enjoy all the advantages of the state, they make haste to associate themselves with them.*

Personal power and independence on the laws, being in such states the immediate consequence of the favour of the people, they are under an unavoidable necessity of being betrayed. Corrupting, as it were, everything they touch, they cannot show a preference to a man, but they thereby attack his virtue; they cannot raise him, without immediately losing him and weakening their own cause; nay, they inspire him with views directly opposite to their own, and send him to join and increase the number of their enemies.

Thus, at Rome, after the feeble barrier which excluded the people from offices of power and dignity had been thrown down, the great plebeians, whom the votes of the people began to raise to those offices, were immediately received into the senate, as has been just now observed. From that period, their families began to form, in conjunction with the ancient patrician families, a new combination, or political association of persons; and as this combination was formed of no particular class of citizens, but of all those who had influence enough to gain admittance into it, a single overgrown head was now to be seen in the republic, which, consisting of all who had either wealth or power of any kind, and disposing at will of the laws and the power of the people,+ soon lost all regard to moderation and decency.

* Which always proves an easy thing. It is in commonwealths the particular care of that class of men who are at the head of the state, to keep a watchful eye over the people, in order to draw over to their own party any man who happens to acquire a considerable influence among them; and this they are (and indeed must be) the more attentive to do, in proportion as the nature of the government is more democratical.

The constitution of Rome had even made express provisions on that subject. Not only the censors could at once remove any citizen into what tribe they pleased, and even into the senate (and we may easily believe that they made a political use of this privilege); but it was moreover a settled rule, that all persons who had been promoted to any public office by the people, such as the consulship, the ædileship, or tribuneship, became, ipso facto, members of the senate.-See Middleton's

Dissertation on the Roman Senate.

+ Called nobiles and nobilitas.

It was, in several respects, a misfortune for the people of Rome, whatever may have been said to the contrary by the writers on this

Every constitution, therefore, whatever may be its form, which does not provide for inconveniences of the kind here mentioned, is a constitution essentially imperfect. It is in man himself that the source of the evils to be remedied lies; general precautions therefore can only prevent them. If it be a fatal error entirely to rely on the justice and equity of those who govern, it is an error no less dangerous to imagine, that, while virtue and moderation are the constant companions of those who oppose the abuses of power, all ambition, all thirst after dominion, have retired to the other party.

Though wise men, led astray by the power of names, and the heat of political contentions, may sometimes lose sight of what ought to be their real aim, they nevertheless know that it is not against the Appii, the Coruncanii, the Cethegi, but against all those who can influence the execution of the laws, that precautions ought to be taken;-that it is not the consul, the prætor, the archon, the minister, the king, whom we ought to dread, nor the tribune, or the representative of the people, on whom we ought implicitly to rely but that all those persons, without distinction, ought to be the objects of our jealousy, who, by any methods, and under any names whatsoever, have acquired the means of turning against each individual the collective strength of all, and have so ordered things around themselves, that whoever attempts to resist them, is sure to find himself engaged alone against a thousand.*

:

subject, that the distinction between the patricians and the plebeians was ever abolished; though, to say the truth, this was an event which could not be prevented.

*The reflections of De Lolme on democracies, are just, as far as respects democratical governments in Europe, and in a great degree as regards all the Spanish American republics. Not so with respect to the United States of America. It is fortunate for the latter, that instead of the inhabitants having been entangled with the disadvantages of ignorance, hereditary bigotry, and superstition, they at once carried with them to America political intelligence, and a determination to maintain civil and religious liberty. The Anglo-American colonies advanced in prosperity, free institutions, wealth, and happiness, until their oppression by the British Government drove them to rebellion and independence. When they achieved their liberty the people were generally intelligent,-their habits frugal and industrious,their character virtuous. None were really poor,-none possessed

CHAPTER X.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS JUST DESCRIBED-IN ENGLAND ALL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IS PLACED OUT OF THE HANDS OF THOSE IN WHOM THE PEOPLE TRUST-USEFULNESS OF THE POWER OF THE CROWN.

IN what manner, then, has the English constitution contrived to find a remedy for evils which, from the very nature of men and things, seem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige those persons to whom the people have given up their power, to make them effectual and lasting returns of gratitude ?-those who enjoy an exclusive authority, to seek the advantage of all ?-those who make the laws, to make only equitable ones? It has been by subjecting themselves to those laws, and for that purpose excluding them from all share in the execution of them.

