is invested with the kingly office in England, has need of no other weapon, no other artillery, than the civil insignia of his dignity to effect a dissolution of the parliament: he steps into the midst of them, telling them that they are dissolved; and they are dissolved:- he tells them that they are no longer a parliament; and they are no longer so. Like the wand of Popilius,* a dissolution instantly puts a stop to their warmest debates and most violent proceedings. The peremptory words by which it is expressed have no sooner met their ears, than all their legislative faculties are benumbed: though they may still be sitting on the same benches, they look no longer on themselves as forming an assembly; they no longer consider each other in the light of associates or of colleagues. As if some

strange kind of weapon, or a sudden magical effort had been exerted in the midst of them, all the bonds of their union are cut off; and they hasten away, without having so much as the thought of continuing for a single minute the duration of their assembly.‡

A Roman ambassador, who stopped the army of Antiochus, King of Syria.-Livii Hist. lib. xlv.

True, the Sovereign can thus dissolve the Parliament; but the Sovereign never can govern the country without assembling a new Parliament; nor can the Crown even maintain its ministers in power without the consent of the House of Commons. William IV. dismissed his ministers, but the Commons would not bear those who replaced them, and he was compelled to take back his old advisers.-Ed.

Nor has London post-horses enough to drive them far and near into the country, when the declaration, by which the Parliament is dissolved, also mentions the calling of a new one.

A dissolution, when proclaimed by a common crier assisted by a few beadles, is attended by the very same effects.

To the account of the expedient used by Louis XV. of France to effect the dismission of the Parliament of Paris, we may add the manner in which the Crown of Spain, more arbitrary perhaps than that of France, undertook some years ago to rid itself of the religious society of the Jesuits, whose political influence and intrigues had grown to give it