been correctly called sympathy. Now, a child can, like every other person, excite this sentiment in us.

Moreover, a man regards his child as a cause, much more certain than any other, of pleasures and of pains. To him his child is an object of great interest; in other words, a succession of interesting ideas,-ideas of pleasure or of pain,—associate themselves with him. The vivacity and simplicity of a child's expressions, of his ways and attitudes, give him a special power of awakening our sympathy. As the child is, besides, in a state of entire dependence on his parents, who must incessantly watch over his safety, the idea of him is therefore constantly associated with those of pleasures and of pains, in addition to which it awakens an idea of power which is always agreeable. Another source of pleasant association is the following: It is a fact of daily experience, that we come to love a person to whom we have frequently done good. This is not only true in the case of our fellows, but also in that of animals. By the mere fact that they have been the object of repeated acts of kindness on our part, they become an object of affection to us. The idea of those individuals, united to that of the pleasures which we experience, form a composite idea, an affection.

Every time a man is placed in the circumstances which produce these associations, he feels the paternal affection even when parentage does not exist ; as in the case of a husband, who, being ignorant of the infidelity of his wife, loves the child of another man as though he were his own son.

In very rich and in very poor families, circumstances are but little favourable to those associations from which the affection of parents results.

In the case of extreme (not moderate) poverty, the circumstances which lead to the association of the idea of the child are either wanting, or are neutralized by the necessity for ceaseless toil, for being but little occupied with him, etc.

In the case of extreme opulence, parents are engrossed by the pleasures and obligations of society, etc. As they attend but little to his education, they can associate but few pains or pleasures with his idea. Thence comes an imperfect affection.

3. Objects called beautiful or sublime, and their contraries,

2

are a third source of pleasures or pains to us. These æsthetic emotions 1 are also referable to an association. Regarded as a whole, feeling for the sublime and for the beautiful appears perfectly simple. It is by taking their stand on these appearances, many, even eminent, philosophers have argued that a particular sense was necessary to explain their existence. This apparent simplicity is only an example of that mode of association which unites several ideas so closely that they appear to be no longer several ideas but one alone.

A sound, a colour, any object is called beautiful or sublime, according to the ideas which it awakens in us by association. Thus the sounds which associate themselves with ideas of power, majesty, and profound melancholy, are generally sublime; such as the roar of a tempest, the fall of a cataract, the tones of the organ. Sounds of another kind produce the feeling of the beautiful,—a water-fall, the murmurs of a stream, the bells of a flock of sheep.3

1 It is the custom of English philosophers to comprehend in their study of the affective phenomena that of the pleasures and pains which are caused us by the beautiful and the ugly, by good and evil. They thus include Esthetics and Morals among their psychological ground-work. The feeling of the Beautiful and that of the Good admits of manifestations as varied and important as those of the Fine Arts, Manners, Legislation, etc., and we cannot be astonished at the importance accorded to them. But should not the same be granted to the religious sentiment? Our author does not mention it. Mr. Bain, generally so thorough in his treatment, disposes of it in two pages (Emotions and Will, ch. vi.) The Germans study this point. See Wundt, vol. ii. p. 218 to 311.

2 Vol. ii. chap. xxi. p. 250.

3 The author, who relies here upon Alison's theories, does not say in what the associations consist which awaken the feeling of the Beautiful. The examples given seem rather to refer to the Agreeable. Mr. John Stuart Mill (Note 48) directs us to Mr. Ruskin on this point, saying that he supplies unconscious evidence in favour of the theory of association. According to Mr. Ruskin, 'we call all those objects beautiful and sublime which express these ideas :-Infinite, Unity, Repose, Symmetry, Purity, Measure, Adaptation to an end.' Is not this saying that the things which excite the emotion of the Sublime and Beautiful, are those which are naturally associated with certain ideas profoundly rooted in us?' The above list is neither exact nor complete; but that does not affect the correctness of the doctrine.

White pleases us, because it recalls day and light; black displeases us, because it reminds us of darkness. These associations vary according to different countries, and are not absolute. In China, white is the colour of mourning, and consequently is far from being considered beautiful. In Spain, black is liked, because it is the colour of the garments worn by the grandees.1

A more true and weighty remark than the preceding is, that those who do not associate any agreeable idea with sounds or colours have no feeling for the beautiful. 'Children wait long before they evince any sensibility to the beauty of sound. And the majority of men are totally indifferent to a great number of sounds which we call beautiful. To the peasant the curfew marks simply the hour of evening, the sheep-bells are merely a sign that there is a flock in the vicinity, the noise of a cascade only announces a fall of water. Give him the associations which cultivated imaginations join to these sounds, and he will infallibly feel their beauty.' '

2

III.

