A Treatise on the Law of Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment, and the Abuse of Legal Process: As Administered in the Courts of the United States of America, Including a Discussion of the Law of Malice and Want of Probable Cause, Advice of Counsel, End of Prosecution, Etc
Callaghan, 1892 - 645 стор.
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A Treatise on the Law of Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment, and the ...
Martin L Newell
Попередній перегляд недоступний - 2015
action for malicious actual advice alleged appear Applications arrest attorney authority believe brought called character charge circumstances civil claimed commenced committed common complaint constable counsel court crime criminal damages defendant determined directed discharge duty entered error evidence examination execution existence facts faith false imprisonment give given ground guilty held indictment injury instituted instructions issued judge judgment judicial jurisdiction jury justice justify liable magistrate maintain malicious prosecution Mass matter N. W. Rep necessary obtained offense officer opinion party peace person plaintiff plea Pleadings present probable cause proceedings procured proof proper protection prove question reasonable recover rendered Reports rule sheriff shown Smith statement statute sued sufficient suit sustained taken term tion Torts trespass trial verdict want of probable warrant Wend witness writ wrong
Сторінка 397 - The answer of the defendant must contain : "1. A general or specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint controverted by the defendant, or of any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief. "2. A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition.
Сторінка 369 - ... death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
Сторінка 271 - Probable cause" has been defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Сторінка 303 - Probable cause is defined as such a state of \facts, in the mind of the prosecutor, as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the per•son arrested is guilty.
Сторінка 132 - But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.
Сторінка 396 - PLEADING is the statement in a logical and legal form of the facts which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action, or the defendant's ground of defence...
Сторінка 369 - Be it therefore enacted, that whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof...
Сторінка 144 - This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.
Сторінка 440 - But a judgment recovered in any form of action is still but a security for the original cause of action, until it be made productive in satisfaction to the party ; and therefore till then it cannot operate to change any other collateral concurrent remedy which the party may have.