Thus, the Parliament can establish as numerous a standing army as it will; but immediately another power comes forward, which takes the absolute command of it, fills all the

great wealth; their ideas and their institutions were free from the thraldom of priestly and hierarchical tyranny. The leaders who conducted their assemblies were men whose abilities were more solid than brilliant, more practical than theoretical. Notwithstanding their separation from the British government, they had the good sense and discrimination to adopt as the ground-work of their constitution and laws the principles, legislation, and civil institutions of the then most free government in the world; making a national church establishment, a titled hereditary nobility, and a royal hereditary chief magistrate, the only remarkable exceptions. They possessed all the advantages of an immense territory, with every variety of climate, and a soil yielding every kind of useful production, including every useful raw material; and their rivers, lakes, and harbours, afforded every convenience for navigation, trade, and fisheries. The language, history, laws, and literature of England, were familiar to, and regarded as their own by inheritance; and they had the peculiar good fortune of being governed at that critical period by honest men. Their democratical form of government arose from necessity as well as choice; the constitutional laws of the new government were as nearly as possible accommodated to the ideas of the people; and although their chief magistrate is not hereditary, his power, while in authority, is in most respects at least equal to that of the royal sovereign of the British empire.-Ed.

The Par

posts in it, and directs its motion at its pleasure. liament may lay new taxes; but immediately another power seizes the produce of them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arising from the disposal of it.* The Parliament may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the safety of the subject is grounded; but it is not their own caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprices and passions of other men, which they will have gratified, when they shall thus have overthrown the columns of public liberty.+

And the English constitution has not only excluded from any share in the execution of the laws, those in whom the people trust for the enacting them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the same pernicious influence on their deliberations-the hope of ever invading that executive authority, and transferring it to themselves.

This authority has been made in England one single, indivisible prerogative: it has been made for ever the inalienable attribute of one person, marked out and ascertained beforehand by solemn laws and long-established custom; and all the active forces in the state have been left at his disposal.

In order to secure this prerogative still farther against all possibility of invasions from individuals, it has been heightened and strengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of the people. The power of conferring and withdrawing places and employ

*This is not correct. Parliament, it is true, has alone the power of imposing new taxes; but the Crown cannot dispose of any revenue derived from taxations until voted by Parliament, whether it be for the army, navy, ordnance, or any other purpose. The estimates for all expenditures are annually voted by the Parliament. The civil list, it is true, is voted at the beginning of each for the whole reign. If, to annual estimates, Parliament sanctioned the loans which have constituted the National Debt, the Parliament also, and not the Crown, has appropriated the revenue to pay the annual interest on that debt, and the Crown has not the power to divert a shilling of it to any other purpose. There is, however, an irregularity fraught with many abuses, in making payments for salaries, &c. to revenue uses, out of revenues in their way to the Exchequer; which unscrupulously keeps out of sight some unjust pensions.-Ed.

† Parliament, it is true, may repeal the laws upon which the safety of the subject is grounded, if any Act to that effect were passed and received the royal assent; but not otherwise.-Ed.

ments has also been added to it; and ambition itself has thus been interested in its defence and service.*

A share in the legislative power has also been given to the man to whom this prerogative has been delegated; a passive share, indeed, and the only one that can, with safety to the state, be trusted to him, but by means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his constitutional authority.

Lastly, he is the only self-existing and permanent power in the state. The generals, the ministers of state, are so only by the continuance of his pleasure. He would even dismiss the Parliament itself, if ever he saw it begin to entertain dangerous designs; and he needs only to say one word to disperse every power in the state that may threaten his authority. Formidable prerogatives these; but with regard to which we shall be inclined to lay aside our apprehensions, if on one hand we consider the great privileges of the people by which they have been counterbalanced, and, on the other, the happy consequences that result from their being thus united.

From this unity, and, if I may so express myself, this total sequestration of the executive authority, this advantageous consequence in the first place results-the attention of the whole nation is directed to one and the same object. The people, besides, enjoy this most essential advantage, which they would vainly endeavour to obtain under the government of many;-they can give their confidence, without giving power over themselves, and against themselves; they can appoint trustees, and yet not give themselves masters.

Those men to whom the people have delegated the power of framing the laws, are thereby made sure to feel the whole pressure of them. They can increase the prerogatives of

* Although the power of conferring and withholding place and employment is vested in the Crown, yet this prerogative can never be dangerously exercised, as members of the House of Commons, accepting office under the Crown, must vacate their seats and go to their constituents and be re-elected; or, in other words, to have their appointment approved of by those who sent them to Parliament.-Ed.

Those prerogatives are ridiculously exaggerated. If they should ever be exercised, a revolution would be the inevitable consequence.—Ed.