When the idea of an action emanating from us (cause) associates itself with the idea of a pleasure (effect), a particular state of mind is produced, characterized by tendency to action, and which is properly called motive. A motive is the idea of a pleasure which may be attained; a particular motive is the idea of a particular pleasure which may be attained (Fragment on Mackintosh, Note 49). Motive, according to the author, means aim, end, term.

Not only pleasures and pains, but also the causes of pleasures and of pains, become motives of action. These causes, associating themselves in our mind with the pleasures and pains which they produce, become, in the first place, agreeable or disagreeable in themselves; afterwards, associating themselves with such of our actions as may put them into execution, they become very strong motives. Thus it is that wealth, power, dignities, our fellows, the

1 Might it not just as well be said that black is the colour of the garments of the grandees, because Spaniards like black?

2 Vol. ii. p. 240.

beautiful and sublime objects which, as we have seen, have become affections through association, become also motives.

We can now explain the phenomena classed under the titles moral sense, and moral faculties or affections. Although many of the psychologists with whom we are engaged have a marked tendency towards sketching a treatise on morals, we shall be very brief on this point, for though psychology touches upon Morals, it is not Morals.1

The actions from which men derive advantage, have all been classed under four titles,-Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Benefi

cence.

In the present state of education, the praise and blame of most men are very erroneously bestowed, with great precipitation, commonly in excess upon small occasions, with little regard to its justice; blame being very often inflicted where applause is due, and applause lavished where blame ought to be bestowed. When education is good, no point of morality will be reckoned of more importance than the distribution of praise and blame; no act will be considered more immoral than the misapplication of them.2

Motives lead us to the Will.

The work on the Will, though very insufficient in many respects, is valuable, especially on account of the questions which it indicates, and the method which it inaugurates. When we compare two Analyses of the Will, one written by Mr. Mill, the other by Mr. Bain, with an interval of thirty years between them; when we see how far the last surpasses the first in the amount of facts observed, in precision, in descriptive exactitude, we are forced to conceive a good opinion of the experimental method in psychology,-of a method which, taking up the task where the forerunners had laid it down, profits by acquired results, by the progress of years, by discoveries, ever adding to them, and thus causes the science to grow, instead of constantly beginning over again.

One of the principal merits of the author of the Analysis

1 Mill's Analysis, vol. ii. p. 280, line 15.

2 Vol. ii. p. 300, line 16.

is that he saw the necessity for studying the development of voluntary power.1 He understood the falseness of the idea of a Will being, so to speak, armed at all points, whose first act would be to command imperiously, and to be instantly obeyed. He had endeavoured, though imperfectly, to show the first efforts and the first conquests of the Will. He may be reproached with errors in his choice of examples, with confusion between voluntary acts and acts which are purely reflex, into which a more advanced physiologist would not have fallen; but the fundamental fact remains, that he perceived the method.

The author, though not absolutely silent on the subject of freewill, barely touches it, and does not use the word at all. No doubt, an Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind,' ought to limit itself to facts; but liberty, whether one regards it as real or illusory, is also a question of fact, and it is not possible to relegate it to the domain of Metaphysics.

In the only passage in which he touches the question (ch. xxiv. p. 328), the author says that a false conception of the idea of cause has obscured the 'controversy' on that state of the mind which we call will. Will was invariably and with reason regarded as the cause of action; unfortunately an element which has been found to be entirely imaginary, was also always regarded as making a portion of the idea of that cause. In the sequence

of events called cause and effect, a third thing was imagined, called force or power, which was not the cause, but emanated from it. A recent philosopher 2 has shown incontestably that cause and power are one; and thus everything is reduced to inquiring into 'What is the state of mind which immediately precedes an act?'

We will not analyse this chapter on the Will, as it is our chief aim to make results known, and we shall find them more fully stated by Mr. Bain.

1 We find the study carried out by Mr. Bain.

2 The philosopher to whom the author alludes, without naming him, is Thomas Brown, in his Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect.